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Preface
This volume contains a significant part of the talks presented at the Workshop on “Focus
at the Syntax-Semantics Interface”, which took place on April 6th-7th, 2008 at the Uni-
versity of Stuttgart. The aim of the workshop was to address some major semantic and
syntactic issues of focus theory: focus representation, compositionality, focus interpreta-
tion, syntactic marking, presuppositions, focus sensitivity as well as focus movement. In
addition, related phenomena such as the semantics of discourse particles and the relation
between discourse prominence and case marking were raised. We hope that this volume
will contribute to the clarification of some of these questions as did the workshop itself.
The event was supported by the SFB 732 “Incremental Specification in Context”,
funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG) and came about as a result of the
cooperation between the projects A1 (Incremental Specification of Focus and Givenness
in a Discourse Context) and C2 (Case and Referential Context).
Project A1 is a joint project of the Experimental Phonetics group and the group of
Formal Logic and Philosophy of Language, both at the IMS. Principal investigators are
Grzegorz Dogil and Hans Kamp, and the subject of the project is to develop annotation
methods for information structure, based on formal semantic insights, to apply these in
the annotation of written transcripts of speech corpora and to investigate the correlation
between these information structural annotations and their phonetic and phonological
manifestations.
Project C2, with Klaus von Heusinger as principal investigator, discusses the im-
pact of the referential context for Differentiated Object Marking (DOM) in Spanish,
Romanian, Turkish and Mongolian. DOM describes the property of certain languages to
morpho-syntactically (case-)mark the direct object if it is highly ’individuated’, i.e. high
on the scales for animacy, definiteness and topicality. The project develops a semantic
model that accounts for the interaction of these three quite different categories and uni-
fies them in the new concept of ’referential context’, which determines the specification
process.
We would like to thank all participants of the workshop for their contributions and
useful comments; Grzegorz Dogil, Klaus von Heusinger and Hans Kamp for supporting
our efforts, Torgrim Solstad for editorial support, and Sabine Mohr, the coordinator of
the SFB 732, as well as our student assistants who helped us organize the event.
Stuttgart. May 12th, 2009
Edgar Onea
Arndt Riester
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Abstract 
 
The fact that in Romanian a direct object is sometimes morphologically marked 
by the particle pe and sometimes not is a long attested phenomenon. Diverse 
studies on Differential Object Marking (DOM) explained most occurrences of pe 
as a case marker by means of the features animacy, definiteness, and specificity. 
The only cases left unexplained are those in which a direct object realized as an 
unmodified definite or indefinite nominal phrase are optionally marked, whereby 
the difference in meaning between the two alternative constructions is subtle 
though significant. 
Post-verbal indefinite human direct objects are optionally pe-marked. Based on a 
synchronic study, we will show that besides specificity, discourse prominence 
also influences the case-marking of indefinite direct objects. Case marked 
indefinite direct objects show the property of “referential persistence”, i.e. a direct 
object introduced by an indefinite pe-marked nominal phrase will be more often 
taken up in the subsequent discourse than its unmarked counterpart. In 
conclusion, we will add another feature to the local parameters triggering DOM 
another feature, namely discourse prominence.  
 
1 Introduction 
As in many other languages, direct objects are differentially marked in Romanian. The 
syntactic position of the direct object realized by means of a nominal phrase is 
compatible with two forms of expression, namely a non- marked and a marked form. 
The latter form is morphologically realized by means of the particle pe. The former 
autonomous lexeme pe with a directional meaning underwent a process of 
decategorization becoming a grammatical marker of the direct object (see Mardale 
2002 for a synthesis of the discussions on this theme). However, even if pe shares 
some properties of prepositions, it does not have a prepositional meaning. 
 The decision in favor of one of the two realization forms depends on the 
characteristics of the entity that is realized as a direct object. Animacy, definiteness, 
specificity, and topicality are the factors that are considered to be the main triggers of 
the marked direct object form. DOM-marking starts at the more prominent part of 
these scales, covering areas of different length (Farkas 1978, Dobrovie-Sorin 1994, 
von Heusinger & Onea 2008). So, whether a direct object will be obligatorily, 
optionally or never marked by pe depends on the amount of features reunited in the 
object in cause.  
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 However, even if the factors licensing DOM as well as its development have 
been amply discussed in the literature so far (Cornilescu 2001, Chiriacescu 2007, 
Stark& Sora 2008), there still remained certain constructions that could not be 
accounted for by means of the above mentioned factors. These not elucidated cases 
involve direct objects realized by means of a post-verbal unmodified definite or 
indefinite nominal phrase. In such cases, both the marked and the unmarked direct 
object constructions coexist, whereby the difference in meaning between the two forms 
is difficult to analyze. 
In the present paper we will focus on direct objects realized as indefinite nominal 
phrases which involve alternations not clearly delimitated/ explained alternations 
between a pe-marked and an unmarked construction. The examples (1) illustrate the 
above mentioned variation. The common context sentence (A) can be continued either 
as in (1a) where the indefinite direct object is pe-marked, or as in (1b) where the 
indefinite direct object is not preceded by pe:  
 
(1) A: Ce face Petru? (What does Peter do?) 
 a. Petru îl vizitează pe un prieten 
  Peter CL visits  PE a friend 
  „Peter visits a friend.‟ 
 b. Petru vizitează un prieten 
  Peter visits  a friend 
  „Peter visits a friend.‟ 
 
Constructions as the one presented above underline the limitations as well as the 
insufficiency of the general acknowledged criteria that trigger DOM to account for the 
controversial cases of pe-marking in Romanian. Not considering arbitrariness for such 
cases of free variation, we believe that a more detailed picture of the principles 
involved in pe-marking arises form an analysis of the particular discourse context 
where these constructions occur. Consequently, we propose the introduction of an 
additional discourse- based parameter, to explain more subtle differences such as those 
within “minimal pairs”- the ones involving indefinite unmodified noun phrases. 
It is generally assumed that the form of the DP or the DP-type (proper name, definite 
NP etc.) reflects different accessibility relations between the expression and the 
referent introduced earlier in the text. This relation is often generalized in the form of 
“Accessibility Hierarchies” or “Givenness Hierarchies”. In cases like these, the form of 
the DP “looks backwards”. We hypothesize that there are also formal means to 
determine the activation level of the referent introduced by the expression, i.e. the form 
of the DP “looks forward” and simultaneously gives some structural information to the 
discourse. Furthermore, we show that pe-marking in Romanian displays the property 
of “referential persistence” of a referent introduced by a direct object, i.e. the number 
of occurrences of co-referential expression in the following text. This claim is weaker 
than to assume that DOM reflects topicality.  
In Section 2 we will take a look at the local parameters that license the differential 
marking of objects in Romanian. In this sense, we will enumerate the contexts in 
which different type of NPs can be pe-marked, focusing on definite and indefinite 
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expressions. Global parameters such as the lexical semantics of the verb, secondary 
predication etc. will be excluded from the present analysis. In the last part of this 
section we will analyze two „parallel contexts‟ which introduce an indefinite NP into 
the context. We notice that differentially marked direct objects receive some 
preferential treatment in the production and perception of a discourse. In Section 3 we 
will sketch out the concepts of topic continuity and accessibility, which will represent 
the staring point for the analysis of the discursive nature of the pe-marked indefinite 
NPs. A special emphasis will be put on the concept of discourse prominence and its 
subcomponent referential persistence. In Section 4 we will show that pe-marked direct 
objects realized as indefinite NPs are taken up in the subsequent discourse more often 
than their unmarked counterparts, signalizing a higher degree of activation. Section 5 
contains the summary of our findings and the concluding remarks, as well as some 
open remained questions. 
 
2 Local factors determining DOM 
As we have already stated in the introductory part of this paper, animacy, definiteness 
and specificity are the three main factors that determine the pe-marking of a direct 
object. In the following, we will briefly enumerate the distribution of pe as a case 
marker along these scales, however, at the heart of the discussion will be entities 
realized as definite or indefinite direct objects in postverbal position. Furthermore, we 
will also have to generalize over many exceptions because of lack of space. For a 
detailed picture of this distribution, see Farkas (1978), Gramatica Academiei Române 
(2005), Chiriacescu (2007), von Heusinger & Onea (2008), Stark & Sora (2008), 
among others.  
 The pe-marked direct object is usually doubled by a co-indexed unstressed / 
weak pronoun like in (6a). Accusative clitics are disallowed without pe-marked objects 
in post-verbal position as in the sentence (6b). Whenever the direct object occupies a 
post-verbal position, the doubling of the clitic generally correlates with the pe-
marking. So, DOM marked pronouns, proper names and definite NPs are doubled by a 
clitic while DOM-marked indefinite NPs can occur both with and without a clitic. 
Nevertheless, the construction in which the direct object is doubled by a clitic is used 
more often (see Gramatica Academiei Române 2005, Chiriacescu 2007, von Heusinger 
& Onea 2008). 
 
2.1 Animacy  
The table in (2) illustrates the distinction between human and non-human objects in 
relation to DOM. Animate objects (animals) may only go to the human site if they are 
highly relevant for humans, otherwise they remain unmarked. 
Few non-human direct objects receive pe-marking. 
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(2) Animacy scale for pe-marking in Romanian 
human > no- human 
most DOs ø 
 
At the present stage of the evolution of the language, pe-marking typically targets 
those direct objects which denote human entities. This prediction points the 
acceptability of sentences such as that in (3a), and the ungrammaticality of those as the 
one in (3b): 
 
(3) a. Am vǎzut -o pe femeia  frumoasǎ 
  Aux. saw CL PE woman beautiful 
  „I saw the beautiful woman.‟ 
 b. *Am vǎzut -o pe pisica frumoasǎ 
  Aux. saw CL PE cat beautiful 
  „I saw the beautiful cat.‟ 
 
2.2 Personal pronouns and proper names  
Personal pronouns referring to animate entities are always marked with pe and doubled 
by a clitic in present-day Romanian: 
 
(4) El o iubeste pe ea 
 He CL loves PE she 
 „He loves her.‟ 
 
Direct objects realized as reflexive pronouns, the interrogative and relative pronouns 
care and cine (“that/ who”) referring to animates as well as inanimates, demonstrative 
pronouns (except asta “this”.FEM.SG referring to neuter nouns) are also preceded by 
pe. The negative pronoun nimeni (“nobody”) and the indefinite pronouns are also 
differentially marked with pe when they replace a noun referring to an individual.  
Proper names referring to humans or strongly individuated, personified animals are 
regularly case marked with pe when they appear in the direct object position: 
 
(5) Am vǎzut o pe Maria/ Lassie 
 Aux. saw CL PE Mary/ Lassie 
 „I saw Mary/ Lassie.‟ 
Exceptions from this rule are proper names referring to names of countries or cities, 
even if these names are used metonymically, denoting the inhabitants of a city. 
 
2.3 Definite nominal phrases  
The examples in (6a) and (6b) below intend to exemplify the possible alternations with 
definite modified NPs, starting from the common context sentence (A), which licenses 
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the definiteness of the direct object in the subsequent sentences. The direct object o 
fată brunetă („a brunette girl‟) introduced by means of an indefinite NP in the context 
sentence (A) is taken up in the continuation sentences (6a) and (6b) by means of the 
same definite NP which is modified by the adjective brunetă („brunette‟). If no other 
semantic and/or syntactic restrictions are present in the sentence, definite NPs that are 
further modified, generally take the case-marker pe, as in (6a). Constructions of the 
other type, in which the modified direct object is not pe- marked, like in (6b), tend not 
to be preferred:  
 
(6) A: O fată brunetă întâlneşte fata blondă.(A brunette girl meets the    
                         blonde girl). 
 a. Fata  blondă o salută pe fata  brunetă 
  Girl.DEF blonde CL salutes PE girl.DEF brunette 
  „The blonde girl salutes the brunette girl.‟ 
 b. Fata  blondă  salută fata  brunetă 
  Girl.DEF blonde  salutes girl.DEF brunette 
  „The blonde girl salutes the brunette girl.‟ 
 
The pe-marked direct object is usually doubled by a co-indexed unstressed / weak 
pronoun like in (6a). Accusative clitics are disallowed without pe-marked objects in 
post-verbal position as in the sentence (6b). Whenever the direct object occupies a 
post-verbal position, the doubling of the clitic generally correlates with the pe-
marking, the referentiality scale and animacy. So, DOM marked pronouns, proper 
names and definite NPs are doubled by a clitic while DOM-marked indefinite NPs can 
occur both with and without a clitic. Nevertheless, the construction in which the direct 
object is doubled by a clitic is used more often (see Gramatica Academiei Române 
2005, Chiriacescu 2007, von Heusinger & Onea 2008). 
 At sentence level, DOM is disallowed whenever the definite direct object 
(whether further modified or not) is modified by a possessive Dative that occurs in 
preverbal position. Furthermore, when a definite unmodified direct object is suffixed 
by the definite article in the absence of further modifiers, the pe-marking is also 
blocked. However, to keep the story simple, we will neither explain nor enumerate the 
blocking effects and the exceptions found within the class of definite unmodified NPs. 
It suffices to emphasize at this point that, in the case of direct objects realized by 
means of a definite nominal phrase, Romanian language users can generally choose 
between two constructions, like the ones in (7a) and (7b) below: 
 
(7) A: O fată întâlneşte un prieten (A girl meets a friend). 
 a. Prietenul o salută  pe fată 
  Friend.DEF CL salutes  PE girl 
  „The friend salutes the girl.‟ 
 b. Prietenul salută  fata 
  Friend.DEF salutes  girl.DEF 
  „The friend salutes the girl.‟ 
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Both (7a) and (7b) are grammatical and have the same propositional content. 
Depending on the context, speakers tend to prefer one construction over the other.  
Such cases which were only marginally discussed in the literature so far are amply 
analyzed in our next article (von Heusinger & Chiriacescu, to appear). 
 
2.4 Indefinite nominal phrases  
In the case of post-verbal, indefinite human direct objects, pe-marking is optional; 
however, the parameters that might influence the DOM-marking are not quite clear, 
this being a typical instance of “fluid” constraints (see de Malchukov & de Hoop 2007, 
de Swart 2007). In what follows, we test different types of specificity: scopal 
specificity with intensional and extensional operators and epistemic specificity in 
transparent contexts.  
 Scopal specificity, whether with extensional or intentional operators, triggers 
pe-marking. While the sentence (8a) is ambiguous between a specific reading (or wide 
scope) and a non-specific (or narrow scope) reading, the non-specific reading in (8b) is 
ruled out due to the presence of pe (Dobrovie-Sorin 1994). The variation between wide 
and narrow scope is maintained for constructions with intentional operators, like in (9): 
 
(8) Extensional operators (universal quantifiers) 
 a. Toţi bărbaţii iubesc o femeie  
  All men  love a woman 
  „All men love a woman.‟ (specific/ non-specific) 
 b. Toţi bărbaţii o iubesc pe o femeie 
  All men  CL love PE a woman 
  „All men love a/ this woman.‟ (only specific) 
 
(9) Intensional operators 
 a. Ion caută   o secretară 
  John looks for a secretary 
  „John looks for a secretary.‟ (specific/ non-specific) 
 b. Ion o caută  pe o secretară 
  John CL looks for PE a secretary 
  „John looks for a secretary.‟ (only specific) 
 
The indefinite NP o secretară („a secretary‟) in (9a) could refer to a specific as well as 
a non-specific individual, while the sentence (9b) only allows a specific interpretation 
of the individual introduced in the sentence by means of a morphologically marked 
indefinite direct object. 
 In a “transparent” context, the contrast between (10a) and (10b) may be 
explained with epistemic specificity. While in (10a) the particular circumstances of the 
referent for a friend are not important, (10b) has a reading in which the speaker may or 
wish to communicate more information of the direct object. The situation becomes 
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even more complex, since we find, though marginally, examples like (10c) with pe, 
but without clitic doubling.  
 
(10) Transparent context 
 a. Petru a vizitat un prieten 
  Petru Aux. visited a friend 
  „Petru visited a friend.‟ 
 b. Petru l -a vizitat pe un prieten 
  Petru CL Aux. visited PE a friend 
  „Petru visited a friend.‟ 
c. Petru a vizitat pe un prieten 
  Petru Aux. visited PE a friend 
  „Petru visited a friend.‟ 
 
This very interesting variation hints towards are more complex systems of contrasts 
(see von Heusinger & Onea 2008 for a detailed analysis). We will concentrate in the 
following on the variation between (10a) and (10b), which is not sufficiently described 
by epistemic specificity. 
 The discourse factor of topicality is also a strong trigger of the differential 
marking of direct objects. In cases like in (11a) below, the direct object becomes 
highlighted, playing a special role within the current discourse due to its topicalization 
and because of the pe-marker. If the sentence is constructed with a topical object, in 
the absence of the DOM-marker pe, like in (11b), then the object loses its special 
status: 
 
(11) Topicality 
 a. Pe un băiat îl strigau  părinţii 
  PE a boy CL called  parents 
  „A boy was called by the parents.‟ 
 b. Un băiat strigau  părinţii 
  A boy calls  parents 
  „A boy was called by the parents.‟ 
 
Topicality seems not to be general enough to account for the not elucidated examples 
like that in (10).  
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2.5 Summary 
The next table (12) comprises the referential contexts in which direct objects are pe-
marked in Romanian. Besides the type of phrase through which the objects are 
realized, the table also makes a clear distinction in the domain of indefinite nominal 
phrases with respect to specificity. So, indefinite non-specific NPs are not 
differentially marked.  
 
(12) Referentiality Scale for pe-marking in Romanian for human direct objects 
pers. 
pron. 
> propr. 
noun 
> def. NP > indef.  
spec. NP 
> indefinite  
non-spec.NP 
obligatory  
obligatory  
(with exceptions) 
optional 
 
ø 
 
As we could see so far, besides situations in which the morphologically marked form 
and the unmarked one are in complementary distribution (as it was the case with 
pronouns and proper names), excluding one another, there are also cases of free 
variation which allow both forms. Definite NPs are usually preceded by pe but 
examples in which the pe-marked form co-occurs with the unmarked form exist. (For 
an extensive discussion of these constructions, see von Heusinger & Chiriacescu, to 
appear).  
Unmodified indefinites in direct object position are optionally marked with pe. We 
could see above, that specificity is a factor which „disambiguates‟ contexts in which 
both, the pe-marked and the unmarked form, are allowed. So, on the one hand, the 
absence of the marker before an indefinite human object is compatible with a specific 
and non-specific interpretation of the NP in question. On the other hand, an indefinite 
NP object preceded by pe is interpreted as referring to a specific entity.  
However, animacy, definiteness and specificity cannot thoroughly account for the 
distribution of pe with the free variation found in the domain of unmodified indefinites 
in contexts like that in (10). Neither topicality, nor other global parameters (like the 
lexical properties of the governing verb or secondary predications, etc.) are general 
enough or useful to explain the variation found with indefinites.  
In what follows, we will account for the problematic examples involving indefinites by 
adding a more general parameter on the list of the factors licensing DOM in 
Romanian. We will use the gradual concept of “topic continuity” introduced by Givon 
(1981), to show that pe- marked indefinites are more prominent in the discourse than 
their unmarked counterparts. 
3 Topic continuity, accessibility, and indefinite reference 
Before the seminal work of Givon, the concept of topic was understood in an intuitive 
way, a sentence was therefore conceived as containing at most one topic. Givon (1981, 
1983) was the first to introduce the graded concept of “topic continuity” (the situation 
in which the same topic extends over several clauses) for the behavior of discourse 
referents across more than one sentence. This behavior is mirrored by the form of 
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referential expressions used, as it can be seen in (13). He showed that an entity realized 
as a zero anaphor is an accessible topic and is most continuous, while an indefinite NP 
is less accessible and therefore usually discontinuous. 
 
(13) zero anaphors        indef.NPs 
 
[most continuous/ accessible topic] [discontinuous/ less accessible topic] 
 
Assuming that more important referents tend to be more anaphorically accessible and 
cataphorically persistent, Givon (1981, 1983) proposed three measures for referential 
continuity. The three “measurements of topic continuity” listed by Givon (1983) and 
repeated by us in (14), correlate with the form and type of reference used: 
 
(14) Three factors of “topic continuity” 
 i. Referential Distance / Look back 
 ii. Potential Interference/ Ambiguity / Competition 
 iii. Persistence/ Look forward 
 
The first factor, “referential distance” (i) determines how recently an entity has been 
mentioned, by looking at the sentences on the left of the referent. The second factor 
that plays a role in the activation of a referent is the so called “potential interference” 
(ii) which can arise between semantically compatible referents. The third factor 
“persistence” (iii) measures how long the entity will remain in the discourse after it 
was introduced for the first time. The way in which an entity is referred to reflects the 
speaker‟s intentions about the role this entity will play in the subsequent discourse. 
These measures determine the activation status of the referent in question. Because the 
first and the third factor often overlap and the second is not relevant for the present 
analysis, we will only look at the “persistence” of a referent introduced in the 
discourse.  
 
3.1 Referential Distance and Accessibility Hierarchies 
Accessibility/ giveness/ salience theories offer a procedural analysis of the referring 
expressions, as marking different degrees of mental accessibility. In this framework, 
where “accessibility” is regarded as a gradient category rather than a categorical one, 
as in DRT, a discourse referent can be more or less accessible. The basic idea behind 
this theory is that referring expressions are actually accessibility markers by giving 
evidence to the addressee on how to retrieve the appropriate mental representation for 
an entity. In conclusion, the referential form of the referent mirrors its accessibility 
status and its prominence in the discourse. There have been many attempts to capture 
the correlation between the accessibility of an entity and the referential expression 
through which this entity is realized, for example Prince‟s (1981) “Familiarity Scale”, 
Ariel‟s (1988) “Accessibility Hierarchy” or Gundel, Hedland & Zacharski‟s (1993) 
“Giveness Hierarchy” which is exemplified in (15).  
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(15) Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel, Hedland & Zacharski 1993) 
 
in focus  > activated  > familiar > 
uniquely  
identifiable   
 >  referential  > 
type 
identifiable 
it that, this 
that N 
this N 
the N 
indefinite 
this N 
a N 
more accessible      less accessible 
 
This approach suggests that the mental accessibility of an entity has a strong impact 
upon the reference form which will be chosen to refer to it. The examples 16 (a-f) 
show the relation between the referential form and the mental accessibility of the 
referent it designates:  
 
(16) a. I couldn‟t sleep last night. It kept me awake. 
 b. I couldn‟t sleep last night. That kept me awake. 
 c. I couldn‟t sleep last night. That dog (next door) kept me awake. 
 d. I couldn‟t sleep last night. The dog (next door) kept me awake. 
 e. I couldn‟t sleep last night. This dog (next door) kept me awake. 
 f. I couldn‟t sleep last night. A dog (next door) kept me awake. 
  
The hearer of the (16f) sentence only has to know what a dog looks like to understand 
the least restrictive construction “a dog”. However, the hearer of a sentence like that in 
(16a) cannot understand the most restrictive form “it” unless s/he has a concrete 
mental representation of the dog the speaker is talking about. It is the correlation 
between different mental representations and the referring expression that are 
important in Gundel‟s approach. 
 As it became obvious in (15) above, there are two determiners which can 
precede a NP in English in a specific indefinite context: the indefinite article a and the 
determiner this (the referential and not the deictic this determiner). However, these two 
forms cannot be used interchangeably. Ionin (2006) notes that besides their different 
scopal behavior (this-determiners do not take narrow scope with respect to intensional 
or modal operators and negations), the two forms also differ with respect to the 
noteworthiness property. The examples 17(a) and (b) underline the latter difference: 
 
(17) a. He put √a/ #this 3$ stamp on the envelope, so he wants to send the    
letter. 
b. He put √a/ √this 3$ stamp on the envelope and realized only afterwards  
that it was worth 100$. 
 
If the speaker uses this over a in (17a), s/he conveys additional information about the 
NP headed by the determiner. Accordingly, the hearer expects that the speaker will 
talk about the stamp again, perhaps explaining what the noteworthy quality of the 
stamp is. Because this expectation remains unfulfilled in (17a) in contrast to (17b), the 
usage of this is rendered infelicitous. So, in the so called “transparent context” as in 
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(17), a noteworthy referent can be preceded by this if it will be implicitly or explicitly 
referred again (c.f. Prince 1981).  
We will see in Section 4. that the apparent optionality of the pe-marked construction 
and the unmarked one can be explained (in most contexts) in a similar manner as the 
variability presented above. 
 
3.2 Discourse prominence and the grammaticalization of the indefinite 
article 
Indefinite expressions do not “look back” or refer to already introduced referents in the 
same way as definite expression. Therefore, Ariel (1988) does not include indefinite 
expression into her scale. However, as already stated, Gundel et al. (1993) assume two 
kinds of indefinite NPs - one specific and one non-specific. Givon (1981) and Wright 
& Givon (1987) give more types of indefinites in order to explain the development of 
the indefinite article at different stages. They distinguish between specific and non-
specific uses of indefinite expressions, among others. However, they observe that 
specificity (understood as referentiality) cannot be applied to the contrast between two 
forms in simple (transparent) sentences in the past tense, as in (18) and (19) (Givon 
1981: 36): 
 
(18) ba  hena ish-xad  etmol  ve-hitxil  le-daber ve-hu  
Street Hebrew 
 came here man-one  yesterday and-started to-talk   and-he 
 „A man came in yesterday and started talking and he […].‟ 
(19) ba  hena ish etmol,  lo isha  Street Hebrew 
 came here man yesterday, not woman 
 „A man came in, not a woman!‟ 
 
Givon (1981: 36) comments on the example (for stage 1 of the indefinite article): 
 
“The presentative formula in (1) [= (18)], with VS syntax, introduces a new referential 
argument into the discourse in subject position and that argument remains salient, it is 
„talked about‟. The subject of (2) [= (19)] is logically just as referential, but 
pragmatically its exact identity is incidental to the communication. Rather its type 
membership or generic properties is the gist of the communication. In Street Hebrew 
„one‟ – in its reduced, de-stressed form – is obligatory used in (1) but cannot be used in 
(2).” 
Wright & Givon (1987, 12-13) argue that the pragmatic or discourse concept of 
“referential importance” must not be confounded with the semantic concept of 
“referentiality” or the information structural concept of “topic”. Rather, they account 
for it by the following “measurable concepts”:  
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(20) Parameters for “referential importance” Givon & Wright (1987, 12-13) 
 i. Text frequency: Total number of occurrences in the text. 
 ii. Persistence: number of occurrences in the ten clauses directly  
  following the first occurrence in the discourse 
iii. Thematic importance: as judged by native speakers 
iv. Semantics status: referential vs. non-referential 
 
The “presentational” use of indefinite expressions is the starting point for the 
development of an indefinite article in many languages. In the next section we 
investigate the effects of pe-marking in terms of its persistence and text frequency.  
 
4 Referential persistence  
In this section we will illustrate the persistence of a pe-marked referent by comparing 
this type of construction with the one in which the referent in direct object position is 
not preceded by pe. The first article in (21) contains a direct object that was introduced 
by means of pe in the discourse, whereas in the second article (22), the same indefinite 
direct object occurs without pe. The two article extracts relate the same shooting event 
in the same way; the only difference being the form of realization of the two objects.  
 
(21) pe-marked DO
1
     
[1] Neculai Florea, de 40 de ani, viceprimarul 
satului Horodniceni, şi-a pus poliţia pe cap după 
ce l-a împuşcat cu un pistol cu gloanţe de cauciuc 
pe un tânăr din localitate.  
[2] Incidentul s-a petrecut în noaptea de 10 spre 
11 februarie, la discoteca ce aparţine soţiei 
viceprimarului Florea şi a fost reclamat la poliţie 
în cursul după amiezii, la ora 15:40.  
[3] La ora respectivă, Vasile M., de 24 de ani, 
din comuna Horodniceni, pro s-a adresat postului 
de poliţie reclamând că pro a fost împuşcat în 
picior de viceprimarul Neculai Florea.  
[4] La Horodniceni s-a deplasat în aceeaşi zi o 
echipă operativă a Serviciului arme, explozivi, 
substante toxice din IPJ Suceava, pentru a 
elucida cazul. 
[5] Din primele verificări efectuate s-a stabilit că 
în cursul nopţii, la discoteca viceprimarului, pe 
fondul consumului de alcool, a avut loc o 
altercaţie, iar Neculai Florea a folosit pistolul cu 
gloanţe de cauciuc împotriva lui Vasile M., pe 
care l-a împuşcat în picior, rănindu-l.  
[6] Viceprimarul Neculai Florea susţine că a fost 
nevoit să facă uz de armă, întrucât a fost agresat 
de tânărul în cauză.  
[1] The 40-year-old Nicolae Florea, the vice 
mayor of the Horodniceni village, angered the 
police after he shot a young man from the same 
village with a gun with plastic bullets.  
[2] The incident took place during the night of 
February 10
th
 in the discotheque whose owner is 
Florea‟s wife, while the police were notified in 
the course of the afternoon at 15:40.  
[3] At that time, the 24-year-old Vasile M, from 
the Horodniceni village complained to the police 
that he was shot in the leg by the vice-mayor 
Neculai Florea.  
[4] A team of the IPJ Suceava went to 
Horodniceni to elucidate the case.  
 
 
[5] In keeping with the first findings, it was 
established that, during the night, at the vice 
mayor‟s discotheque, an altercation took place 
due to alcohol consumption and Neculai Florea 
used his gun with plastic bullets against Vasile 
M, whom he shot in the leg, hurting him. [6] 
The vice-mayor Neculai Florea sustains that he 
had to make use of his gun, as he was aggressed 
by the mentioned young man.  
                                                 
1
 http://www.obiectivdesuceava.ro/index.php?ids=26841&page=articol 
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[7] A spus că în cursul nopţii de 10 spre 11 
februarie, în discoteca administrată de soţia lui a 
izbucnit un scandal între două grupuri rivale de 
tineri.  
[8] "Soţia mea m-a chemat şi am intervenit ca să 
liniştesc apele.  
[9] Am încercat să stau de vorbă, să-i calmez, dar 
băiatul acela m-a lovit în piept şi era cât pe ce 
să... 
[7] He said that in the night on the 10
th
 of 
February, a scandal broke up between two rival 
young men groups in the discotheque 
administered by his wife. 
[8]. My wife called me and I came to calm down 
the situation.  
[9] I tried to calm them down by talking to them, 
however, that boy hit me in the chest and he 
almost…  
 
 
(22) pe-unmarked DO
2
 
 
[1] Viceprimarul Neculai Florea, din comuna 
Horodniceni, este cercetat de poliţie după ce în 
noaptea de sâmbătă spre duminică a împuşcat în 
picior un tânar de 24 de ani la discotecă.  
 
[2] Viceprimarul, care este membru PNG, a scos 
pistolul pentru a interveni într-o încăierare între 
tineri, care avea loc în discoteca familiei sale.  
 
[3] El este asociat unic, iar soţia sa administrator.  
 
[4] Poliţia a stabilit că tânărul împuscat, Vasile 
Mihai, pe fondul consumului de alcool, pro a fost 
implicat într-un scandal, iar viceprimarul a 
intervenit pentru a-l stopa.  
 
(no further co-referential expressions) 
[1] The vice mayor Neculai Florea from the 
village Horodniceni is verified by the police after 
he shot a 24-year-old young man in the leg in the 
night from Saturday to Sunday in a discotheque.  
[2] The vice mayor, who is a PNG member, took 
his gun out in order to intervene in a quarrel which 
started in his family‟s discotheque between some 
young men.  
[3] He is a unique associate and his wife the 
administrator.  
[4] The police found out that the young man, 
Vasile Mihai, was shot due to alcohol consuming, 
that (he) was involved in a scandal, and that the 
vice mayor intervened in order to stop him. 
(no further co-referential expressions) 
 
Before analyzing the persistence of the direct objects, it is also important to underline 
the fact that in (21), it is the other man, Neculai Florea, who is the topic of the 
discourse, and not the pe-marked DO. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that the two 
examples in (21) and (22) do not contrast in their epistemic specificity. 
 A striking observation with respect to DOM is the fact that the pe-marked 
direct object in (21) displays a higher discourse prominence than the direct object 
which is not preceded by pe in the discourse, because it displays the potential to 
generate further co-referential expressions. This feature of DOM marked indefinite 
direct objects is underlined on the one hand by the fact that the referent of this object is 
taken up in the next nine sentences 8 times, while the referent of the not pe-marked 
direct object in (22) was mentioned again in the next eleven sentences only 3 times.  
The structures of the above given examples are summarized in the following table 
(23): 
  
                                                 
2
 http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/2007-02-13/un-viceprimar-a-impuscat-un-tanar-in 
discoteca.html 
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(23) 
 (21) indef. NP. [+pe] (22) indef. NP [-pe] 
Sentence 1 Ø ø 
Sentence 2 PN, pro, pro ø  
Sentence 3 ø  ø  
Sentence 4 ø  (def.NP+Adj.+PN), pro,CL 
Sentence 5 PN, pers.pron, PN ø  
Sentence 6 def. NP ø  
Sentence 7 ø  ø  
Sentence 8 ø  ø  
Sentence 9 def. NP ø  
 
On the other hand, the discourse prominence of the pe-marked direct object is 
evidenced by the first anaphoric item. In article (21), the newly introduced referent un 
tânăr („a young man‟) is taken up in the following discourse by a proper name. 
However, a proper name can be opted for only in cases in which the presupposition 
licensed by the proper name can be accommodated within the context. This does not 
hold for the second article (22), in which the referent of the not pe-marked direct 
object is mentioned again by means of the definite NP tânărul împuşcat („the young 
man that was shot‟). 
 The next table in (24) is a modified version of the table presented under (12).  
Besides the distribution of pe-marking along the Referentiality scale, the table also  
contains the factor referential persistence: 
 
(24) Referentiality Scale for pe-marking in Romanian for human direct objects 
Ref Scale 
Disc Prom 
pers.  
pron. 
> PN > def. 
NP 
> indef NP > non-arg  
     NP 
spec. non-spec  
topic + + + + + n.a. 
ref persistence + + + + n.a. n.a. 
non-prominence + + + (±) - - – 
 
Indefinite specific objects which are important for the upcoming discourse are 
characterized through a high persistence and will therefore be marked by pe. 
Accordingly, indefinite specific objects which are not that relevant for the discourse in 
question will not be taken up too often in the subsequent discourse. The lack of 
prominence of such objects is formally expressed by the absence of pe. 
 
5 Conclusion and open questions 
As we have showed in this paper, pe-marking expresses different functions, while one 
of them is to indicate a higher activation in terms of referential persistence of the direct 
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object marked in this way. To assume that the direct object preceded by pe is more 
activated is a weaker claim than to assume that DOM-marking expresses topicality. 
 It is still open to debate whether the referential persistence can also be found in 
relation to definite NPs and also if this feature is a property that only holds for 
synchronic Romanian data, or if it also applies to diachronic texts.  
Several problems of the empirical base of the hypothesis still remain unresolved. One 
of these problems might be the fact that other parameters (as for example different 
verb classes still exist (see von Heusinger 2008 for Spanish) that could interact with 
pe-marking. Another major problem is the fact that we could find only a limited 
number of instances of pe-marking with indefinite direct objects under “controlled 
conditions” as in the examples (21) and (22) above.  
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1 Goal 
This paper proposes a theory of structural focus derived via focus movement which 
can account for all the focus-related facts attested in Hungarian, among them facts 
which other current theories cannot explain. It will claim that focus movement serves 
the purpose of creating a predicate–subject structure, in which the focus-moved 
constituent functions as a specificational predicate. The properties of both the focus 
and the background follow from the independently established properties of 
specificational predication constructions. 
 Section 2 of the paper briefly introduces two recent theories of focus 
movement: the ‟movement for stress‟ theory of Szendrői (2003), and the ‟movement 
for the checking of the exhaustive identification feature‟ theory of Horvath (2005), 
pointing out the problems which they cannot handle. Section 3 presents the proposal 
argued for. Section 4 demonstrates how the problems observed in section 2 receive a 
natural solution in the proposed framework. Section 5 discusses a further consequence 
of the proposed theory, involving the definiteness effect attested in presentational 
constructions. 
 
2 Some current theories of structural focus 
2.1 Structural focus as a phonological phenomenon 
Szendrői‟s (2003) influential theory of structural focus aims to provide a unified 
analysis of English-type prosodic focus and Hungarian-type structural focus: both are 
claimed to be motivated by the stress–focus correspondence principle (Reinhart 1995, 
and Zubizarreta 1998), according to which 
 
(1) The focus of a clause is a(ny) constituent containing the main stress of the 
intonational phrase, as determined by the stress rule. 
 
Whereas in an English-type language the stress–focus correspondence is usually 
attained by stress shift, in a Hungarian type language it is claimed to be achieved by 
the movement of focus into the position of main stress, at the left edge of the verbal 
projection. (Szendrői analyzes the Hungarian sentence as a VP. Topic constituents are 
claimed to be extrametrical adjuncts, which are skipped by the stress rule.) The V 
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movement accompanying Hungarian focus movement serves the purpose of 
establishing a functional projection the specifier of which provides a landing site for 
focus movement. Szendrői‟s ‟movement for stress‟ theory of focusing raises several 
problems, namely:  
(i) The structural focus in Hungarian does not necessarily bear main stress. If it is 
preceded by a universal quantifier (preposed to the left edge of the VP via overt Q-
raising), or certain types of adverbs, it can lack primary stress – as pointed out by 
Horvath (2005). In the following examples, the initial quantifier and adverb bear 
primary stresses, whereas the focus (spelled in capital letters) can be unstressed: 
 
   (2)   a. ’Mindenkit  [FocP JÁNOS hívott  meg]                   
     everybody-ACC John      invited PRT                          
     „JOHN invited everybody. [For everybody, it was John who invited him.]‟                               
  b. ’Valóban [FocP JÁNOS késett    el] 
       indeed             John     was.late PRT 
      „Indeed it was John who was late.‟ 
 
The focus is unstressed if it is given; e.g. (2b) would be felicitious in a context of the 
following type: 
 
   (3)   a. Azt gyanítom, hogy [FocP JÁNOS késett    el]. 
    „I suspect that it was John who was late.‟ 
  b. ’Valóban [FocP JÁNOS késett    el] 
      „Indeed it was John who was late.‟ 
 
The intuition is that (3b) involves a second occurrence prosodic focus, with the first 
focus given, hence destressed – however, Szendői does not give any hint regarding 
how such an analysis could be executed in the framework outlined by her. 
(ii) A more severe problem is that the uniform treatment of the English-type prosodic 
focus and the Hungarian-type structural focus hides their interpretational difference. It 
remains unaccounted for why structural focus – and only structural focus – has 
exhaustive interpretation; why (2a), unlike its English counterpart, is true if and only if 
everybody was invited only by John. 
 The exhaustivity of structural focus was first demonstrated by Szabolcsi 
(1981), on the basis of solid evidence often quoted in the literature ever since.1 Here let 
me only present two little known arguments. 
 According to Horn (1972), Levinson (2000), Kadmon (2001), and others, the 
basic meaning of a numerical modifier n in natural language is ‟at least n‟. Indeed, this 
is the meaning a Hungarian numerical modifier is associated with whether the 
modified expression is in postverbal argument position (4a) or in pre-focus topic 
position (4b). (Pragmatic factors can impose an upper limit on n – however, the upper 
limit is always a mere implicature which can be easily cancelled.) In the preverbal 
                                                 
1
 See also É. Kiss (1998; to appear), and Horvath (2005, 2006). For a somewhat different view, treating 
the exhaustivity of focus as an implicature, see Wedgwood (2005).  
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focus position, however, the numeral n can only mean ‟exactly n‟ (4c), no matter what 
the pragmatic conditions are – which is derived from the [+exhaustive] feature of 
focus, i.e., the exclusion of all alternatives but the one denoted by the focused 
constituent in É. Kiss (to appear).  
 
   (4)   a. János [PredP meg keres egy milliót           havonta]          
    John           PRT earns one million-ACC monthly 
    „John earns a/one million a month.‟                      (one million or more) 
  b. [TopP Egy milliót [PredP meg keres János havonta]] 
      „A/one million, John earns a month.‟                    (one million or more) 
  c. János [FocP EGY MILLIÓT keres meg havonta]              
     „It is one million that John earns a month.‟           (exactly one million) 
 
As shown by Szabolcsi (1981), ha ‟if‟ clauses are also interpreted differently in and 
out of focus. Conditionals, like other types of embedded clauses in Hungarian, have a 
pronominal head. When focused, the embedded clause is obligatorily extraposed, 
leaving only the pronominal head in the focus position of the matrix clause (5c).  
Whereas a ha-clause functions as a simple conditional both in postverbal position and 
in topic position, it is a biconditional (an if and only if clause) in focus position, which 
is again derived from the exhaustivity of focus by Szabolcsi (1981). 
 
   (5)   a. Fel-hívlak    [(akkori) [ha János megérkezett]i]   
               up call-I-you then       if  John   arrived 
    „I will call you if John has arrived.‟ 
 b. [(Akkori) [ha János megérkezett]i], fel-hívlak. 
     „I will call you if John has arrived.‟ 
 c. [FocP AKKORi hívlak      fel, [ha János megérkezett]i] 
     „I call you if and only if John has arrived.‟ 
 
If focusing is merely movement for stress, as claimed by Szendrői (2003), the 
interpretational differences between (4a,b) and (4c), and between (5a,b) and (5c) 
cannot be predicted. 
(iii) Szendrői‟s theory cannot handle the acceptibility difference between (6b) and (6c). 
Both sentences intend to answer the question What happened?, i.e., both are all-new 
sentences. In the English equivalents, the object bears primary stress in both cases. If 
focusing is movement for stress, the object should be focusable in both sentences. In 
(6c), however, the focus-movement of the object is unacceptable. 
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   (6)    a. Mi történt? ‟What happened?‟ 
 b. McCAINT      választották elnökjelöltnek a    republikánusok az  USÁ-ban. 
                McCain-ACC elected        candidate         the republicans       the USA-in 
              „Republicans elected McCain presidential candidate in the USA.‟ 
 c.%BENAZIR BHUTTÓT   gyilkolták meg  a   fanatikusok Pakisztánban. 
       Benazir      Bhutto-ACC murdered  PRT the fanatics in Pakistan 
       „Fanatics murdered Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan.‟ 
 
This example is also problematic for the focus theory of Fanselow (2006), according to 
whom focus movement is nothing but the movement of an accented constituent, and 
the focus position is not associated with any special semantic or pragmatic function. 
(iv) According to Szendrői (2003: 37) the focus of an answer is the constituent that is 
questioned. In question-answer pairs like that in (7), however, it is the other way 
round: it is the familiar, non-questioned constituent of the question that has to undergo 
focus movement in the answer  – contrary to prediction:   
 
   (7)   a. Ki volt Fleming?/Mit tudsz Flemingről? 
    „Who was Fleming?/What do you know about Fleming?‟ 
 b. Ő/FLEMING fedezte      fel     a    penicillint.  
     he/Fleming    discovered PRT the penicillin 
     „It was him/it was Fleming who discovered penicillin.‟ 
 
A proper theory of structural focus should also account for examples of this type. 
 
2.2 Structural focus as a constituent with an exhaustive identification 
operator 
In reaction to Szendrői‟s theory of focus, Horvath (2005, 2006) has developed an 
alternative theory intended to account for the exhaustivity of the Hungarian focus, 
while maintaining the unified treatment of English and Hungarian focus. She claims 
that structural focus is an XP with an invisible Exhaustive Identification operator 
(EIOp) in its specifier, attracted to the specifier of an Exhaustive Identification Phrase 
in order to check the Exhaustive Identification features of its head. The EIOp requires 
association with focus. 
 This theory only eliminates problem (ii) of the stress-driven theory of focus 
movement, and also raises new problems, among them: 
(v) The theory – correctly – acknowledges the structural difference between sentences 
of type (8a) and those of type (9a), which becomes transparent under negation. In (8a), 
orvos ‟doctor‟ occupies the specifier of EIP, where it precedes the verb also when 
negated: 
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   (8)   a. Az  apám [EIP ORVOS [volt]].         
    my father        doctor    was                 
    „My father was a doctor.‟                          
 b. Az apám [NegP nem [EIP ORVOS [volt]] 
     my father         not         doctor     was 
     „My father wasn‟t a doctor.‟ 
 
In (9a), on the other hand, jó orvos ‟good doctor‟ occupies the position of the verbal 
modifier (identified here as Spec,PredP), where it is preceded by the V, undergoing 
head movement, in negative sentences: 
 
   (9)   a. Az apám [PredP jó      orvos [Pred‟ volt]].     
    my father        good doctor        was             
    „My father was a good doctor.‟                     
  b. Az apám [NegP nem [volt [PredP jó      orvos]]] 
      my father        not    was         good doctor 
      „My father wasn‟t a good doctor.‟ 
 
What Horvath‟s theory leaves unexplained is why orvos – as opposed to jó orvos – is 
to be focused in the unmarked case. 
(vi) In the framework of the EIOp theory, the object in (10) is associated with an EI 
operator, the effect of which is cancelled by the expression többek között „among 
others‟. It seems uneconomical to introduce an operator and immediately neutralize it. 
 
   (10) Többek között JÁNOST hívtam    meg. / JÁNOST hívtam meg többek között. 
 among others John-acc invited-I PRT 
 „It was John, among others, that I invited.‟ 
 
(vii) Hungarians tend to move to focus position also constituents whose interpretation 
is inherently exhaustive.  
 
   (11) Andrásnak [FocP DECEMBER 13-ÁN  van a    születésnapja] 
 Andrew            December      13th-on has the birthday-his  
 „It is on December 13th that Andrew has his birthday.‟ 
 
December 13th exhausts the set of days of Andrew‟s birth. It seems redundant, hence 
uneconomical, to mark its exhaustivity also with an EI operator.  
(viii)  It does not follow from the theory why universal quantifiers cannot be focussed: 
 
   (12)*MINDEN FIÚT        hívtam    meg. 
 every        boy-ACC invited-I PRT 
 „I invited everybody.‟ 
 
(ix) It is unexplained why a bare nominal, ungrammatical in argument position, 
becomes perfectly acceptable if focussed: 
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   (13)  a.*Évát         fel-kérte                         szőke fiú. 
      Eve-ACC PRT asked[for a dance] blond boy-NOM 
 b. Évát SZŐKE FIÚ kérte fel. 
     „It was a blond boy that asked Eve for a dance.‟ 
 
3 The proposal: focus as a specificational predicate 
The present proposal adopts Higgins‟s (1973) analysis of the English pseudo-cleft 
focus, and Huber‟s (2000) analysis of the Swedish and German cleft focus to 
Hungarian structural focus.2 In the theory developed by Higgins and Huber, pseudo-
cleft and cleft sentences instantiate a type of predication structure called specificational 
predication. The wh-clause represents the subject of predication, and the (pseudo-)cleft 
constituent, identified as the focus, represents the predicate. In specificational 
predication constructions, neither the subject, nor the predicate is claimed to be 
referential.3 In the formulation of Huber (2000), the subject determines a set, and the 
predicate referentially identifies it, by listing its members. The predicate, i.e., the 
(pseudo-)cleft focus, is exhaustive because the referential identification of a set 
consists in the exhaustive listing of its members. The subject is associated with an 
existential presupposition because only an existing set can be referentially identified. 
 I claim that focus movement in Hungarian – and presumably in other 
languages, as well – serves the purpose of establishing a predicate–subject articulation 
to be interpreted as a specificational predication construction. The focus-moved 
constituent functions as the specificational predicate, and the post-focus sentence part 
(the background) functions as the subject of predication.4 The subject of predication, 
an open sentence, determines a set, which the focus identifies referentially. The 
referential identification of the set determined by the background is predicted to entail 
the exhaustive listing of its members. Furthermore, the background is predicted to be 
associated with an existential presupposition.  
 
  
                                                 
2
 For previous formulations of this proposal, see É. Kiss (2006a,b). For an extension of Higgins‟ (1973) 
analysis  to English truncated clefts, see Mikkelsen (2004). 
3
 Mikkelsen (2004) argues that the predicate of a specificational construction is, nevertheless, more 
referential than its subject. 
4
 Although in subsequent stages of the derivation, Q-raising and topicalization can remove certain 
constituents of the post-focus unit (the subject of predication), they remain represented by their copies in 
postverbal position. 
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4 The facts explained 
From the proposed analysis, all the properties of the Hungarian focus construction fall 
out, including the problematic facts enlisted under (i)-(ix) above. 
 Focus movement is triggered by the need of creating a predicate–subject 
structure, with the predicate and the subject mutually c-commanding (or m-
commanding) each other.  
 The fact that focus-movement goes together with V-movement seems to be 
independently motivated, as focusless negated sentences and e.g. imperatives also 
involve V-movement. Apparently, a neutral predicate, with its preverbal position 
occupied by the secondary predicate: a verbal particle, a predicative NP or a 
predicative AdvP (see, e.g.,  (14)) cannot be further extended by an operator; it can 
merely be merged with Q-raised quantifiers, adverbials, and topics. The neutral 
predicate can only be combined with a further operator if it becomes V-initial, i.e., if it 
undergoes V-movement (see, e.g., (15)). Thus V-movement signals a kind of type-
shift: the predicate phrase becoming the argument of a higher predicate. 
 
(14)  PredP 
   
    Spec      Pred‟                            
     felk                             
            Pred           vP                   
           hívtaj                                                                          
                        Spec         v‟               
                       Péter                                                            
                                  v            VP 
                                  tj                                                                     
                                        Spec          V‟ 
                                        Évát 
                                                   V       AdvP                         
                                                    tj           tk                                
     up  called  Peter        Eve-ACC                       „Peter called up Eve.‟                             
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 (15)  FocP 
 
 Spec        NegP 
PÉTERi  
          Spec       NNP 
           nem                            
                  NN       PredP      
                 hívtaj                                                               
                        Spec      Pred‟                          
                         felk                                                               
                                Pred        vP 
                                   tj                                                                     
                                        Spec          v‟ 
                                           ti 
                                                   v            VP                         
                                                    tj                                          
                                                          Spec         V‟ 
                                                          Évát   
                                                                    V        AdvP                                                               
                                                                     tj            tk 
Peter not called up                         Eve-ACC      „It was Peter who did not call up Eve.‟5 
 
This is how the proposed analysis accounts for problems (i)-(ix). Problem (i), 
illustrated by examples (1a,b), concerns the question why the structural focus of the 
Hungarian sentence does not always bear main stress. In the proposed framework, 
there is no direct relation between structural focus and stress. In Hungarian, Nuclear 
Stress is assigned to the leftmost constituent in a phrase. There is also a stress-
reduction rule which destresses given (anaphoric) constituents. If the filler of 
Spec,FocP is preceded by quantifiers and/or adverbials adjoined to FocP, they are also 
assigned Nuclear Stresses, as shown in (1a) and (1b). Any of the constituents marked 
as ‟strong‟ by the Nuclear Stress Rule can also be destressed, if it is anaphorically 
given. This is what happens to the focus in both (1a) and (1b). 
Problems (ii), (vi) and (vii), related to the exhaustivity of structural focus, are 
explained by the specificational predicate function of focus. Specification means the 
referential identification of a set by listing its members, hence it is understood to be 
exhaustive, as illustrated by examples (4) and (5). However, exhaustivity is not 
asserted in focus constructions; it is merely entailed. That is why focusing is not 
redundant even when  exhaustivity appears to be neutralized right away by the overt 
expression többek között ‟among others‟ (cf. (10)), and when it is also lexically 
entailed, as in (11). Sentences (10) and (11) are not formulated as specificational 
constructions in order to mark the exhaustivity of focus. (11) serves the purpose of 
                                                 
5
 The postverbal section of the Hungarian sentence, i.e., the vP in (14), and the PredP in (15), can be 
freely linearized. The optimal postverbal order is that observing Behaghel‟s (1932) Law of Growing 
Constituents - see É. Kiss (2008). 
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identifying the day when Andrew has his birthday, whereas (10) serves the purpose of 
specifying the set of those I invited. This set is specified in part by an R-expression 
(János), in part by a kind of pronominal expression (többek (között) ‟(among) others‟).  
Examples (6) and (8)-(9), illustrating problems (iii) and (v), show that specificational 
predication is licensed if the background is associated with an existential 
presupposition.6 Although both (6b) and (6c) are all new sentences answering the 
question What happened, in the case of (6b) it is part of the knowledge base of the 
speaker and the listener that there is someone that the Republicans will elect, or have 
already elected, presidential candidate in the USA.7 In the case of (6c), the focus-
background articulation is impossible because the background lacks an existential 
presupposition: When Benazir Bhutto was murdered, it was not shared knowledge  that 
there was someone that fanatics would murder or had already murdered in Pakistan. 
 The minimal pair in (8) and (9) illustrate the same point. In the case of a 
grown-up person it is presumed that he has an occupation; when asking (8a) we are 
merely interested in the specification of this occupation. Thus (8a) amounts to asking 
‟is it true that the profession that your grandfather had is the profession doctor?‟ Being 
a good doctor, on the other hand, is not the specification of a generally held 
assumption.   
Problem (iv) is also related to problems (iii) and (v). The question is why we have to 
focus Fleming/he in (7b), when Fleming/he represents the only given element in the 
sentence. Observe another question–answer pair illustrating the same point:8 
 
   (16)  a. Who was Jack Ruby? 
 b. [FocP Ő [NNP lőtte le     Lee Harvey Oswaldot]] 
  he        shot PRT Lee Harvey Oswald 
    „It was him who shot Lee Harvey Oswald.‟ 
 
Both (7b) and (16b) are clear instances of specificational predication: their 
backgrounds determine a set associated with an existential presupposition (the set 
‟who invented penicillin‟, and the set ‟who shot Lee Harvey Oswald‟, respectively), 
which the focus referentially identifies. It is not a requirement that the set to be 
specified must be given information, and the listing of its member(s) must be new; it 
can just as well be the other way round, as happens in (7) and (16). 
 The focus–background articulation of the answer is not licensed if the 
background is not associated with an existential presupposition; thus the discourse in 
                                                 
6
 According to Geurts and van der Sandt (2004), the background is associated with an existential 
presupposition in all types of focus constructions. They call the following rule „the null hypothesis‟: 
(i) The Background-Presupposition Rule 
     Whenever focusing gives rise to a background λx.φ(x), there is a presupposition to the effect that 
λx.φ(x) holds of some individual. 
7
  Delin & Oberlander (1995) make a similar claim about the subordinate clause of cleft sentences: they 
count as presuppositional also when they convey information that is expected to be known.  
8
 The English equivalents of (7b) and (16b) are called comment-clause clefts by Delin and Oberlander 
(1995). 
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(17) is unacceptable – unless there has already been discussion about a certain man 
who shot his wife. 
 
   (17) Who was John Smith? 
       %[FocP Ő [NNP lőtte le     a    feleségét]] 
                  he        shot PRT his wife 
       „%It was him who shot his wife.‟ 
 
Problem (viii) was the question why a universal quantifier cannot be focussed. 
Giannakidou and Quer (1995) have shown that universal quantifiers cannot be used as 
predicate nominals, in other words, as nominal predicates. If the focus functions as a 
predicate, the impossibility of focussing a universal quantifier is predicted.9  
Problem (ix), illustrated by example (13), also represents a consequence of the 
predicate status of focus. A bare NP, which cannot function as an argument,10 is 
grammatical as a predicate in Hungarian:  
 
   (18)  a. Éva vőlegénye szőke fiú (volt). 
     Eve‟s fiancé    blond boy (was) 
    „Eve‟s fiancé is/was a blond boy.‟ 
 b. A   tettest               szőke fiúnak      hitték. 
     the offender-ACC blond boy-DAT saw-they 
               „The offender was seen to be a blond boy.‟ 
 
In (13b), the bare nominal subject is grammatical because the focus position it 
occupies is associated with a (specificational) predicate interpretation. 
 
                                                 
9
 Puskas 2000:342) claims that this does not hold in Hungarian, on the basis of examples like 
(i) Emőke (volt) minden örömöm. 
     Emőke (was) all         joy-my 
     „Emőke is/was all my joy.‟ 
According to Surányi (2002), the constraint formulated by Giannakidou and Quer (1995 ) does not apply 
to all-type universal quantifiers. However, in Hungarian, every and all-type quantifiers do not seem to 
differ in the relevant respect (neither of them can be focussed). In my analysis, Emőke is the predicate 
nominal in (i), and minden örömem is the subject. If minden örömem were a predicate nominal, it ought 
to be able to precede the verb volt (occupying first Spec,PredP, and then Q-raised into a PredP-adjoined 
position).  Furthermore, if Emőke were the subject, it ought to be able to undergo topicalization, i.e., to 
occupy an unstressed clause-initial position. Both of these moves are impossible: 
(ii)*Emőke ‟minden örömöm volt. 
       Emőke  all          joy-my  was 
      „Emőke was all my joy.‟ 
Cf. 
(iii) Minden örömöm Emőke volt. 
      „All my joy was Emőke.‟ 
10
 In fact, a semantically incorporated theme or goal argument, occupying Spec,PredP, the position of 
secondary predicates, can be represented by a bare nominal.  
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5 A further consequence of the proposal 
The proposed analysis is further supported by the fact that it has good consequences in 
other areas of grammar, as well. For example, it can explain a curious correlation 
between focusing and definiteness effect. 
 As is well-known from the literature (Szabolcsi 1986, É. Kiss 1995, Piñón 
2006a,b, Peredy 2008, and the references therein), verbs of (coming into) being and 
creation require a non-specific theme. Compare: 
 
   (19)  a. Született egy baba.   b.*A   baba született.            
                was.born a     baby        the baby was.born                
                „A baby was born.‟        „The baby was born.‟            
 
   (20)  a. János szerzett egy autót.  b.*János  minden autót szerzett.11  
                John  obtained a    car        John    every    car    obtained 
 
Interestingly, the focusing of an adjunct, or the focusing of the agent neutralizes the 
‟definiteness effect‟, i.e., the non-specificity requirement on the theme; the focusing of 
the theme, on the other hand, has no such neutralizing effect: 
 
   (21)  a. A   baba TEGNAP született.   
     the baby yesterday was.born       
               „The baby was born YESTERDAY.‟   
 b.*A   KISLÁNY született. 
      the little.girl     was.born 
      „THE LITTLE GIRL was born. 
 
   (22)  a. Minden autót        JÁNOS szerzett.           
     every    car-ACC JOHN obtained        
     „Every car was obtained by JOHN.‟                                    
 b. János minden autót ILLEGÁLISAN  szerzett. 
     John  every    car     illegally              obtained 
     „John obtained the car from a relative of his.‟ 
 
                                                 
11
 Hungarian verbs of (coming into) being and creation also have particle verb counterparts, which 
denote the change of their theme, the existence of which is presupposed. These particle verbs, as 
opposed to their bare V equivalents, select a [+specific] theme: 
(i)a. A   gyerekek meg-születtek. 
        the children  PRT-were.born 
        „The children were born.‟ 
    b.*Gyerekek meg-születtek. 
 
(ii)a. János meg-szerezte  az  autókat. 
         John  PRT obtained the cars 
         „ John obtained the cars.‟ 
     b.*János meg-szerzett autókat. 
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Szabolcsi (1986) derived the (in)definiteness effect illustrated in (19) and (20) from the 
meaning of the verbal predicates: they assert the (coming into) being of their theme 
argument; hence the existence of their theme cannot be presupposed; that is why they 
cannot be associated with a determiner eliciting a [+specific] reading. In (21) and (22), 
both the verb expressing  coming into being and the theme whose coming into being it 
denotes constitute (part of) the background of a focus–barkground construction, in 
other words, (part of) the subject in a specificational predication structure. (More 
precisely, in (22) it is the variable bound by the Q-raised universal quantifier that 
represents the theme argument in the background/subject of predication.) Recall that 
the subject of a specificational predication construction is associated with an 
existential presupposition, i.e., the event of the theme‟s coming into being is 
presupposed in both cases; that is why also a [+specific] theme is licensed. However, if 
the theme is the focus/specificational predicate, no existential presupposition is 
assigned to it, hence the (in)definiteness effect is not neutralized. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The paper has proposed a theory of structural focus which analyzes focus movement as 
the establishment of a syntactic predicate-subject structure, expressing specificational 
predication in the sense of Higgins (1973) and Huber (2000). It is claimed that this 
analysis also accounts for properties of focus movement constructions that current 
alternative theories cannot explain. The subject of a specificational construction, an 
open sentence, determines a set, which the predicate (the focus-moved constituent) 
identifies referentially. The crucial properties of a specificational predication 
construction are the existential presupposition associated with the subject of 
predication (only an existing set can be referentially identified), and the exhaustivity of 
the focus (the referential identification of a set consists in the exhaustive listing of its 
members). Hence the [+exhaustive] feature of the focus is not asserted, but is always 
present as an entailment. The specificational predicate–subject of predication (in other 
words, the focus–background) articulation of the sentence does not correlate with 
either the new–given division of  the information conveyed (the open sentence 
determining the set to be identified (i.e., the background) can also be new, and the 
listing of the members of the set (i.e., the focus) can also be given). There is no direct 
correlation between the focus–background articulation and the stress pattern of the 
sentence, either (e.g., a given focus can be destressed).  
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Towards a DRT-based Account
of Adversative Connectors
Elena Karagjosova
University of Oslo
Abstract
The paper presents an exploratory DRT-based account of the adversative connec-
tor doch. It is assumed that doch is weakly ambiguous between various relations
of contrast, and an underspecified meaning is defined in the framework of UDRT
Reyle et al. (2005). It is shown how in concrete discourse, a particular reading is
selected from the underspecified meaning representation, depending on the infor-
mation structure of the sentence, as well as on the syntactic and prosodic properties
of the respective doch-use. This process is modelled in the framework of the most
recent version of DRT Kamp et al. (2005) and the version of DRT that takes into
consideration the focus-background division of the sentence Kamp (2004).
1 Introduction
The German adversative connector doch (Engl. though, but) is notoriously ambiguous. It
has at least five syntactically and prosodically different uses that belong to different parts
of speech and express various discourse relations, such as correction, semantic opposi-
tion and concession. For instance, dochmay express the relation semantic opposition, as
in (1), where two mutually excluding properties are applied to different individuals. In
cases like that, doch is unaccented, placed before the forefield of the German sentence
and categorized as a conjunction:
(1) Hans ist reich, doch Peter ist arm.
‘Hans is rich but Peter is poor.’
The connector doch may also express different kinds of concession, as in (2a) and (2b),
where the first conjuncts are interpreted as giving rise to the expectation that the second
conjuncts do not hold true. This form of concession is also called denial of expectation.
Here, doch is either accented, placed in the initial field of the sentence and categorized
as conjunct adverb (as in (2a)), or is a conjunction (as in (2b)):
Arndt Riester & Edgar Onea (eds.)
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(2) a. Das Pferd war klein, seine Beine waren kurz, und DOCH war es der schnell-
ste Renner weit und breit.
b. Das Pferd war klein, seine Beine waren kurz, doch es war der schnellste
Renner weit und breit.
‘The horse was small, his legs were short, and yet he was the fastest runner
far and wide.’
Another form of concession that doch may express is concessive opposition, as in (3),
where the first conjunct and the negation of the second conjunct are interpreted as conse-
quences from a contextually given claim, e.g. here the forest paths are strenuous. Here
it is again the conjunction doch that we deal with.
(3) Die Waldwege sind steil, doch nicht lang. (from Sæbø (2003))
‘The forest paths are steep but not long.’
There are further various kinds of correction marked by doch, like for instance in (4),
where the B-utterance asserts the opposite of what utterance A asserts, thus denying
the truth of A. Here, doch is accented, may be used in isolation and is categorized as a
response particle.
(4) A: Es stimmt nicht, dass Peter verreist ist.
‘It is not true that Peter has left.’
B: Doch(, es stimmt).
‘It IS true.’
A similar case is (5), where at some point in a conversation either speaker A or speaker
B asserts “Peter is coming to the cinema” and later A learns that Peter is out of town and
B then draws the conclusion that if Peter is out of town, he is not going to the cinema.
The doch-utterance here does not correct An but the earlier utterance A0/B0. The doch-
variant that expresses this relation is accented, placed in the middle field of the German
sentence and is categorized as an adverb.
(5) A0/B0: Peter kommt mit ins Kino.
‘Peter is coming to the cinema.’
An: Peter ist verreist.
‘Peter has left.’
Bn: Er kommt also DOCH nicht mit ins Kino.
‘So he is not coming to the cinema, after all.’
Another example of correction expressed by doch is (6), where the B-utterance corrects
what the speaker believes is a misconception of the hearer as regards the whereabouts of
Peter. This use of doch indicates here that A should know that Peter is out of town and
should not have claimed that he is coming to the cinema. In corrections like that, doch
is unaccented, placed in the middle field of the German sentence and categorized as a
modal particle.
(6) A: Peter kommt mit ins Kino.
‘Peter is coming with us to the cinema.’
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B: Er ist doch verreist.
‘He has left, as you should know.’
All uses of doch illustrated by (1)-(6) involve a certain degree of contrast. Semantic
opposition is the mildest form of contrast where two entities are compared with respect
to some properties. Concession involves default expectations that are incompatible with
what is asserted, and correction can be seen as an extreme kind of contrast where the
contrasted elements mutually exclude each other. I will use the term contrast as the
generic term for these relations.1 Furthermore, all uses of doch are historically related,
cf. Hentschel (1986). These facts suggest that doch can be assumed to be weakly am-
biguous (cf. Pinkal (1985)) between expressing different kinds of contrast. It is therefore
legitimate and desirable to try and unify the various uses in terms of a basic meaning of
the connector. It is also desirable to give an account of connectors in a formal theory
of discourse, since connectors have various important effects on discourse meaning, and
formal theories provide the necessary level of precision for adequately dealing with such
complex linguistic phenomena like dicourse connectors.
Earlier attempts to define a common semantics for all doch-variants are too ab-
stract or not elaborate enough Helbig (1988), Karagjosova (2001), Lerner (1987). I am
currently not aware of any existing DRT-based accounts of connectors and their dis-
course effects.
In a recent paper Karagjosova (2007), I propose an unitary analysis of doch based
on Sæbø’s analysis of German aber Sæbø (2003), where the semantics of these connec-
tors is defined in terms of a contrast presupposition involving negation and topic alter-
natives. I argue there that the meaning of doch is best seen as underspecified and define
it in terms of an UDRT alternation Reyle et al. (2005), i.e. a sequence of alternative
DRSs. Each alternative DRS represents a version of the contrast presupposition that
corresponds to some doch-variant and involves different information-structural units,
depending on the context in which the variant is used and on its syntactic and prosodic
properties. I also hint at a disambiguation algorithm that allows to model the construc-
tion of discourses with doch in DRT starting from the underspecified representation of
the connector and employing information about (i) its syntactic and prosodic properties,
(ii) the focus-background structure of the sentence that hosts it, and (iii) the structure of
the discourse in which it is used.
In what follows, I elaborate on the question of how the construction of discourses
with doch can be modelled in a DRT-based approach. I present a DRT-based account of
the meaning and discourse effect of this connector. The analysis I present is exploratory
and rather sketchy. It tries to get by with the extsting DRT machinery and leaves a
number of technical questions open.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I present the contrast presuppo-
sition defined by Sæbø for aber. Section 3 introduces my analysis of the semantics of
doch based on Sæbø. Finally, in section 4 I demonstrate how the construction of dis-
course representations may look like for two of the doch-variants, the conjunction doch
and the conjunct adverb doch.
1The term adversativity is also used generically for all types of contrast relations expressed by connec-
tors like doch, aber and but.
38 Elena Karagjosova
2 The contrast presupposition
The main idea in Sæbø (2003) is that semantic opposition is the basic contrast relation
expressed by aber from which other kinds of contrast such as various forms of conces-
sion can be derived as a result of generating conversational implicatures based on Grice’s
Maxim of Relevance. The main observation is that aber is sensitive to the information
structure of the sentence.2 More precisely, the contrast between two conjunctsC1 andC2
that aber indicates, can be seen as a semantic opposition between the contrastive topic
of the aber-clauseC2 and an alternative to it that is provided by the first conjunctC1. For
instance in (7), the CT of C2, mittlere, is opposed to the CT of C1, kleine, and kleine is a
contrastive topic alternative of mittlere:
(7) [Fu¨r [kleine]T Betriebe ha¨lt sich der Schaden noch in Grenzen]C1; [fu¨r [mittlere]T
aber wird er allma¨hlich ruino¨s]C2 .
‘For small companies, the harm is yet limited; for intermediate-size companies,
however, it is becoming ruinous.’
Based on this observation, Sæbø specifies the basic meaning of aber in terms of an
assertion and a presupposition in dynamic semantics in the following way: a sentence
of the form ‘φ aber’ updates the context σ to a context τ iff σ entails the negation of φ
where the contrastive topic of φ is substituted by some alternative, and σ is updated by
φ. Formally:
(8) σ [[φ aber]]τ iff σ |= ¬φ[T (φ)/α] for some alternative α and σ [[φ]]τ.
In other words the presupposition requires that the context contains the negation of a
sentence which is just like the aber-sentence except for its contrastive topic. The con-
trastive topic of the required sentence is a contextual alternative of the contrastive topic
of the aber-sentence. Consider again (7), repeated below as (9). The presupposition can
be verified, since in the negated aber-sentence, we replace its contrastive topic mittlere
for the alternative, here the contarstive topic ofC1 kleine, and get that the harm for small
companies is not ruinous. This is entailed byC1, sinceC1 asserts that the harm is limited.
2An analysis of aber based on similar observations is proposed in Umbach (2005).
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(9) [Fu¨r [kleine]α Betriebe ha¨lt sich der Schaden noch in Grenzen]C1; [fu¨r [mittlere]T
aber wird er allma¨hlich ruino¨s]C2 .
σ |= ¬φ[T (φ)/α] iff
σ |= ¬(fu¨r mittlere Betriebe wird der Schaden ruino¨s)[mittlere/kleine] iff
σ |= ¬(fu¨r kleine Betriebe wird der Schaden ruino¨s)
The topic of the contrast presupposition is defined in Sæbø (2003) as “the portion of
the sentence for which the context provides a substitute”. Contrastive topics are one
such case. Sæbø considers further cases which do not involve contrastive topics. He
argues that there we deal with an “implicit topic” that in general is the complement of
the apparent focus. A simple example is (10), where the focus is nicht lang, and the
“implicit topic” is the complement of the focus, namely lang. The presupposition is
verified: in the negated aber-clause, we replace the “implicit topic” lang for the focus of
the first clause steil and get that the context entails that the forest paths are steep, which
is indeed so:3
(10) Die Waldwege sind [steil]α, aber [nicht [lang]IT ]F .
‘The forest paths are steep but not long’.
σ |= ¬φ[T (φ)/α] iff
σ |= ¬(¬(die Waldwege sind lang)[lang/steil] iff
σ |= ¬¬(die Waldwege sind steil)
In Sæbø (2003), the “implicit topic” is reconstructed as a result of pragmatic reasoning
that involves a process of accommodation which in turn triggers implicatures which gen-
erate the concessive readings of the connector. For instance in (10), the “implicit topic”
lang vs. nicht lang (or its equivalent kurz) is identified on the basis of the following rea-
soning: coordination alternatives require a relevant parallel or Common Integrator (CI)
Lang (1977) between them. A CI between steep and long is more plausible than between
steep and not long or short when it comes to forest paths: both steep and long paths are
strenuous. Identifying the CI forest paths are strenuos gives us also the concessive op-
position reading of the sentence: the first conjunct supports the proposition that the paths
are strenuous, whereas the second runs against it. As pointed out in Karagjosova (2007),
however, the process of identifying the implicit topic is not entirely clear. Therefore, I
assume that in lack of contrastive topics, aber pertains to the complement of the appar-
ent focus of the aber-conjunct, and the alternative is the focus of the first conjunct. The
additional pragmatic reasoning on top of the contrast presupposition described above is
needed in order to get behind the reason for treating the complement of the focus of the
aber-conjunct and the focus of the first conjunct as alternatives.
3The notion of topic utilized by Sæbø does not correspond to the structural topic. It seems that it can
be understood in terms of material that is given or inferable in the present context. Consider for instance
the case of contrastive topics. Contrastive topics come with a parallel sentence structure and particular
intonation (called “hat contour” in German Fery (1993)) that evoke a set of alternative expressions. The
mention of the topic of the first conjunct evokes a set of alternatives from which the topic of the aber-
clause is recoverable and is in this sense given information. In cases like (10), the “topic” is in the scope
of the negation, and negation is generally known to trigger the implicature that the opposite is normally
the case (cf. e.g. Jacobs (1991)), hence the element in the scope of the negation is in a way given in the
context.
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3 The semantics of doch
In Karagjosova (2007), I apply Sæbø’s analysis of aber on doch, since doch and aber are
partly synonymous. I observe there that the information structural units to which aber
and doch pertain when trying to identify and verify the contrast presupposition can be
not only contrastive topic or the negation of the focus, but also verum focus, as in (11a),
the constituent in the scope of the focussed negation (which I tentatively call “negated
background”), as in (11b), or the discourse topic in the case of unaccented middle-field
doch.
(11) a. A: Peter [lu¨gt]α nicht.
‘Peter is not lying.’
B: Er [LU¨GT]VF aber.
‘But he IS lying.’
b. Die Waldwege sind steil, doch [NICHT]F [lang]NB.
‘The forest paths are steep but not long.’
I also notice that when doch is interpreted as correction, the topic of the contrast pre-
supposition, i.e. the part of the sentence for which the context provides a substitute, is
the complement of the apparent focus, and the topic coincides with the alternative, thus
reducing the presupposition to the requirement that the context contains a sentence with
the reversed polarity. For instance in (12), the focus is on doch, and the complement
of the focus is nicht, since doch asserts the sentence that hosts it. The alternative is the
sentence negation nicht in the preceding utterance. The presupposition is verified, since
the context, here utterance A, contains the negation of the doch-sentence.
(12) A: Es stimmt [nicht]α, dass Peter verreist ist.
‘It is not true that Peter has left.’
B: [Doch]F , es stimmt.
‘It IS true.’
σ |= ¬φ[T (φ)/α] iff
σ |= ¬(¬(es stimmt nicht, dass Peter verreist ist)[nicht/nicht] iff
σ |= ¬(es stimmt, dass Peter verreist ist)
Based on these observations, I argue in Karagjosova (2007) that the semantics of doch,
as well as that of aber, is best captured by enumerating the different ways in which
the contrast presupposition may be instantiated in concrete discourse. I formulate the
semantics of doch as an UDRT alternation, i.e. a disjunction of alternative DRSs, which
is a technique used in UDRTReyle et al. (2005) for specifying the meaning of ambiguous
lexical items. The representation in (13) is intended to capture this “meaning potential”
of doch:
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(13) doch pi 

pi′
pi′ : ¬pi[CT (pi)/CT (pi′)]
!∨ pi′ : ¬pi[F(pi)/F(pi′)]
!∨
pi′ : ¬pi[F(pi)/F(pi)]
!∨ pi′ : ¬pi[NB(pi)/F(pi′)]
!∨
pi′ : ¬pi[pi/pi]
BSGIVEN(pi)

In (13), pi and pi′ are discourse referents for representing clauses, as in SDRT Asher and
Lascarides (2003), pi is the clause hosting doch, and F is the complement of the focus
F . The representation is intended to express that doch triggers the presupposition that
there is a sentence pi′ in the discourse context such that pi′ is the negation of the result of
replacing the respective information-structural unit of pi by its corresponding alternative.
The sign ‘
!∨’ is an operator used for representing lexical ambiguity Reyle et al. (2005),
and underlined discourse referents are anaphoric referents that have to be bound to an
antecedent in the context or accommodated. The first DRS in the alternation takes care
of cases like (14) where we have contrastive topics, the second of cases like (15), where
doch pertains to the complement of the focus.
(14) [Hans]α ist reich, doch [Peter]CT ist arm.
‘Hans is rich but Peter is poor.’
(15) Die Waldwege sind [steil]α, doch [nicht [lang]F ]F .
‘The forest paths are steep but not long.’
The third alternative DRS captures cases like (12), repeated below as (16), as well as
cases like (2a), repeated below as (17), where doch is itslef focussed. In both cases,
doch pertains to the complement of the focus, nicht, and the complement of the focus
coincides with the alternative.4
(16) A: Es stimmt [nicht]α, dass Peter verreist ist.
‘It is not true that Peter has left.’
B: [Doch]F , es stimmt.
‘It IS true.’
4The reason for not having just ¬pi in the DRS for this version of the contrast presupposition is the idea
that the meaning representation should reflect the contextual conditions under which the doch variants are
used, more specifically the IS unit to which the respective doch-variant pertains.
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(17) Das Pferd war klein, seine Beine waren kurz, und DOCH war es der schnellste
Renner weit und breit.
‘The horse was small, his legs were short, and yet he was the fastest runner far
and wide.’
In a way, the meaning specification of doch that I propose in (13) is not strictly unitary
since it is a disjunction of a number of possible interpretations. On the other hand, it has
a common format, and the various doch-readings differ from one another mostly with
respect to the IS unit to which the connector pertains. This way the meaning specification
reflects the main property of discourse connectors, namely their contextual sensitivity,
in a rather straightforward way.
The alternative versions of the contrast presupposition represented in (13) reflect
the properties of the context in which the connector is used and which determine the
interpretation of the relation that the connector expresses in that particular context. It
is in this sense that the meaning of doch is underspecified: its interpretation in context
requires the selection of one of a number of possible mutually related readings under
specific contextual conditions.5
The above meaning specification also reflects partly the interpretation of the con-
nector doch in the respective context. For instance, when doch pertains to the contrastive
topic of the doch-host, its interpretation is semantic opposition, and when it pertains
to the complement of the focus of the doch-host, it is a form of concession. However,
there are additional contextual parameters that co-determine the interpretation of doch
in a particular context that are not captured in (13). For instance, in cases when the
presupposition is reduced, the interpretation of doch may be correction or denial of ex-
pectation, depending on whether doch is positioned in the middle field (correction) or
the initial field (denial of expectation). In what follows, I suggest how these additional
parameters come into play in a DRT-based account of the way in which a particular inter-
pretation of doch emerges from its underspecified meaning under a particular contextual
setting.
4 Towards a DRT-based account
The idea is roughly that the DRS construction is informed by the focus annotated syntac-
tic tree of the sentence hosting the connector. The semantic representations are built by
means of DRT-construction rules Kamp and Reyle (1993). The construction rules select
the reading that corresponds to the syntactic and prosodic properties of the doch-variant
that is used in the concrete discourse, as well as to the focus-background structure of
the discourse. The selected doch-reading is a presupposition that in a further step has
to be bound to an antecedent in the context or the context must be accommodated, i.e.
the content of the presupposition is added to the context on the background of which the
sentence is interpreted.
I next go through two examples that illustrate how the construction of represen-
tations of discourses in which doch occurs may look like in a DRT-based formalism. I
5Cf. Pustejovsky’s cases of lexical underspecification involving a contextual specification of meaning
in cases of weak ambiguity (called there “logical polysemy”) Pustejovsky (1998)).
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focus on the two clause connecting uses of doch, namely the conjunction doch and the
conjunct adverb doch.
4.1 Conjunction doch
The first example involves the conjunctional use of doch, as in (18):
(18) Die Waldwege sind [steilF ], doch [nicht lang]F .
‘The forest paths are steep but not long.’
The focus-annotated syntactic tree of the sentence is presented in (19):6
(19)
Shhhhhhhhhhhh


((((((((((((
S
PPPP

DP
Die Waldwege
VP
QQ
COP
sind
AdjF
steilF
COORD
doch
S`
``````
       
DP
Die Waldwege
VPFocusPPPP

VPFaaa!!!
ModF
nichtF
VPF
QQ
V
sind
AdjF
langF
∼C
For the assignment of focus to the constituents in the syntactic structure I assume a
system like the one proposed in Riester (2005), where semantic-syntactic constraints are
defined by means of which syntactic constituents are marked as being part of the focus
or the background of the sentence. The sign ∼ is Rooth’s focus interpretation operator,
and C is a variable that is resolved or accommodated to a set of contextual alternatives
Rooth (1992).
In this context, focus is on the VP of the doch-sentence, and this is a case where
doch pertains to the complement of the focus of the conjunct that hosts it. To choose the
correct reading for doch in this context from the ones specified in (13), we can formulate
a DRT-construction rule like CR.dochCon j.1 in (20). DRT-construction rules are rules
that are applied to the syntactic structure of the sentence. By the application of such
rules the discourse representation of the sentence is obtained.
6I have represented the complete structure with the elided material.
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(20) CR.dochCon j.1
1.Introduce a presupposed speech act discourse referent pi′ into the
discourse universe.
2.Introduce into the condition set of the discourse representation
of the sentence the condition pi′ : ¬pi[F(pi)/F(pi′)].
The application of construction rules is triggered by a particular syntactic configura-
tion. The triggering configuration of this rule would be the one in (21), where the doch-
sentence must exhibit the particular focus-background structure, here wide focus over
VP:7
(21)
S
HHH

doch S
bb""
NP VPFocus
I must refrain here from a more precise formulation of the construction rule and its ap-
plication. Obviously, there must be some way to instantiate the parameters F(pi) and
F(pi′) with information about the information structure of the doch-sentence and its pre-
ceding context, possibly by means of operations defined by the construction rule. I will
assume for now that there is such a mechanism without elaborating on it, in order to give
just the general idea of how construction rules may be used in the case of assumedly
underspecified connectors like doch. The construction rules that I am envisaging here
are not classical since they are formulated for items introducing presuppositions into the
discourse. On the other hand, the idea that the appropriate doch-reading is chosen de-
pending on the syntactic and prosodic properties of the sentence that hosts the connector,
invites such a solution.
In the most recent version of DRT Kamp et al. (2005), the first step of the DRS
construction is a preliminary sentence representation in which the presuppositions of the
sentence are explicitly represented. The second stage of the DRS construction is the
justification of the sentence presuppositions.
In the DRT version that takes the focus-background division of the sentence into
consideration Kamp (2004), focus structure is represented as a triple<K0,K1,K2> con-
sisting of a restrictor (a condition that restricts the possible values of the focus variable),
7There may be cases where only the negation is focussed, and the adjective (or NP) is backgrounded. In
such cases a different rule CR.dochCon j.2 must be specified because the IS unit that doch pertains to is no
longer the complement of the focus, but the element in the scope of the negation (the negated background).
I.e., a different reading is triggered by this syntactic-prosodic configuration. For cases where the doch-
sentence is not negated, as in (i), an operator COMP is required which will look into meaning postulates
in order to get us e.g. the antonym of a property, which will be the complement of the focus.
(i) Die Waldwege sind [steilF ], doch [kurz]F .
‘The forest paths are steep but short.’
For the cases involving CT, we will have to formulate yet another rule CR.dochCon j.3.
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a focus frame (corresponding to the background) and the focus constituent. I will leave
out the restrictor for simplicity in what follows.
The representation of the first clause is provided in (22). The left part between
the angled brackets represents the focus frame, the right part the focus constituent. The
focus variables are set in boldface to indicate that they were obtained by abstracting the
focus marked constituents from the representation of the sentence thus rendering the
focus frame. I ignore here for simplicity the presupposition triggered by the definite
description.
(22)
pi1
pi1:
〈 XPs1
Waldwege(X)
s1:P(X)
, P=steil
〉
The DRS in (22) represents the context for the interpretation of the doch-clause pi2.
The representation in (23) provides the preliminary DRS in which the presupposition
introduced by doch is explicitly represented.
(23)
pi1
pi1:
〈 XPs1
Waldwege(X)
s1:P(X)
, P=steil
〉
,
pi2 pi′
pi2:
〈 Qs2B
s2:B(Q(X))
, B=¬
Q= lang
〉
 pi
′ : ¬
s′ Q′
s′ : B(Q′(X))
Q′ = ALT (Q)

CONTEXT PRELIMINARY DRS
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In the representation of pi2, there are two focus variables that are extracted from the
sentence structure of pi2, since focus is on both constituents.8 The variable B is a variable
for the Boolean value of the sentence, which is here negative. The presuppositional
part is between the curly brackets. Here the original condition pi′ : ¬pi[F(pi)/F(pi′)] is
transformed into a DRS, where the first condition is the focus frame of pi2 except for the
property variable Q′ which is to be instantiated by an alternative of Q in the context. The
second condition is a requirement to find in the context an alternative to the value of the
complement of the focus of pi2. The focus of pi2 is nicht lang, so its complement will be
lang. The operator ALT is intended to get us a contextual alternative to the property lang.
I.e. ALT looks into the context-DRS for an appropriate entity, and this is the property
steil.9 We get as a result the following representation, where we have the presupposition
that there is a sentence pi′ in the discourse context with the content ¬¬ steil(Waldwege):
(24)
pi1
pi1:
〈 XPs1
Waldwege(X)
s1:P(X)
, P=steil
〉
,
pi2 pi′
pi2:
〈 Qs2B
s2:B(Q(X))
, B=¬
Q= lang
〉
 pi
′ : ¬
s′ Q′
s′ : B(Q′(X))
Q′ = P

CONTEXT PRELIMINARY DRS
In a third step, the presupposition that there is a sentence pi′ in the discourse context
with the required content is verified: the context contains the sentence pi1 with the same
content (steil(Waldwege) is the semantic representation of the sentence when we apply
the focus variable to the background). So pi′ can be resolved to pi1:
8How this is done techincally is a question that cannot be addressed here.
9A more explicit but complicated way is to write in the focus part B(Q) = ¬lang, and in the doch-
presupposition to have the condition s′ : B(Q′(X)),Q′ = ALT (COMP(B(Q))), where COMP(B(Q)) will
beCOMP(¬lang) and will give us lang, i.e. Q, and ALT will get us the alternative steil.
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(25)
pi1
pi1:
〈 XPs1
Waldwege(X)
s1:P(X)
, P=steil
〉
,
pi2 pi′
pi2:
〈 Qs2B
s2:B(Q(X))
, B=¬
Q= lang
〉
pi′ = pi1
CONTEXT NONPRESUPPOSITIONAL DRS
Finally, the new DRS is merged with the context.
4.2 Accented IF doch
The second example involves the conjunct adverb doch which is accented and placed in
the forefield of the German sentence:
(26) Das Pferd war klein, seine Beine waren kurz, und DOCH war es der schnellste
Renner weit und breit.
‘The horse was small, his legs were short, and yet he was the fastest runner far
and wide.’
The relevant part of the focus-annotated syntactic structure is given in (27) below,
where I assume that doch modifies semantically the clause in which it is syntactically
integrated.
(27)
Shhhhhhhhhh
,
,
((((((((((
SXXXXX

Das Pferd war klein
COORD
und
SXXXXXX

ModFocus
QQ
ModF
dochF
∼C
Shhhhhhh
(((((((
es war der schnellste Renner
A construction rule for this use of doch may look as in (28).
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(28) CR.dochCA.1
1.Introduce a presupposed speech act discourse referent pi′ into the
discourse universe.
2.Introduce into the condition set of the discourse representation
of the sentence the condition pi′ : ¬pi[F(pi)/F(pi′)].
The triggering configuration of this rule would be the one in (29).10
(29)
S`
`````

      
S COORD
und
S
b
b
"
"
ModFocus
QQ
ModF
dochF
∼C
S
In the first step of the DRS construction we get the representation in (30). Now, the
presupposition introduced by CA doch should be resolved in the context of the first
clause pi1, since CA doch performs just like the conjunction doch a clause connecting
function. However, pi1 does not provide an antecedent to which pi′ could be bound.
Nevertheless, the intuition is that pi′, here that not being the fastest runner, is a natural
consequence from pi1, here that the horse is small. In Karagjosova (forthcoming) and
Karagjosova (to appear), I present an analysis of CA doch in which the presupposition
that CA doch gives rise to is bound to a default inference of the first conjunct.11 However,
the question of how this idea can be implemented in the present framework is far from
trivial and must therefore be postponed for future work.
10Strictly speaking, we deal here with the host including doch, which is syntactically integrated into the
host sentence and carries the focus, so that pi correspondts to the upper S that is the second part of the
coordination.
11I give two alternative explanations of the origin of this default inference. In Karagjosova (forthcom-
ing), it follows from the semantics of the connector that I assume there. In Karagjosova (to appear), I
argue that it is an implicature generated as a result of an interaction between focus-induced contrast and
discourse linking.
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(30)
pi1
pi1:
〈 xs1
Pferd(x)
s1:P(x)
, P=klein
〉
,
pi2 pi′
pi2:
〈 s2 B
s2: schn Renner(x)
B(s2)
, B=ASS
〉
 pi′ : ¬ s2: schn Renner(x)

CONTEXT PRELIMINARY DRS
4.3 Adding discourse relations
A final point concerns the discourse effect of the various uses of doch. The discourse
representations above do not contain information with respect to the discourse relations
that doch marks in the respective contexts. As pointed out in section 3, this information
is partly captured in the underspecified doch-alternation (13). As already pointed out in
section 3, the full specification of the type of contrast expressed by a particular doch-use
occurs when the additional information-structural and syntactic information is combined
with the semantics of doch in the process of the semantic construction of the discourse.
But the result of this interaction is not obvious from the constructed discourse representa-
tions. The representations would be more adequate if they contained explicitly relations
like Concession(pi2,pi′) or Correction(pi,pi′), possibly introduced by means of additional
conditions specified in the construction rules for the respective doch-variants.
In standard SDRT, connectors like doch specify the rhetorical relation Contrast
and are treated as anaphoric. For instance, but is assumed to presuppose that an an-
tecedent of an appropriate sort exists in the discourse context Asher and Lascarides
(2003).12
However, doch, as well as but, can mark not only the SDRT-relation Contrast,
but also Correction. This means that we cannot conceive of a connector as hardwired to
the introduction of a unique discourse relation.
Further, discourse relations are defined in SDRT independently of the semantics
of the connectors which indicate them, since the relations may not be explicitly marked
by connectors. However, the relation marked by doch cannot always be inferred on
the basis of the semantics of the clauses alone. Consider for instance (31), where the
12This presupposition does not have to do with the semantics of but, but with its status as a two place
connector.
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doch-sentence confirms the preceding utterance and corrects a previously held contrary
opinion of speaker B that is not present in the discourse but must be accommodated. On
the stardard SDRT account, doch would introduce a correction relation between utter-
ances A and B, which would be clearly wrong.
(31) A: Karl hat gelogen.
‘Karl lied.’
B: Er hat also DOCH gelogen.
‘So he lied after all.’
On the account presented here, the semantics of the connector contributes to specifying
the relation as well as to finding the correct argument for it. For instance, in (32), which
would be the representation of (18) with explicitly represented discourse relation, finding
the antecedent of the presupposed clause pi′ leads also to identifying the second argument
of the relation:13
(32)
pi1
pi1:
〈 XPs1
Waldwege(X)
s1:P(X)
, P=steil
〉
,
pi2 pi′
pi2:
〈 Qs2B
s2:B(Q(X))
, B=¬
Q= lang
〉
Concession(pi2,pi′)
pi′ = pi1
5 Conclusions
I presented an exploratory DRT-based account of the adversative connector doch, mo-
tivated by the consideration that connectors are discourse phenomena that should be
treated in a formal theory of discourse. Although I leave many important and intricate
details for further elaboration, the presented account demonstrates how the complexity
of a phenomenon like discourse connectors may be dealt with within existing DRT-based
formalisms.
13Actually, Concession is not among the inventary of SDRT relations. It is treated as a special case
of Contrast. The semantics of Contrast is defined in SDRT in terms of implying that the arguments
of the relation are semantically dissimilar (i.e. the constituents are semantically dissimilar), cf. Asher
and Lascarides (2003). In the case of Concession, the degree of dissimilarity between the arguments is
maximal, i.e. p |∼ ¬q.
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Exhaustiveness of Hungarian Focus. Experimental
Evidence from Hungarian and German
Edgar Onea
University of Stuttgart
Abstract
Preverbal focus in Hungarian has been argued to be more exhaustive or exhaus-
tive in a distinguished way as compared to what has been generally called prosodic
focus in languages like English or German. In virtually all analysis it has been
assumed that the reason for this property of Hungarian focus is related to its im-
mediately preverbal syntactic position. This effect has thus been derived composi-
tionally at the syntax-semantics interface as part of the truth conditional content of
the respective sentences. In this paper I present new data from a pilot experiment
that suggests that exhaustiveness is not part of the truth conditional content of sen-
tences containing preverbal focus in Hungarian. The data also shows, however, that
Hungarian focus is indeed somewhat more exhaustive than prosodic focus in Ger-
man. Hence there is definitely something to say about exhaustiveness in Hungarian.
Finally I present a new empirical puzzle emerging from the experimental data.
1 Introduction
In the literature about information structure it is widely known and accepted that Hungar-
ian (and probably other languages as well) has a special kind of focus. The observation
is this: if a focused expression appears in the immediately preverbal position as in (1)
it is interpreted exhaustively, i.e. as if it were in the scope of ‘only’, while if it appears
somewhere else as in (2) this exhaustiveness effect is not available (Szabolcsi, 1981).
(1) Pe´ter
Peter
[Marit]F
Mary.ACC
szereti.
loves
‘Peter loves Mary (and no one else).’
(2) Pe´ter
Peter
szereti
loves
[Marit]F .
Mary.ACC
‘Peter loves Mary (and possibly someone else as well).’
Arndt Riester & Edgar Onea (eds.)
Focus at the Syntax-Semantics Interface.
Working Papers of the SFB 732, Vol. 3, University of Stuttgart, 2009
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Since arguably the immediate preverbal position is a specific focus projection and the
focused expression appears in this position by virtue of focus-movement as roughly ex-
emplified in (4), one can view preverbal focus in Hungarian as structural focus and may
expect a generalization of the kind given in (3).
(3) Generalization about structural focus:
Structural focus is generally/always/context independently interpreted exhaus-
tively while prosodic focus is not or not always exhaustive.
(4)
CP
PPPP

Pe´ter FP
aaa
!!!
Marit1 VP
ZZ
szereti’ t1
Since this generalization may not hold as solidly as one would expect, the somewhat
looser notions of identificational focus vs. information focus have been introduced that
capture this intuition but leave languages a bit more freedom in what exactly is coded
by these different types of foci and how they are syntactically coded in languages. This
way, English it-clefts have been argued to be instances of identificational focus while
prosodic focus in English is probably thought of as an instance of information focus.
This argument can be found most prominently and most influentially in E´. Kiss (1998,
267):
Wheres languages with structural focus appear to be uniform in distinguish-
ing between a preposed identificational focus and an in situ information fo-
cus, they differ with respect to the actual feature content of their identifica-
tional focus. [...] the identificational foci of different languages are specified
for the positive value of either or both of the features [± exhaustive] and [±
contrastive]. Furthermore, the feature complex associated with the indenti-
ficational focus can be strong [...], triggering obligatory focus movement in
syntax, or can be optionally strong or weak, allowing focus movement either
in syntax or in LF.
In the literature on Hungarian focus, virtually every aspect of the argument sketched
above has been criticized. It has been argued, that in fact only preverbal focus is focus in
Hungarian while there is no such thing as ‘information focus’ which would appear post-
verbally. It has been argued that identificational focus in Hungarian is indeed exhaustive
but it appears preverbally not by virtue of focus movement but because of other specific
features of the left periphery of Hungarian; namely a so called exhaustive-identificational
projection (Horva´th, 2006). It has been argued that identificational focus in Hungarian
is indeed exhaustive, but only pragmatically and not semantically, as originally pro-
posed (Wedgwood, 2005). It has been argued that exhaustiveness is rather irrelevant for
Exhaustiveness of Hungarian Focus 55
the discussion of the Hungarian data: the crucial point is rather that Hungarian focus-
movement is driven by stress and not by some specific semantic feature (Szendro˝i, 2003).
It has been argued that the major problem is not to derive exhaustiveness for preverbal
focus (which would pragmatically follow anyway) but to understand what is going on
with post-verbal focus (Onea, 2007) etc. Nevertheless, the classical view is still the most
influential.
In effect, there is some agreement about the fact that Hungarian focus is spe-
cial in some way that is clearly related to exhaustiveness but scholars are divided about
the question how one could semantically and syntactically model this special feature of
Hungarian focus.
What has not happened yet is a carefull empirical discussion of the data. Instead
linguistic introspection or information elicitated from informants is generally used as
primary piece of evidence.1 However, this is not quite as straightforward as it may
appear at the first glance. There are two reasons for this that are closely connected to the
type of argument used. The way in which it has been argued that Hungarian focus differs
from, say, English focus is that some test-sentences are acceptable in Hungarian which
are not acceptable in English, or that some sentences are not acceptable in Hungarian
whereas they are in English. But at the same time the following must also be considered:
1. such acceptability judgements (especially involving pragmatic phenomena) are
mostly anything but clear yes/no issues and exhibit a large variance both within
and between subjects.
2. independently of its alledged exhaustive interpretation, focus quite generally plays
a role in discourse. Hence, viewing focus-examples in isolation may be misslead-
ing because discourse effects may interact with exhaustiveness effects.
Especially since we are dealing with a phenomenon intensely discussed over the
past twenty years and more without any consensus, it is important to have a clear data
background, so as to have a better view on what actually needs to be modelled. This
paper is not an attempt to settle the data question once and for all but rather presents a
first step. As such it is a part of a larger ongoing enterprise of experimental studies, cf.
Onea and Beaver (2009) for further developments.
In this paper I will present some experimental data about the exhaustive feature
of Hungarian focus. The experiment attempts to measure the degree of exhaustiveness
of preverbal focus in Hungarian and compares the results with the results of the very
same experiment run in German. The results are as expected to the extent that they
confirm that Hungarian preverbal focus is more exhaustive than German prosodic focus.
Unfortunately, ‘more exhaustive’ does not mean ‘exhaustive’, since the results clearly
show that in Hungarian preverbal focus is significantly less exhaustive than examples in
which only overtly marks exhaustiveness. Moreover, it turns out that the degree of ex-
haustiveness is correlated to the presence of verbal prefixes. The results, hence, suggest
1The only study (to my knowledge) that attempts an empirical discussion of the data is a corpus study
in Wedgwood et al. (2006) which presents a number of examples that are not quite in line with the theo-
retical expectations of former studies. And, indeed, as one looks even at brief sequences of real, natural
occurring text in Hungarian, exhaustiveness is not the kind of thing one could extract from these data as a
characteristic feature of the focus occurrences.
56 Edgar Onea
that more needs to be said about Hungarian focus than has been said before. In particu-
lar, a more fine grained analysis is apparently needed that can account for effects like a
possible interaction between the presence of verbal prefixes and focus interpretation, as
suggested by the experimental data.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In the first section I will present the
general exhaustiveness argument and the kinds of tests that have been used to show that
Hungarian focus is exhaustive. Nevertheless, I will not enter the details of any particular
analysis here. In this chapter I will also point out some shortcomings of these tests. In
the second part I will present the experimental design and the results of the experiment
that I have conducted and finally I will wrap up and discuss the new questions opened
up by the results.
2 The exhaustivity argument
Preverbal focus in Hungarian has been argued to be exhaustive, i.e. the focused expres-
sion is interpreted as if it would be in the scope of an exhaustification operator roughly
paraphrased as only. Hence, for (1) it is predicted that the hearer understands that Peter
loves Mary and no one else. As mentioned above, the reason for this is that focus in the
immediate preverbal position occupies a specific syntactic projection that provides the
necessary exhaustiveness feature. Unfortunately, the argument is a bit more complicated.
In order to illustrate this complication, let us consider the examples given in (5). These
examples are interesting because they show the behavior of focused preverbal quantified
noun phrases. We know that not all quantifiers support exhaustification as not all of them
can be combined with ‘only’. For (5-a) it is seems reasonable to assume that the focused
quantifier phrase is interpreted exhaustively, for (5-b) this may make sense in particular
contexts, although it is not easy to combine ‘many’ with ’only’ even in contexts in which
‘many’ is contrasted to ’all’. Finally, exhaustification simply does not make any sense
for (5-c).
(5) a. Pe´ter
Peter
[keve´s
few
la´nyt]F
girl.ACC
szeret.
loves
‘Peter loves few girls’.
b. Pe´ter
Peter
[sok
many
la´nyt]F
girl.ACC
szeret.
loves
‘Peter loves many girls’.
c. Pe´ter
Peter
[minden
every
la´nyt]F
girl.ACC
szeret.
loves
‘Peter loves every girl’.
As such this would suggest that preverbal focus cannot be exhaustive after all. But on a
closer look it turns out that this observation about exhaustiveness correlates to hard dis-
tributional facts about these quantifiers. These distributional contrasts can be observed
if the verbal predicate is complex. Verbal predicates in Hungarian can be simple as in
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(5) or complex. Complex verbal predicates involve verbal particles used as prefixes or
incorporated bare nouns. The particles that can be used as verbal prefixes are generally
local prepositions that combined with a verb form a phonological word and give rise
to often transparent complex meanings as in ki (‘out’) + dob (‘throw’) = kidob (‘throw
out’). There are two important facts to keep in mind about verbal prefixes in Hungarian:
1. Verbal prefixes mostly have an impact on the aspectual properties of verbal pred-
icates in that simple verbs are mostly imperfective while verbs with prefixes are
mostly perfective (non-eventive verbs are excepted from this generalization, see
Kiefer (2006) for a very detailed overview). This aspectual effect is most clearly
available for the prefix meg which has no spatial meaning at all and has the sole
function of turning verbs perfective (and telic).
2. Verbal prefixes may appear post verbally under specific conditions as well. In-
corporated bare nouns behave syntactically exactly like verbal prefixes but do not
change the aspectual properties of the verbal predicates (cf. Farkas and de Swart
(2003) for details and a semantic analysis).
After this short introduction to complex verbs in Hungarian the distributional
differences between different focused preverbal quantifier phrases can be captured with
the generalization given in (6). Hence, as shown in (7) verbal prefixes appear post-
verbally with ‘few’ and preverbally with ‘every’ while they can appear both pre- and
post-verbally with ‘many’ depending on the appropriate interpretation.
(6) Generalization: Verbal prefixes and exhaustiveness
If a preverbally focussed quantifier phrase is interpreted exhaustively and the
verbal predicate contains a verbal prefix (or a bare noun) the prefix (or the bare
noun) will appear post-verbally. If a preverbally focussed quantifier phrase is not
interpreted exhaustively the verbal prefix (or bare noun) remains in its default
preverbal position.
(7) a. Pe´ter
Peter
[keve´s
few
la´nyt]F
girl.ACC
(∗meg-)cso´kolt
kissed
meg.
meg
‘Peter kissed few girls’.
b. Pe´ter
Peter
[sok
many
la´nyt]F
girl.ACC
(meg-)cso´kolt
kissed
(meg).
meg
‘Peter kissed many girls’.
c. Pe´ter
Peter
[minden
every
la´nyt]F
girl.ACC
meg-cso´kolt(∗meg).
meg-kissed
‘Peter kissed every girl’.
The generalization in (6) has usually been treated as a test in the literature. The dis-
tribution of the verbal prefixes has been taken to show whether the focused expression
appears in the focus-position or some other quantifier position. Crucially, the reason why
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a focused quantifier phrase appears in these positions is different: if it is in the focus po-
sition the reason for the movement that results in this overt structure is exhaustiveness
whereas in other cases we have a case of quantifier raising which is independent of focus
movement, and hence a case of in situ focus. When speaking about preverbal focus in
Hungarian I will not refer to these cases and simply ignore them for the rest of this paper.
This specific observation about the related distribution of quantifiers and verbal
prefixes is the most powerfull argument for the semantic exhaustiveness of preverbal fo-
cus in Hungarian, but at a closer look, the argument is not as clear as it may seem. It
turns out, for instance, that it is not a trivial task to state the difference between exhaus-
tive and non-exhaustive readings of ‘many’. In Onea (2008) I proposed an alternative
analysis that moves the focus of attention away from exhaustiveness feature as such and
rather concentrates on the discourse function of the focused expressions. The expnala-
tion of the contrast in (7) proposed there is as follows: if ‘many girls’ is used to answer a
wh-question (‘How many?’) directly, the prefix appears post-verbally, while if the quan-
tifier phrase is an indirect answer to the same question, the prefix appears preverbally.
The direct answer could be paraphrased such that ‘many’ is actually perceived as the
answering constituent and with this answer the question is no longer open. An indirect
answer could be understood as a hint that there were too many girls Peter kissed for the
question to be reasonable. A direct answer to a wh-question is often understood exhaus-
tively, hence, in a way this observation still fits the generalization stated above, although
the notion of exhaustiveness must be understood in somewhat looser terms that would
need to be made precise by any theory claiming that preverbal focus in Hungarian is
exhaustive. A more convenient way would be to leave the notion of exhaustiveness as
strong as usually but to assume that it is something Hungarian focus is only associated
with pragmatically, crucially in a defeasible way.
But then again, there are some other exhaustiveness arguments to handle. For
instance Szabolcsi (1981) argues that the sentence in (8), which is perfectly fine in Hun-
garian, would be a contradiction and hence infelicitous if the focused element ‘Peter’
was not interpreted exhaustively. As with the previous one, this argument has also been
challenged in the literature.
(8) Nem
Not
[Pe´ter]F
Peter
aludt
slept
a
the
padlo´n,
floor-on
hanem
but
Pe´ter
Peter
e´s
and
Pa´l
Paul
‘It wasn’t Peter who slept on the floor, but Peter and Paul.’
In Onea (2007) I have argued that under specific conditions such a sentence is also fe-
licitous in languages in which a strict exhaustive focus interpretation has never been
claimed: in particular I have claimed that such sentences are acceptable in German ex-
actly if they refer to a singular event in which Peter and Paul are participating together.
In these cases exhaustiveness would be coded independently of focus. Such event re-
lated features have recently been argued to be responsible for exhaustiveness inferences
in Kratzer (2009) as well. Moreover, in Onea (2007) I argue that such sentences are
only acceptable in Hungarian under such readings as well, hence (8) means that Peter
and Paul are the participants of the same sleeping event. This intuition has been chal-
lenged by Anna Szabolcsi (p.c.). This is an important data question, which should be
experimentally testet, but this goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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While every single argument for semantic exhaustiveness of preverbal focus in
Hungarian is controversial in my view, it is generally beyond controversy that Hungar-
ian focus is exhaustive in some way or another. The controversy starts with the question
of how this effect should be modelled. Without entering the details of the derivations
proposed by different scholars, two possible positions can be distinguished: a) either the
exhaustiveness effect is part of the truth conditional content of the respective sentences
or b) it is a pragmatic effect. In the first case the exhaustiveness effect must be derived
at the level of semantic composition. There are several ways of doing this including
an exhaustiveness operator as originally proposed in Szabolcsi (1981) or an operator of
exhaustive identification as recently proposed by E´.Kiss (this volume). In the second
case exhaustiveness does not need to be derived at the level of truth conditional content.
However, if the intuition that exhaustiveness is a systematic effect associated with Hun-
garian focus is correct even a pragmatic account of exhaustiveness may need to derive
a property X of sentences containing preverbal foci such that this property can trigger a
systematic exhaustiveness effect in most if not all contexts. Such a property would need
to be either some discourse property that could be described e.g. in terms of a question-
answer paradigm, some event structure related property as proposed in Onea (2007) and
Onea (2008) or an information processing related property of sentence meaning such
as being the main predicate and hence the most relevant predication with respect to the
conversational tasks, as argued in Wedgwood (2005). Note that the only fully explicit
pragmatic account at this point is the latter.
This controversy can be understood in quite different ways but one fairly natural
way to see it is that the question at issue is whether exhaustiveness is part of the context
dependent or context independent meaning of sentences. Or put in another way, whether
the exhaustiveness inference is an entailment of the semantic value of sentences con-
taining preverbal focus or an entailment of the semantic value of sentences containing
preverbal focus and some additional contextually given premises and possibly even more
general conversational principles.
Another way to understand the issue is to draw the distinction not between con-
text dependent and context independent meanings but rather between different ways of
interaction with context. This way of thinking could have two reasons. The first one is
that there are reasons to assume that truth conditions are not something that sentences
generally have per se but rather some kind of contextual enrichment is mostly necessary
in order to get actual truth conditions from the semantic value of sentences, e.g. in the
sense that a number of implicit variables must be bound by context for the sentence to
actually arrive at type t. The second one is more specific to exhaustiveness: even in the
first case, if exhaustiveness is semantic in nature, exhaustiveness is still context depen-
dent since it is to be understood as quantification over context dependent sets. Crucially,
however, in the second case, if exhaustiveness is pragmatic, exhaustiveness is a defea-
sible, context dependent inference in a way in which the first one is not. Hence, an
exhaustive interpretation may be facilitated but not determined by the linguistic form.
Put in more standard terms of truth conditional semantics the theoretical decision
problem is this: either the exhaustiveness inference is an entailment (or a presupposition)
or it is an implicature. In the next section I will present experimental data supporting the
latter view.
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3 The experimental results
Experimentally testing exhaustiveness involves some difficulties. The main difficulty
is that as argued in Grice (1967) according to the principles of rational communication
people will say neither more nor less than is necessary for achieving their communica-
tive tasks. This means that the hearer can generally conclude that there is no relevant
information that the speaker whitholds and that everything the speaker says is relevant.
But then this also means that generally the information will be understood as exhaustive
whenever being non-exhaustive would mean that the speaker witholds relevant informa-
tion. If this is correct, testing any exhaustiveness effect that goes beyond this general
tendency must be a nontrivial task, because we expect people to interpret utterances as
exhaustive relevant to the task of the conversation anyway. Hence, if a subject hears that
Peter has two children he is expected to assume that he has no more and no less than two
children regardless of focus.
Moreover, focus plays a role in indicating the communicative task in the sense
that it indicates what the question under discussion is (Beaver and Clark, 2008) or, put in
less functional terms, intonation is at least sensitive to the communicative task, hence it
is expected to interact with exhaustiveness inferences. As such it has been argued byvan
Kuppenvelt (1998) that even scalar implicatures only arise if the scalar item is an answer
to a question, and to a certain degree experimental evidence for this claim has been
presented e.g. in Zondervan (2007). Hence, regardless of any particular theory of focus
interpretation some pragmatic tendency to interpret focused expressions as exhaustive
is expected simply because a non exhaustive relevant (since potentially an answer to a
question) information is less likely to be used in successfull communication.
The task of the pilot experiment I present in this paper is therefore not to show
whether there are any exhaustiveness effects associated with preverbal focus in Hungar-
ian but rather to decide whether these effects are truth conditional or not.
3.1 The theoretical background
In the literature it is an open question whether it makes sense to assume that sentences
generally have truth conditions. The intuitive argument for assuming that sentences
have truth conditions is that people are generally able to decide whether a sentence is
true or false in a given situation and that people use language to communicate content,
i.e. information, which is most naturally modelled in terms of propositions. The major
argument against the assumption that sentences have truth conditions is that the intuitive
answer to the question whether a sentence is true or not in a given situation is often
context dependent. See Cappelen and Lepore (2005) for a detailed discussion of the
controversy.
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In this paper I will assume that truth conditions are usefull to determine the lin-
guistic meaning of sentences, in particular I will assume that sentences have at least
truth conditional content (if not fully specified truth conditions) and whether or not hear-
ers contradict a sentence given a particular situation which at the same time is also the
extra-linguistic context of the utterance can be used as a test to decide whether some
particular (alledged) inference that is contradicted by the situation is part of the truth
conditional content of a sentence or not.
Put in another way: if people tend to contradict a sentence and in a particular
situation without further context, there is reason to doubt that in that particular situation
the sentence is true.
Of course, this is not a matter of necessity, since people may contradict certain
utterances for quite different reasons. In addition, we may assume that context plays a
role in establishing the truth conditions of sentences, in the sense that whatever is miss-
ing from the sentence meaning but is needed to get a proposition is given by the context.
If so, it may also be the case that the fact that people contradict a sentence merely sig-
nals that they construct contexts in which the sentence in not true given the particular
situation. But let us assume that context plays only a partial role in establishing the truth
conditions of a sentence, i.e. not everything depends on the context. Let us also assume
that people do not have a default tendency to construct contexts in which a sentence is
not true given a particular situation: i.e. if it does not cost ‘too’ much they will rather
construct contexts in which the sentence is true. For instance assume that the someone
is given the sentence in (9) and he knows that Peter actually weights 87 kg. Of course a
context could be imagined in which this sentence is true, namely if the topic of discus-
sion is the weight of people on a distant planet slightly smaller than the Earth such that
on this planet Peter actually would weight exactly 70 kg. But imagining such a context is
not something we can expect from a hearer of (9), because such a context is not a usual
one. Hence the hearer would rather contradict (9).
(9) Peter weights 70 kg.
Under these two assumptions, if speakers of a language tend to contradict a sentence
given a particular situation, one can conclude that there is some kind of inherent incom-
patibility between the meaning of the sentence and the situation. This kind of inherent
incompatibility can be seen as an incompatibility between the truth conditional content
of the sentence and the situation.
The same applies to the opposite. If speakers generally tend to accept a sentence
given a particular situation, this in itself does not prove that the sentence is truth condi-
tionally compatible with the situation, but it certainly gives us no reason to doubt this.
Of course, the reasons not to contradict a sentence may be various, stretching from lack
of interest in achieving a common ground to reasons of politeness, but if there is reason
to believe that people do contradict false sentences regularly in a certain experimental
setup then these considerations may be neglected.
In addition I assume that contradicting an utterance is an extreme measure in
communication at least as far as social normative aspects for Hungarian and many other
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languages are concerned. There may be a whole array of disagreement or misscontent
regarding an utterance for which an overt contradiction may generally not be chosen.
Assume for instance that an utterance is missleading or not relevant for the tasks of the
communication. In this case the hearer may choose not to contradict the sentence but
rather to choose a yes, but type of answer, which on the one hand signals his misscontent
but on the other hand avoids contradiction. I further assume that overt contradiction (no)
is reserved for more serious types of misscontent. If there is at least a kernel of truth
in these assumptions, one can conclude, that in a 0-context contradiction is more likely
to be a signal of falsity while yes, but answers generally signal some kind of pragmatic
oddity with respect to the constructed context in which the hearer interprets the sentence.
Of course, one may still contradict a true utterance for being pragmatically odd
and in fact one may also accept a false utterance, but if these assumptions are correct, I
predict at least some statistically relevant correlation between falsity and the tendency to
contradict, truthfulness and the tendency to accept and pragmatically missleading nature
and yes but answers.
For the task at hand, i.e. experimentally testing whether exhaustiveness effects
in Hungarian are truth conditional or not, I conclude that whether and how speakers
contradict focus utterances given a situation in which the sentence is otherwise true
but not exhaustive can be used as a test. If in such a situation speakers of Hungarian
choose to systematically contradict sentences with preverbal focus the conclusion seems
plausible that exhaustiveness is a truth conditional effect while if this is not the case this
can be treated as counter evidence, if the experimental setup can rule out other reasons
for not contradicting false utterances.
3.2 The experimental setup
In the pilot experiment that I conducted Hungarian speakers were confronted with pic-
torial stimuli2 showing a number of 2-4 persons fulfilling some activity (e.g. running
after a ball) or having some property (e.g. holding a banana) such that more than one
person is involved as an agent in the activity or has the particular property. In addition,
the participants were confronted with audio stimuli3 containing one spoken sentence in
three different conditions:
• In the first condition the subject of the sentence is modified by csak (‘only’) and
receives a focus intonation as in (10).
• In the second condition the subject of the sentence receives a focus intonation as
in (11) and appears in the immediately preverbal position but there is no (‘only’).
• In the third condition the subject of the sentence has default intonation as in (12)
and does not occupy the immediately preverbal position. If the verb is transitive
the object appears post-verbally.
2The stimuli were kindly painted by Anna Volodina from the University of Frankfurt specially for this
experiment, hence the availability of pictorial stimuli was not a criterion in the choice of the stimuli
3The audio stimuli were recorded in Audacity (http://audacity.sourceforge.net/) by myself as a native
speaker of Hungarian and independently checked for the correct intonation by an additional native speaker
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In all of these cases the pictorial stimulus shows that the subject of the spoken
sentence has the property asserted by the sentence but there is always at least one addi-
tional person who has the same property. Hence, sentences in the first condition, which I
will refer to as only-sentences are false, sentences in the third condition, which I will re-
fer to as normal sentences are true but eventually pragmatically misleading and sentences
in the second condition which I will refer to as focus-sentences are false or missleading
depending on whether the exhaustiveness feature is part of the truth conditional content
or not.
(10) Csak
Only
PE´TER
Peter
verte
beat.PAST
meg
PRF
Jancsit.
John.ACC
‘Only Peter has beaten up John.’
(11) PE´TER
Peter
verte
beat.PAST
meg
PRF
Jancsit.
John.ACC
‘It is Peter who has beaten up John.’
(12) Pe´ter
Peter
meg-verte
PRF
Jancsit.
beat.PAST John.ACC
‘Peter has beaten up John.’
The task of the participants was to choose one answer to the spoken stimulus from three
proposed alternatives. The alternatives asserted the missing information, namely that the
other person on the picture also has the asserted property but differed in that the degree
of acceptance of the spoken stimulus. The first alternative was a yes, and answer as in
(13), the second alternative was a yes, but answer as in (14) and the last alternative was
a no answer, i.e. a clear contradiction, as in (15). Note that the alternatives were always
presented in the same order. The reason for the decision not to randomize the alternatives
was twofold: on the one hand I wanted to avoid the possibility that because of the very
high visual similarity of the alternatives subjects would make mistakes especially in the
later stages of the experiment because of missreading the alternatives and on the other
hand I wanted to avoid any kind bias towards no-answers and have a consequent bias
towards yes, and answers. Hence, if someone has chosen a no-answer there must have
been a good reason for this. Indeed, more yes, and answers were given than expected,
but in the overall this eventual bias did not have any effect on the results, since people
consequently have chosen no answer for the only-sentences.
(13) Igen,
Yes
e´s
and
Misi
Misi
is
too
meg-verte
PRF
Jancsit.
beat.PAST John.ACC
‘Yes, and Misi has beaten up John too.’
(14) Igen,
Yes
de
but
Misi
Misi
is
too
meg-verte
PRF
Jancsit.
beat.PAST John.ACC
‘Yes, but Misi has beaten up John too.’
(15) Nem,
No
Misi
Misi
is
too
meg-verte
PRF
Jancsit.
beat.PAST John.ACC
‘No, Misi has beaten up John too.’
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In the experiment 8 lexicalizations for each condition were set up. The experimental
software4 randomly chose 2 stimuli for each condition, that is a total number of 6 stimuli
for each participant, as well 6 control sentences and 13 fillers. This total set of 25 stimuli
was presented in a random order.
There were 22 participants aged 17-65 whereby 12 of them participated in the
experiment under supervision in Budapest and 10 without supervision. There were no
noticeable differences between the answers of these groups. 2 supervised and 1 unsuper-
vised participant needed to excluded from the results because of mistakes in the control
stimuli, hence in the end the results are based on 19 participants. For this reason the
experiment can only be considered a pilot study and is not supposed to give definitive
clarity on the topic of investigation.
For purpose of comparison exactly the same experiment has been repeated in
German with translated experimental items.5 The major difference was that in German
there is no particular preverbal focus position. Instead focus intonation (A-accent) on the
subject was used in analogy to the focus sentences in Hungarian, and default intonation
without an A-accent on the subjects was used as analogon to the normal sentences in
Hungarian. Hence, here preverbal focus in Hungarian has been compared to prosodic
focus in German. For German the number of participants was even more restricted, in
fact there were only 12 undergraduate students, but even with these low numbers a very
clear difference to the Hungarian data could be achieved.
3.3 The results
The experimental results clearly show that a) preverbal focus in Hungarian is signifi-
cantly less likely to be contradicted for not being exhaustive than only sentences and b)
the exhaustiveness effect associated with preverbal focus in Hungarian is much clearer
than the exhaustiveness effect associated with prosodic focus in German.
The detailed results of the experiment for Hungarian are shown in the following
table. The given numbers are absolute numbers. The table clearly shows that there is
a preverbal focus effect regarding the tendency of subjects to contradict sentences that
are not exhaustive as compared to the normal case where there is no preverbal focus,
but this effect is not comparable to the effect of an explicit only. If only is present
nearly all answers were no-answers, while in the focus case most answers are yes but
answers. A statistical analysis shows that these results are significant (provided that the
the chi-square test can be applied to such a low number of datapoints): (χ2(2) = 20.17
p< 0.01). Note that there is a very clearly observable effect of preverbal focus as well,
since most people did not simply accept the sentences but gave yes but or no answers
in the preverbal focus condition, while more than half of the subjects gave a yes and
answer in the normal case. This effect is not statistically significant because of the low
quantity of datapoints but confirms the expectation that preverbal focus has some effect
on exhaustiveness.
4I have used a self programmed experimental software. The source code of the experimental software
is available on www.ilg.uni-stuttgart.de/mitarbeiter/onea
5The audio stimuli for German were kindly recorded by Barbara Schlegel from Radio Regenbogen.
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Experiment/condition only focus normal
yes and 2 8 16
yes but 1 15 10
no 27 7 4
In the following table the analogous results for German are presented. The table shows
that in German the difference between the only and the focus conditions is similarly clear
as in Hungarian. Significantly less clear is the effect of focus on exhaustiveness. The
very few data seem to suggest that in German such an effect is somewhat smaller than in
Hungarian.
Experiment/condition only focus normal
yes and 0 7 11
yes but 0 7 4
no 15 1 0
The results are summarized in a somewhat more intuitive way by means of an average
number that I obtained by assigning no-answers the value 3, yes but answers the value 2
and yes and answers the numeric value 1. The average number gained this way can be
considered a rough exhaustiveness measure, the higher the number, the more exhaustive
the sentence seems to be judged by the experiment participants. Here, the difference in
exhaustiveness between German and Hungarian focus sentences (where the Hungarian
sentence has a preverbal focus) is much clearer, hence it seems that preverbal foci in
Hungarian are interpreted more exhaustively than prosodic focus in German. Again, this
is only a tendency observable from the few datapoints I have and needs to be proven in
a follow up experiment.
Experiment/condition only focus normal
Hungarian no context 2.7 1.97 1.6
German no context 3 1.6 1.27
While these results clearly indicate that Hungarian focus is not semantically exhaustive
in the sense that exhaustiveness is not part of the assertion of a Hungarian sentence con-
taining a preverbal focus, these results are compatible with the claim that structural, i.e.
preverbal focus in Hungarian is indeed special as claimed by Szabolcsi and E´. Kiss in a
number of works, in that it is more exhaustive than prosodic focus in other languages like
German and (presumably) English. But if the difference is not a semantic difference, the
question arises, what could be the reason for the observed difference in exhaustiveness.
In Onea (2008) I have argued that the exhaustiveness feature of Hungarian sen-
tences may be related to aspectual properties associated with verbal predicates although
a complete analysis has not been presented. A closer look at the experimental data sug-
gests that the hypothesis assumed there may be indeed on the right track, since for those
stimuli in which verbal prefixes are present the exhaustiveness effect seems higher than
for those in which no prefixes are available. In the following table the results for the sec-
ond condition (the sentences containing preverbal focus) are split up depending on the
presence [+prefix] or absence [-prefix] of verbal prefixes. Unfortunately the extremely
low number of datapoints does not allow any safe generalization. However the fact that
the data are in line with that hypothesis is interesting and needs further investigation.
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Experiment/condition preverbal focus [+prefix] preverbal focus [-prefix]
yes and 5 1
yes but 7 6
no 3 4
4 Summary and open issues
In this paper I have presented experimental evidence from a pilot study that preverbal
focus in Hungarian is not semantically exhaustive. The experimental results also show
that preverbal focus in Hungarian is more exhaustive than prosodic focus in German.
Hence, the intuition of a number of scholars working on Hungarian focus that preverbal
focus in Hungarian is special i.e. exhaustive in a distinguished way as compared to
prosodic foci in some other languages such as German or English is correct.
I interpreted the experimental results such that the exhaustiveness feature of pre-
verbal focus in Hungarian is pragmatic for the simple reason that it is not strong enough
to be part of the truth conditional content of the sentence. However the experimental
results also show that there may be a structural factor involved as well, since in those
cases in which verbal prefixes are present the exhaustiveness level of preverbal focus
in Hungarian appears to rise. Whether this effect is really systematically available or
whether it is a mere coincidence, remains to be clarified by further research. There are,
however, at least two possible explanation for this effect: i) either it is due to the fact that
in case the verbal prefix is present the participants more clearly observe that the expres-
sion is at a specific structural position due to the inversion in the word order between
verb and prefix or ii) the aspectual properties of Hungarian semantically interacts with
focus interpretation given rise to a stronger exhaustiveness effect.
In order to distinguish between these hypothesis a number of open questions
must be clarified: Does this effect appear with incorporated bare nouns as well, which
syntactically behave similar to prefixes but do not have any aspectual role? Does the
effect appear with object foci as well? Is the effect constrained to eventive verbs or is it
still observable in the case of stative verbs with prefixes as well? Only after these ques-
tions are empirically settled can a complete analysis of the focus effects in Hungarian be
given.
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Stress Test for Relative Clauses
Arndt Riester
IMS, University of Stuttgart
Abstract
A brief overview on the semantic differences between restrictive and non-restrictive
relative clauses is given. Subsequently differences with regard to information status
and focus alternatives are presented. I investigate, in a systematic way, which focus
(accent) patterns on relative-clause constructions are (im)possible in which contexts
and why this is so. In order to account for the infelicity of certain restrictive relative
clause constructions a new proposal is made how to derive the contrastive properties
of complex definite descriptions (focus phrases) involving relative clauses. The
account presented in this paper gives rise to predictions on intonational phonology
and sentence processing.
1 On the semantics of relative clauses
Relative clauses are traditionally grouped in two main classes: restrictive and non-
restrictive/appositive.1 There is broad consensus that the distinction between the two
types can informally be described by saying that restrictive relative clauses form an in-
tegral part of the greater (in)definite description and are necessary to determine the ref-
erent of that description whereas appositive relative clauses provide extra information
about their external head noun, whose referent is determined on independent grounds,
compare examples (1a) and (1b).
(1) a. The young man whom you briefly met at the theatre yesterday is my nephew.
b. The moon, which makes a complete orbit around the earth every 27.3 days,
has a diameter of 3,474 km.
Despite this intuitive and clear-cut picture, a description in formal semantic terms has
for a long time presented a challenge which has to do with the presentiment that an ex-
planation must be given in terms of discourse interaction rather than in a purely static
way. I will briefly go through a series of proposals that have been made in the literature
and discuss why they fall short or are not entirely convincing. Later on, I will present
a context-dependent analysis in terms of information status theory and Alternative Se-
mantics.
1The two notions will be used interchangeably.
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1.1 Properties and propositions
A not very helpful claim – especially in the “dynamic age” – says that there is a type
difference between restrictive and appositive relative clauses. According to Rodman
(1976); Heim and Kratzer (1998); Holler (2005); Del Gobbo (2007) and others, re-
strictive relative clauses are property-denoting while appositive relative clauses denote
propositions. In Holler (2005), the following arguments in favor of such a distinction
are given. We can, for instance, have a parenthesis referring back to the relative clause
information in the appositive (2a) but not in the restrictive case (2b).
(2) a. Luise,
Luise
die
who
eine
a
Emanze
women’s libber
ist
is
– was
which
ich
I
sehr
very
bemerkenswert
remarkable
finde
find
. . .
’Luise, who is a women’s libber – which I think is quite remarkable . . . ’
b. *Diejenigen
Those
Damen,
ladies
die
who
Emanzen
women’s libbers
sind
are
– was
which
ich
I
sehr
very
bemerkenswert
remarkable
finde
find
. . .
’*Those ladies who are women’s libbers – which I think is quite remarkable
. . . ’
Another argument (Lehmann, 1984; Holler, 2005) in favour of a type difference is that
appositive relative clauses should come with their own illocution, which is impossible
for restrictive relative clauses. The insertion of the performative adverb “hiermit” nec-
essarily turns the otherwise ambiguous sentence (3) into an appositive.
(3) Die
the
Chinesen,
Chinese
denen
to whom
ich
I
(hiermit)
hereby
fu¨r
for
ihren
their
vorbildlichen
exemplary
Fleiß
diligence
danke,
thank
sind
are
reich.
rich
’The Chinese, whom I hereby would like to thank for their exemplary diligence,
are rich.’
Although I share the intuitions illustrated in the above examples I would like to remain
less outspoken regarding the question whether this justifies a proposition vs. property
distinction. This has to do with the fact that the use of a dynamic framework will blur,
to a certain degree, the question whether some phrase is going to be translated as a
property or proposition because both restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses are at
some point represented as open formulae (discourse conditions in DRT terms) containing
a variable with the value of the referent shared by the head noun and some property
attributed to it. Therefore, the question is rather how these entities are put to use in the
respective cases rather than what their type-theoretic status is.
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1.2 Treatment of relative clauses in DRT
Discourse representation theory (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) provides a formal distinction
– shown in figure 1 – between the two readings of the clause in (4).
(4) The son(,) who attended a boarding school(,) was insufferable.
x
x ∈ X
son(x)
att boarding school(x)
y
y ∈ X
son(y)
att boarding school(y)
⇒ y= x
insufferable(x)
x
x ∈ X
son(x)
y
y ∈ X
son(y)
⇒ y= x
att boarding school(x)
insufferable(x)
a. Restrictive b. Appositive
Figure 1: DRT representations of (4)
Kamp & Reyle’s proposal amounts to capturing the distinction in terms of different
restrictions on the definite determiner’s implicitly or explicitly available context set X .
Not surprisingly, the content of the relative clause occurs within the restrictor box in
the restrictive case (a) while merely functioning as a main level condition in the non-
restrictive case (b). Informally, there is precisely one son attending a boarding school in
(a), while (b) just says that there is precisely one son.
This captures our intuitions. Questions remain, however, as regards the deter-
mination of the context set and, in particular, the role that the relative clauses play in
determining the other (excluded) elements of the set. What we would like to possess is
a non-circular procedure that tells us how to construe or resolve this set X .
Furthermore, the presuppositions triggered by the definite descriptions do not
receive any special treatment (as they do in more contemporary versions of DRT (Kamp,
2001; Kamp et al., to appear)); the interesting procedural character of the restrictive/
appositive distinction is not addressed.
1.3 Presupposition and assertion
A related hypothesis, formulated in Holler (2005, p. 58), following Chierchia andMcCon-
nell-Ginet (1990), is that restrictive relative clauses are presuppositional in nature while
appositives are not. The situation seems a bit unclear, however, since appositives, too,
pass classical presupposition tests, as shown in (6).
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(5) a. The passengers that were saved were happy.
b. The passengers that were saved weren’t happy.
(6) a. The passengers, who – by the way – were saved, were happy.
b. The passengers, who – by the way – were saved, weren’t happy.
Both (5) and (6), whether negated or not, give rise to the implication that (the) passengers
were saved. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990, p. 282) argue for an intermediate
status of the proposition expressed by the appositive: it is not a presupposition but a
“backgrounded” part of the assertion. I do not want to comment on this proposal at this
point and, instead, see whether a different concept can help us further in differentiat-
ing between the two types of relative clauses: the notion of information status, whose
relation to presupposition and givenness is investigated in detail in Riester (2008b).
2 The information status of relative clause constructions
2.1 Two levels of information status
In Riester (2009), I discuss hybrid cases of presuppositions which cannot be grouped as
clear instances of either presupposition resolution (binding) or accommodation.
(7) I just met Fred’s lawyer. She seems to be really smart.
In (7), for instance, we would like to say that the discourse referent associated with
the personal pronoun is anaphorically resolved (bound) to the discourse referent for
Fred’s lawyer (it is D(ISCOURSE)-GIVEN (in small capitals) according to Riester (2008b,
2009)), while the information that the person in question is female, is NEW2 (in big cap-
itals, see explanation below) from the perspective of the discourse context.
referent content information status
female NEW
she D-GIVEN
Table 1: Information status of the pronoun in (7)
In order to sufficiently describe the information status of relative clauses it is to be ex-
pected that we need to employ a similar conceptual separation between a referential and
a content level as exemplified above. This is reminicent of the twofold givenness defi-
nition used in Schwarzschild (1999, p. 151). If an expression is of type e it is given if
and only if it is coreferential. If an expression is of a functional type 〈α,β〉, it is given iff
the context contains an identical or more specific expression (which may or may not be
referentially related).
Nevertheless, the approach described here differs substantially from Schwarz-
schild’s account. Instead of employing a simple givenness vs. novelty distinction, I will
use a more fine-grained set of category labels adapted from the literature on information
2Note that the information probably counts as “accommodated” but that name will be reserved for a
special purpose under this account.
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status (see Riester (2008a) for a survey). Moreover, rather than assuming two different
ways of determining a single notion of givenness, I will strictly differentiate between a
referential and a content level (like in table 1) for which different category labels will be
used.3
2.1.1 Referential level
I take it that the determination of a discourse referent normally takes place at the level of
the NP/DP. This means that assigning a referential information status label only makes
sense for maximal projections. In this paper, I distinguish whether such a phrase is
coreferential with some aforementioned entity (D-GIVEN), whether it has no discourse
antecedent but is hearer-known (ACTIVATE), whether it is construed via BRIDGING or
whether neither of the former holds and the addressee has to simply ACCOMMODATE it.
2.1.2 Content level
At the content level, on the other hand, (which will be annotated on words in contrast to
the phrasal annotations in section 2.1.1), it doesn’t make sense to talk about discourse
referents4 (and, relatedly, about an issue such as co-reference). Here, the concepts we
have to deal with are word relations like (phonetic) identity, synonymy and hyperonymy.
In consequence, the following labels will be used: depending on whether there is a suit-
able term in the previous discourse, a content word will be labeled SAME for phonetic
identity, SYN for synonymy, SUB if the annotated word forms a hyponym or a sub-
ordinate (e.g. part) concept, and SUPER in the opposite case if we are dealing with a
hypernym or superordinate concept in relation to the respective predecessor. A word
which does not possess any appropriate antecedent will receive the label NEW.
2.2 The information status of restrictives
Having defined our vocabulary, we are now able to precisely analyse the information
status of the restrictive relative clause construction in a sentence like (8) provided a
number of relevant contexts.
(8) The passengers that/who were saved were happy.
Note that it is part of the story that not all of those contexts will actually license an
utterance of (8), yet others will impose on it a very distinct intonational pattern. As
we still lack some necessary tools, we cannot satisfactorily explain these matters in this
section; especially issues having to do with prosody. I would like to ask for the reader’s
patience until section 3, where the relevant background will be introduced.
3This section owes much to discussions with Stefan Baumann; in particular the idea of distinguishing
two levels of information status. I carry the responsibility for potential flaws and bad representations.
4At least, if we want that a fundamental distinction between discourse referents and discourse condi-
tions is maintained and an uncontrolled growth of discourse referent types is avoided.
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In this section, we shall purely concentrate on analysing the two levels of infor-
mation status in the written text as sketched above, even for the infelicitous cases. Let
us assume that sentence (8) is uttered in any of the following contexts.
(9) a. A plane had a crash landing.
b. A plane with 155 passengers on board had a crash landing.
c. A plane with 155 passengers on board had a crash landing. Everyone was
rescued.
d. A plane with 155 passengers on board had a crash landing. Only a few were
rescued.
The information status of sentence (8) in the respective environments (information pro-
file) is given in table 2.
(9a) (9b) (9c) (9d)
ref content information status
passengers SUB SAME SAME SAME
(plane)
saved NEW NEW SYN SYN
(rescued) (rescued)
the
passengers BRIDGING/
that were ACCOMM. D-GIVEN D-GIVEN D-GIVEN
saved
Table 2: Information profile of the restrictive case
The annotations at the content level are straightforward. The word “passengers” in (8)
is a repetition when uttered in the contexts (9b), (9c) or (9d); this is why it receives the
label SAME. On the other hand, it is not mentioned in context (9a). Here, it can be
construed as being related to the more general concept plane and will be labeled SUB
(for “subordinate concept”). As regards the word “saved” it will be interpreted as NEW
in the first two contexts and as a synonym of the previously mentioned term “rescued”
in (9c) and (9d).
If we now consider the referential level, i.e. the information status of the entire
relative clause construction, we may state that each of the contexts (9b), (9c) and (9d)
offers a discourse (group) referent that can, in principle, be picked up by the subject
phrase of (8) (label D-GIVEN). The antecedents are the groups formed or described,
respectively, by the phrases “155 passengers” in (9b), “everybody” in (9c) and “a few”
in (9d). In the context of (9a) we have the choice between saying that the passengers
stand in a bridging relation to the contextually available plane or that the existence of
“passengers that were saved” must be accommodated. (The difference is quite subtle
and does not need to be decided at this point.) In any case, the passengers themselves
have not been mentioned in (9a).
Taking a first glance at the felicity conditions, the following rough picture arises.
Sentence (8) sounds fully acceptable in the contexts (9a), (9b), and probably also (9d).
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There is something odd about it when uttered in context (9c). It is difficult to have intu-
itions about these issues, though, because different ways of accenting strongly influence
our felicity judgments.
2.3 The information status of non-restrictives
I will now discuss the corresponding non-restrictive case, as given in (10), in the same
set of contexts (9a)-(9d). Table 3 shows the respective information profile of the relative
clause construction.
(10) The passengers, who were saved, were happy.
(9a) (9b) (9c) (9d)
ref content information status
passengers SUB SAME SAME SAME
(plane)
the passengers BRIDGING D-GIVEN D-GIVEN D-GIVEN
ref content information status
saved NEW NEW SYN SYN
(rescued) (rescued)
who were saved D-GIVEN D-GIVEN D-GIVEN D-GIVEN
Table 3: Information profile of the non-restrictive case
Not surprisingly, the content level information profile is unchanged for both the words
“passengers” and “saved” as compared to the restrictive case. However, what strikes
us when examining table 3 is that is separated in two parts below one another, each of
which possesses its own (referential) information status. This reflects the insight that the
information status of the head noun is determined independently of the apposition.
As we can see, the referential information profile of the host DP “the passengers”
is (almost) identical to the one of the entire (restrictive) construction that we saw in the
previous section. Concerning context (9a), however, we can now wholeheartedly speak
of an instance of BRIDGING.
The additional block in table 3 pertains to a separate referential information status
assigned to the appositive, which in all contexts is indicated as D-GIVEN; in other words,
as co-referential with the head nominal. This deserves some extra comment as it comes
with a non-trivial (and potentially questionable) assumption, viz that a non-restrictive
relative clause is a referring expression in the first place and, more specifically, that it
possesses an individual type referent. This seems at least partly justified if the relative
clause can be interpreted as a projection of its relative pronoun, which, in turn, is co-
referential with the head noun phrase.
If, on the other hand, we are not justified in saying that the apposition is a refer-
ring expression or that it refers to a proposition or eventuality, instead, then it is also not
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in need of being represented in presuppositional/anaphoric terms and will fall beyond
the issues discussed in this paper.
Concerning the felicity conditions of the non-restrictive construction we note that
it sounds good in the first two contexts while being inappropriate in the last two. There
is not much tolerance for prosodic variation; in particular, the apposition itself needs to
be stressed.
3 Intonation and focus interpretation
3.1 Remarks on intonational issues
Concerning the prosodic properties of relative clauses, it has been noted in e.g. Lehmann
(1984, p. 263), that there is an “intonation break” (prosodic boundary) between the head
nominal and the non-restrictive relative clause, while there is one “continuous” intona-
tional contour (presumably, a single intonation phrase) spanning the entire restrictive
relative clause construction. A possible interpretation of this is that in the first case the
relative clause is excluded from the scope of the determiner while in the second case it
is included under it.
Clifton et al. (2002) investigate the attachment preferences for various syntactic
constructions (including relative clauses like in (11)) depending on the relative size of
the prosodic boundaries at the different possible attachment sites. The options consist in
prosodically realizing the positions marked by an ↑ without any boundary (0), with an
intermediate phrase boundary (ip) or with an intonation-phrase boundary (IP).
(11) I met the daughter ↑ of the colonel ↑ who was on the balcony.
In an experiment where the early boundary was subject to variation while the late one
was always realized as ip, interpretation preferences underwent a statistical shift. For
the sequence [0 ip], exemplified in (12a), the sentence was for about half of the time
interpreted as showing high (“the daughter was on the balcony”) and for the other half as
low attachment (“the colonel was on the balcony”). For the boundary sequence [IP ip],
i.e. with a strong boundary on the initial position as in (12b), there was a significantly
higher share of low attachment interpretations.
(12) a. ( ( I
L*
met the daughter of the COlonel
H*
)ip
L-
( who was on the
BALcony )ip )IP
H* L- L%
b. ( ( I
L*
met the DAUGHter
H*
)ip
L-
)IP
H%
( ( of the COlonel
H*
)ip
L-
( who was on the
BALcony
H*
)ip
L-
)IP
L%
While these findings aren’t directly related to our general issue, there are nevertheless
some useful implications that we can draw from them. Firstly, we may suspect that a
strong initial boundary, i.e. the presence of a short initial intonation phrase, goes hand in
Stress Test for Relative Clauses 77
hand with an increased (though not absolute) need to place stress on the word “daughter”.
Secondly, although no reference is made to the restrictive vs. non-restrictive distinction
in Clifton et al. (2002), it is clear that the sentence can give rise to the four different
interpretations shown in table 4.
high attachment, restrictive (HR) low attachment, restrictive (LR)
the d. that was on the b. the c. that was on the b.
high attachment, appositive (HA) low attachment, appositive (LA)
the d., who was on the b. the c., who was on the b.
Table 4: Different interpretation possibilities of (11)
Taking the somewhat impressionistic account by Lehmann (1984) into consideration,
table 4 allows for the following preliminary speculations. If it is true that a restric-
tive relative clause construction indeed forms a single intonation phrase then a prosodic
solution like in (12b) is not compatible with the interpretation HR because the head,
consisting of the complex possessive, arguably should not be split in two parts.
If, on the other hand, a non-restrictive relative clause construction requires an
intonation break between the head noun and the relative clause then an intonation contour
like in (13) – not discussed in Clifton et al. (2002) – would rule out all interpretations
except LR: high attachment is ruled out by the intonation break after “daughter” and a
non-restrictive interpretation is made impossible by the uninterrupted intonation contour
spanning over the lower noun and the relative clause.
(13) ( ( I
L*
met the DAUGHter
H*
)ip
L-
)IP
H%
( ( of the COlonel
L*
who was on the
BALcony )ip)IPh
H* L- L%
The considerations contained in this section certainly have their deficits. Neither is there
room for an exhaustive discussion of all possible cases nor is this paper meant to replace
empirical psycholinguistic research. However, the issues addressed provide a first insight
into the complex prosodic situation we are facing, which is immediately related to the
field of focusing discussed in the next section, although the latter has so far typically
been kept restricted to the meaning of pitch accents rather than intonation boundaries.
3.2 Felicity
In section 2.2, I discussed a number of contexts in which sentence (15) – with varying
intonation – might have been uttered. These are repeated in (14).
(14) a. A plane had a crash landing.
b. A plane with 155 passengers on board had a crash landing.
c. A plane with 155 passengers on board had a crash landing. Everyone was
rescued.
d. A plane with 155 passengers on board had a crash landing. Only a few
were rescued.
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(15) a. The passengers who were SAvedF were happy.
b. The PASsengersF who were saved were happy.
c. The PASsengersF who where SAvedF were happy.
The table below is an exhaustive listing of utterances of the variants in (15) in all con-
texts, along with indications whether the utterance is felicitous (
√
) or not (#) and how it
can be interpreted.
con- (15a) the passengers (15b) the PASsengersF (15c) the PASsengersF
text who were SAvedF who were saved who were SAvedF
(14a) rest:
√
, app: # rest: #, app: # rest: ?, app:
√
(14b) rest:
√
, app:
√
rest: #, app: # rest:
√
, app:
√
(14c) rest: #, app: # rest: ?, app: # rest:
√
, app: #
(14d) rest:
√
, app: # rest: ?, app: # rest:
√
, app: #
Table 5: Felicity conditions and interpretations
There is a lot that could be said about table 5. I shall only give explanations for readings
which are not (#) available. Firstly, I am going to discuss what criteria are responsible
for not getting an appositive reading, then the restrictive case will be discussed, in which
the issue of contrastive interpretation is going to play an important role.
3.2.1 Criteria for not having an appositive reading
The reason why no appositive reading is available in the rows for the contexts (14c) and
(14d) is that the relative clause is not informative here and, thus, simply superfluous. No
choice of accenting can remedy this.
In cases where the information conveyed is not superfluous there are, on princi-
ple, two lines of explanation why an appositive reading can be blocked: a semantic and a
prosodic one. It is speculative to say which one is more fundamental. As has been noted
long ago, an appositive reading is not available if the relative clause lacks an accent (col-
umn under (15b)). We explain this by saying that clauses which are informative have to
be marked as such, i.e. with a pitch accent on “saved”, following the givenness principle
by Selkirk (1996) and Schwarzschild (1999): if an expression is not given (in our termi-
nology: neither SAME, SYN nor SUPER), it must be F-marked (in our case, accented).5
From a prosodic perspective, the apposition seems to form its own intonation phrase and
this is minimally possible if it contains at least one pitch accent.
Finally, a possible explanation why an appositive reading isn’t available if (15a) is
uttered in context (14a) might run as follows. “The passengers” haven’t been mentioned
and are, therefore, not D-GIVEN. According to the reversal of the principle stated in
the previous paragraph, if an expression is not F-marked, it must be given. Because
“the passengers” aren’t accented themselves we may conclude that if (15a) cannot be
understood appositively then something seems to also block the projection of the F-
feature from the relative clause to “passengers”. If we were to argue syntactically, we
would say that this is due to the fact that the appositive relative clause is not an argument
5The same explanation accounts for the observation that there are no foci-less sentences.
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of the head nominal in this case and is, therefore, not subject to horizontal F-projection,
cf. Bu¨ring (2006). The other option is to invoke a prosodic explanation according to
which it is the mandatory prosodic boundary after the head noun – the hermetic nature
of the intonation phrase on the relative clause so to speak – that “locks up” the F-feature
and in doing so prevents it from projecting.
3.2.2 Criteria for not having a restrictive reading
Among the combinations of contexts and intonation contours contained in table 5 above,
restrictive readings are more frequent than appositive readings. Nevertheless, these, too,
have to obey some constraints. Most strikingly, in the contexts (14a) and (14b), the
relative clause construction cannot be uttered without an accent on “saved” (column
(15b)). As in the appositive case, this can purely be explained in terms of the information
status of the word “saved”. This word is neither given (SAME/SYN/SUPER) nor F-
marked and, thus, infelicitous.
As for contour (15a) in context (14c), however, we need to come up with a dif-
ferent explanation. Unlike in the appositive case, we do not want to say that the relative
clause is superfluous, here. On the contrary, it is employed successfully in the task of
singling out a particular group of people: “saved passengers”. The problem is that the
use of the phrase “the passengers that were SAvedF” is only felicitous if there are at the
same time passengers that weren’t saved and this is what context (14c) explicitly rules
out.
It is, furthermore, likely that the prosodic realization (15b) (“the PASsengers that
were saved”) goes together with contexts (14c) (“everyone was rescued”) and (14d) (“a
few were rescued”). Such a solution requires the availability of “non-passengers that
were saved”; an interpretation which is, at least, not in conflict with what has been said
or is known so far, so these variants seem possible.6
3.3 The determiner and the alternative set
Krifka (2006) raises the issue what happens if a focus-sensitive operator associates with
a complex definite description that contains a focus.
(16) John only met the woman who talked to BILLF .
Sentence (16) can be felicitously uttered in a situation in which John met one woman
– Mary – and Mary talked to Bill and Fred; although a classic Structured Meanings
approach (Krifka, 1992, 1993) would predict that this sentence is false here. The theory
translates (16) into a formula saying that “Bill” is the only name that fits the position
marked by the focus in order for the sentence to express a true statement. However
as, in fact, “Fred” fits there equally well, the formula is evaluated as false. This, in
turn, means that Structured Meanings Theory has to be enhanced by the notion of focus
phrase (Drubig, 1994; Krifka, 2006), e.g. the definite noun phrase embedding the focus.
The quantification domain of “only” will contain referentially distinct alternatives to this
6But it is particularly important here not to separate the unstressed relative clause from the head noun
by a strong break.
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focus phrase while the focus-background structure simply provides the general template
for these alternatives.
I argue that the problem described by Krifka is not limited to contexts involving
focus-sensitive particles like “only”. In fact, it also shows up above in our discussion
about the contextual constraints for the felicity of relative-clause constructions. The
question is, even in the absence of a focus-sensitive particle: what are the alternatives of
a somehow focused definite description?
3.4 A previous proposal
Von Heusinger (2007) makes a proposal how to derive the Alternative Semantics of
definite noun phrases. He notes that in a situation in which there is one Dutch but several
English professors the expression in (17a) can give rise to a questionable alternative set
as in (17b), whose second element violates uniqueness.
(17) a. [[the DUTCHF professor]]
f
b. = {[[the Dutch professor]]o, [[the English professor]]o, . . .}
The same problem arises in a scenario in which there are three women and two men such
that Sue talked to Bill, Mary talked to Fred, and Julia also talked to Fred. The alternative
set of the modified noun alone is given in (18). Combining this expression with the
determiner, as in (19a), yields the focus-semantic value in (19b), which – if instantiated
– is represented as (19c).
(18) [[woman who talked to BILLF]]
f
= {λx[woman(x)∧ talk to(x,y)] | y ∈ De}
(19) a. [[the woman who talked to BILLF]]
f
b. = {ιx[woman(x)∧ talk to(x,y)] | y ∈ De}
c. = {ιx[woman(x)∧ talk to(x,bill)], ιx[woman(x)∧ talk to(x, fred)]}
Again, there is reason to feel uneasy about the second element in the set, which seems
to breach the uniqueness conditions in the given situation – speaking of “the woman
who talked to Fred” makes no sense. Von Heusinger’s attempt to solve the problem
is to assign the definite article a special alternative semantic value, generalized union
(∪), which when combined with the focus semantic value in (18) yields the following
derivation in (20).
(20) a. [[the woman who talked to BILLF]]
f
b. = ∪{λx[woman(x)∧ talk to(x,y)] | y ∈ De}
c. = {d | d ∈ P for some P ∈ [[woman who talked to BILLF]] f }
d. = {d | woman(d)∧ talk to(d,y); y ∈ De}
e. = {d | woman(d)∧∃y.talk to(d,y)}
Now, the alternative set consists of all women that were present, which is intuitively the
right result. However, assigning such an idiosyncratic alternative value to the definite
article is a strong deviation from standard Alternative Semantics, which is not entirely
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unproblematic (compare von Heusinger (2007, sect. 4) for a discussion and other poten-
tial solutions).
According to Rooth (1992), the story about focus is not limited to the creation of
a focus semantic value; rather, these sets additionally need to undergo some contextual
interaction called focus interpretation. An operator (∼) is attached to a focus-containing
expression. The job of this operator is to check whether the context provides at least
one contrastive element to the expression in its scope which instantiates the “template”
designated by the focus alternative value. It is necessary at this point to warn the reader
that “context” has to be understood here in a broader sense than just the discourse. While
it may be the case on some occasions that the desired contrastive element can indeed be
found in the previous discourse there are also plenty of cases in which such an overt
item is lacking from the discourse and, yet, listeners are often able to identify it thanks
to their lexical or world knowledge. The set made up from the ordinary meaning of the
expression plus its contextually identified alternatives is a subset of the original focus
semantic value.
In order to make it clear what I am talking about I propose to call the orginal
focus semantic value the logical alternative set and the subset identified via focus inter-
pretation the context-dependent alternative set. Such a distinction, originally present in
Rooth (1992), is not explicitly addressed in von Heusinger (2007).
3.5 Revision
In the remaining space of this paper, I would like to propose a different solution concern-
ing the determination of the context-dependent alternative set of definite NPs which may
be put to use in various discourse processes, e.g. identifying the quantification domain
for a particle like “only” or testing the felicity conditions of relative clauses.
What if the definite determiner, as a functional category, does not participate in
the formation of a focus semantic values at all but is simply an indicator of the position
at which the focus interpretation operator attaches? The (logical) alternative value of the
definite NP “the woman who talked to BILLF” (= X) would thus simply amount to the
set given in (21).7
(21) [[X]] f = {λx[woman(x)∧ talk to(x,y)] | y ∈ De}
A DRT representation of Rooth’s focus interpretation operator ∼, is given in figure 2.
The box represents an unresolved presupposition (indicated by ∂8) with the instruction
to identify a contextual alternative x and a set C, containing x as well as the ordinary
meaning [[X ]]o.
The use of this operator is not yet an answer to the problems raised by Krifka
and von Heusinger. In particular, the logical alternative set in (21) has a different type
7Eventually, it will be necessary to recast this account in an intensional format. Such a move is prop-
agated e.g. in Beaver and Clark (2008, ch. 4). As we are dealing with issues like anaphora, however, this
is a non-trivial enterprise which cannot be dealt with in the scope of this paper. Questions arise whether
context sets are intensional like focus semantic values are. Possible worlds, on the other hand, can differ
with regard to what counts as an alternative in them.
8Beaver (1992) and subsequent work
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∂ :
C z
[[X]]o ∈C C ⊆ [[X]] f
C(z) z 6= [[X]]o
Figure 2: Presuppositional representation of ∼
than what we would like C to be: a set of individuals. Other than postulating a special
alternative meaning for the definite article, I propose to integrate von Heusinger’s union
operator in the definition of ∼, defined in figure 3.
∂ :
C z
[[X]]o ∈C C ⊆ ∪[[X]] f
C(z) z 6= [[X]]o
Figure 3: Presuppositional representation of ∼ι
The advantage of this proposal is that the burden of identifying the right context domain
is shifted to an operator which is presuppositional already; no unusual focus semantic
values have to be assumed. The disadvantage is that we now possess a second focus
interpretation operator (∼ι), for referential expressions. But this might come as not so
surprising since we learnt from section 2 that there is also reason for assuming two types
of information status for individual and functional categories, respectively.
The ∼ι presupposition will be evaluated against the context described at the be-
ginning of section 3.4 (see figure 4) and will lead to the desired result in figure 5.
u v w x y
Sue(u) Mary(v) Julia(w)
Bill(x) Fred(y)
talk to(u,x) talk to(v,y) talk to(w,y)
∂ :
C z
[[X]]o ∈C C ⊆ ∪[[X]] f
C(z) z 6= [[X]]o
Figure 4: Context of evaluation and referential focus presupposition trggered by ∼ι
3.6 Explaining infelicity
Recall what led us to consider the combination of definiteness and focusing in the first
place: to account for the felicity conditions of the restrictive relative clause in (22). Why
is this sequence infelicitous? The preliminary discourse representation of it (ignoring
the assertional contribution of the last sentence) is given in figure 6.
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u v w x y z C
Sue(u) Mary(v) Julia(w)
Bill(x) Fred(y)
talk to(u,x) talk to(v,y) talk to(w,y)
C = {u,v,w} ⊆ {d | woman(d)∧∃y.talk to(d,y)}
z= v
Figure 5: Contrast presupposition resolved
(22) A plane with 155 passengers on board had a crash landing. Everyone was res-
cued. #∼ι[The passengers that were SAved] were happy.
x Y Z
plane(x) has(x,Y )
passengers(Y) |Y |= 155
y
yv Y
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
∀
y rescued(y)
∂ :
C U
[[X]]o ∈C C ⊆ ∪[[X]] f
C(U) U 6= [[X]]o
Figure 6: Incoherent discourse, unresolvable ∼ι presupposition
On principle, the DRS in figure 6 is well-formed and expresses that every passenger of
the the group was rescued and is happy. But now, the focus presupposition goes wrong.
The logical alternative set [[X ]] f of the focus phrase is (23a). Applying generalized union
yields (23b) andC must be a subset of this.
(23) a. [[X ]] f = {λX [passengers(X)∧P(X)] | P ∈ D〈e,t〉}
b. ∪[[X ]] f = {A | passengers(A)∧∃P.P(A)}
We fail to identify a groupU , different from [[X ]]o and with the property that their mem-
bers were not saved. This is why the presupposition cannot be resolved, the discourse
stays incoherent and the restrictive relative clause construction cannot be successfully
uttered in this context.
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4 Conclusions
4.1 Summary and afterthoughts
In this paper, I have presented a comprehensive treatment of the information structural
properties of relative clauses, both with regard to information status and focus alterna-
tives. For a number of exemplary contexts and different intonational variants, I investi-
gated and explained which combinations are possible or impossible and why this is the
case. Furthermore, I sketched a solution to the problem of determining the focus alter-
natives of complex definite descriptions (focus phrases). Relative clauses are one type
of these. In order to identify the focus alternatives and to explain the infelicity of cer-
tain examples, I combined von Heusinger’s proposal using set union with Rooth’s focus
interpretation operator ∼.
Under my account, the definite article does not give rise to special alternative
meanings but instead indicates the position at which a variant of the focus interpreta-
tion operator is attached. This might explain, among other things, why non-restrictive
relative clauses (other than restrictive ones) do not participate in the determination of
the contrastive properties of the whole construction: they are outside the scope of the
determiner and the focus interpretation operator cannot see them.
In future work, the proposal has to be validated further and re-cast in an inten-
sional framework.
4.2 Predictions on intonation
Apart from the semantic and information structural treatment of relative clause con-
structions this paper makes a number of testable predictions with regard to intonational
phonology and sentence processing. Table 5 in section 3.2 not only gives an exhaustive
list of context and accenting combinations but is also meant to inspire production or per-
ception experiments. For instance, if the head noun, and along with it its information
status, is varied (e.g. “the man” (unmentioned), “the man” (D-GIVEN), “the moon” (un-
mentioned but identifiable by the hearer (ACTIVATE)), this is very likely to influence the
interpretation of a subsequent relative clause. Since “the moon” is already fully identi-
fied, further information can only be understood as an apposition, while “the man” in the
unmentioned case is in need of further specification. From the story told in this paper,
it should be much clearer what accenting differences are to be expected. Finally, the
table gives an overview which context-intonation pairs are compatible with both types
of relative clauses. In such cases we may expect intonation boundaries to play a decisive
role in disambiguation.
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Focus, Sensitivity, and the Currency
of the Question
Kjell Johan Sæbø
University of Oslo
Abstract
According to Beaver and Clark (2008), a closed class of items, primarily particles
like even or only, are systematically sensitive to focus, encoding a dependency on
the Current Question (the CQ). This theory appears to give wrong predictions for
exclusive particles like only in some cases where intuitively, what the particle asso-
ciates with is not the (only) constituent in focus, – something else can be in focus
instead or as well, even it itself. I conclude that while both focus itself and exclusive
particles always address a Question, they do not always address the same.
1 Introduction
Beaver and Clark (2008) argue that many items that have been labelled focus-sensitive
do not have a lexically-encoded, conventionalised dependency on focus (some, such as
negation, have a “quasi” association with focus, some, such as quantificational adverbs,
have a “free” association with focus), but that some – particularly exclusive and inclusive
particles – do. This dependency is modelled as a dependency on the Current Question
(the CQ), the (explicit or implicit) question answered by the clause containing the focus-
sensitive item. Beaver and Clark adopt Rooth’s (1992) theory of focus interpretation and
Roberts’ (1998) model of discourse structure: Focus presupposes a set of propositions
based on alternatives, and the Current Question serves to resolve that presupposition.
Thus focus and focus-sensitive particle work in tandem because they are both anaphoric
on and grammatically constrained to address the CQ.
Beaver and Clark (henceforth: BC) pay special attention to exclusives like only,
describing their meaning as consisting of three components:
Meaning of exclusives (BC: 251)
Discourse function: To make a comment on the CQ, a comment which
weakens a salient or natural expectation.
To achieve this function, the prejacent must be weaker than
the expected answer to the CQ on a salient scale.
Presupposition: The strongest true alternatives in the CQ are at least as
strong as the prejacent.
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Focus at the Syntax-Semantics Interface.
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Descriptive Content: The strongest true alternatives in the CQ are at most
as strong as the prejacent.
Note that the three components are all formulated with sole reference to the CQ, without
mentioning focus. Formally – a bit reformulated for perspicuity – the latter two can be
defined as follows (the denominator is the presupposition).
The semantics of only according to BC (260ff.)
[[ only ]]v = λpi
∀p∈CQσ pv⊃pi≥σp
∀p∈CQσ pi≤σp
The numerator, encoding the assertion, says that any true member of the CQ (relative to
the information state σ) is at most as strong as the prejacent, pi. The strength relation ≥σ
can be a more “interesting” ordering than entailment; that depends on σ. The denomi-
nator, representing the presupposition, says that any member of CQσ is weakly stronger
than pi. In conjunction with the Current Question Rule, stating that CQ contains at least
one true proposition, this means that there is at least one true CQ member at least as
strong as pi. Let us look at a simple example to see how this theory works.
(1) – What is Lucia eating?
– She’s only eating PASta.
Consider focus first: the accent on the object tells us that the object or the VP is in focus.
Let us say that just the object is in focus; then to verify the focus presupposition, the CQ
should be a set of propositions φ such that there is an alternative α to pasta such that φ is
the proposition that Lucia is eating α; such an alternative might be meat, salad, meat and
pasta, meat and salad, pasta and salad, meat and pasta and salad; – and the CQ is such
a set of propositions if, as assumed by BC (though the second assumption is only made
implicitly),
1. the meaning of a wh question is the set of propositions expressed by the
sentences resulting from replacing the wh term by a relevant alternative,
2. the CQ for a sentence used as an answer is the meaning of the question.
Thus in (1), the Focus Principle (BC: 37) is satisfied: the set of alternatives evoked by
the answer is a superset of the meaning of the question, the CQ.
Next, consider only. The presupposition of the answer in (1) is that the strongest
true alternatives in the CQ are at least as strong as [[ Lucia is eating pasta ]]. Strength
is not necessarily logical strength, but let us here assume that it is; then the sentence
presupposes that Lucia is eating pasta, – or meat and pasta, or salad and pasta, or all
three: she is eating meat and pasta and salad. The descriptive content is that the strongest
true alternatives in the CQ are at most as strong as the proposition that she is eating pasta;
that is, the sentence entails that she is not eating meat and pasta, she is not eating pasta
and salad, nor is she eating meat and pasta and salad – and in presupposing that those
stronger alternatives were open but asserting that they are not true, the sentence fulfills
its discourse function of weakening expectations.
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So far, so good: we see how one and the same CQ can serve its purpose both
in relation to focus and in relation to only. Ex- and inclusives seem focus-sensitive, but
the truth, according to BC, is that focus and particle are on beat because they are both
sensitive to the same contextual attribute – the CQ.
This may well be the “normal” case. However, there are also instances where
focus and only are not on the same beat; where a CQ may serve its purpose with respect
to one but not with respect to the other.
2 One Focus, 6= the Associate
Various types of evidence cast doubt on the hypothesis that exclusives always depend
on the CQ in the same way as focus, or depend on the same Question (I use the term
“Question” to denote a contextually given set of propositions). In this section, I consider
one such type of evidence: there is exactly one focus, but that is not what the exclusive
associates with. In the first of two cases, a Question does not seem relevant for the
exclusive; in the second, the exclusive seems to relate to a less immediate Question.
2.1 CQ only goes for Focus
This case is related to the examples given by Prince (1978) and Delin (1992) to show
that it cleft constructions do not always have the distribution between old and new infor-
mation that one might expect. Suppose the proposition that Lucia is eating pasta is in the
Common Ground, so that the presupposition of the question in (2) is verified. Then the
answer in (2) is felicitous as far as focus is concerned, with, as marked by the indicated
accent, focus on can afford.
(2) – Why is Lucia eating pasta?
– She can only afFORD pasta.
But intuitively, what the particle associates with is not that constituent but, as in (1), the
object pasta – (2) entails that Lucia cannot afford pasta and salad, or meat, or meat and
pasta, or meat, pasta, and salad; not, say, that she does not like pasta (only that the reason
she is eating pasta is not that she likes it). Yet this constituent is evidently out of focus.
We seem to have a situation where only does not associate with focus but with something
in the background.
Note that this is not an instance of the “second-occurrence focus” phenomenon,
where – in the strict sense of this term, i.e., as it was used by Partee (1999: 215) – a
focus sensitive operator and its associate are both repeated and the latter appears not
to be prosodically prominent in its second occurrence (BC: 119); Beaver et al. (2007)
and, differently, Fe´ry and Ishihara (2005) show that these occurrences are perceptibly
prosodically marked after all. The object in the answer of (2), however, is a case of what
Partee (1999: 216) called “deaccented focus”, where a competition “between contrastive
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focus and focalizer-associated focus” is resolved by omitting “any marking of focus on
the element . . . associated with the focalizer”.
Still, one might contend that the object is not fully deaccented there. In this
connection, it is useful to look at (or rather, listen to) a language like Norwegian, where
neutralisation of the “second tone” in a 2-syllable word is considered a sure sign of
deaccentuation. Consider (3):
(3) –
–
Hvorfor
why
gir
give
du
you
enhjørningen
unicorn-DEF
din
your
mose?
moss
–
–
Fordi
because
den
it
bare
only
TA˚Ler
tolerates
mose.
moss
‘ – Why do you feed your unicorn moss? – Because it can only EAT moss.’
The word mose has the second tone, H*L-H, but in the answer in (3) it can be reduced
to L-H, as could a first-tone word in the same context.
Examples following the same pattern as (2) or (3) are easily multiplied; cf. (4):
(4) – Why are there so many tall students at Duke University?
– They only offer SCHOLarships to tall students.
These are all interrogative contexts, where the sentence showing a discrepancy between
‘the focus’ and ‘what the exclusive associates with’ answers a question, and the question
naturally arises what constitutes the Current Question here. The first assumption is that
it is, again, the meaning of the explicit question. The meaning of a why question is more
difficult to specify than that of a term question, but we can try. Considering (2), we may
constrain it to be
the set of propositions p such that there is a relevant relation R
such that p = [[ Lucia is eating pasta because Lucia R pasta ]]
and if the answer is elliptical for “Lucia is eating pasta because she can only afFORD
pasta”, the Focus Principle is satisfied: the focus semantic value of the sentence under
consideration is a superset of the CQ. That CQ, however, will not do for only: the content
is definitely not that the strongest true alternative in the set of p = [[ Lucia is eating pasta
because she R pasta ]] for some relevant R is [[ Lucia is eating pasta because Lucia
can afford pasta ]]. The reason is obvious: the alternatives relevant for only are not
alternatives to can afford but alternatives to, as earlier, pasta.
We may approach the CQ from another angle, abandoning assumption 2 from
Section 1 to say that the CQ can be implicit even in the presence of a question:
The CQ for a sentence used as an answer is not necessarily
the meaning of the question.
Bear in mind that the CQ is simply a set of propositions, and in a case like (2) this
can well be the set containing just these two: that Lucia can afford pasta and that she
can afford and is eating pasta. Then if the answer is not taken as elliptical, the Focus
Principle is again satisfied – the focus semantic value of the answer, the set of p = [[
Lucia R pasta ]] for some R is a superset of {[[ Lucia R pasta ]]} for R = can afford
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or can afford and is eating. But again, the contribution of only to the truth conditions is
misrepresented if it is computed on the basis of this simple CQ: the content is predicted
to be that [[ Lucia can afford and is eating pasta ]] is either (i) false or (ii) no stronger than
[[ Lucia can afford pasta ]]; since the latter is clearly not the case and it is already a fact
that Lucia is eating pasta, we are left with the implication that Lucia cannot afford pasta,
conflicting with the prejacent.
In fact, the theory predicts that to derive the correct truth conditions, the CQ must
be a set of propositions p = [[ Lucia can afford α ]] for a relevant alternative α. But if
we were to interpolate such a Question in (2), the Focus Principle could not be satisfied
with respect to that Question; the bit of information expressed by afford is not given but
new in the discourse, and focus respects this.
At this point, it may be appropriate to ask what informs us of the intuitively
correct truth conditions in a case like (2), (3), or (4) – how do we know that the exclusive-
relevant alternatives are alternatives to pasta, mose, and tall, even though these words
are discourse-old? We need a term for these expressions, and we could follow Ko¨nig
(1991) and talk about the focus of the focus particle, but since the notion of focus is at
issue, it is better to choose the neutral term ‘the associate’ (of the exclusive particle).
Note that to say that the associate in cases like (2), (3), or (4) is, if not the focus of the
current utterance, the focus of an utterance one or two turns or sentences back in the
discourse comes close to vacuity: any discourse-old item was once discourse-new.
Evidently, all there is to go on to determine what only associates with in (2)–(4) is
plausibility: it would be highly implausible to construe the answer in (4) as saying that [[
they offer scholarships to tall students ]] is as strong a proposition as any true proposition
[[ they R tall students ]] for some relevant relation R . It is much more plausible to
construe it as saying that that proposition is as strong as any true proposition [[ they offer
scholarships to P students ]] for some property P ; the implication that they don’t offer
scholarships to short students answers the question, stating why there are so many tall
students there.
2.2 CQ 1, CQ2
Even if in these cases, there do not seem to be any (discourse or information) structural
correlates to go by when determining the associate, in others, it does look as if a suit-
able set of alternative propositions coincides with a Question, though not the Current
Question if this is what focus is invariably sensitive to. Considering (5), the question is
roughly equivalent to a Question ‘Does he speak a language I know?’ or ‘Which lan-
guage(s) does he speak?’ – and this is a CQ for the exclusive in accordance with BC’s
definition and everybody’s intuition.
(5) – Will I need an interpreter?
– Probably. If he is Russian he is likely to only SPEAK Russian.
(6) His company sells Windows PCs, but that doesn’t mean he only USEs Windows.
So you really think the people who work at KFC only eat CHICKen from KFC?
(web example; accents added)
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(7) Insisting on one food does not necessarily mean he only LIKES that food. (web
example; accents added)
Similarly, the topic of the posting that (6) is excerpted from is that Michael Dell uses
Linux, and that of the posting that (7) is excerpted from is whether the child will ever
again want to eat anything else than crackers. It is easy to extract from this a set of
propositions coming from the prejacent by replacing the associate by an alternative, vin-
dicating BC’s analysis in terms of the CQ. However, this is not the CQ that (intonational,
free) focus is sensitive to. What focus is sensitive to is a more immediate, overlying
Question, such as, for (6),
{ [[ Michael Dell sells Windows ]], [[ Michael Dell uses Windows ]],
[[ Michael Dell sells and uses Windows ]]}
By contrast, the CQ relevant for only is e.g.
{ [[ Dell uses Windows ]],
[[ Dell uses Mac and Windows ]],
[[ Dell uses Linux and Windows ]],
[[ Dell uses Mac and Linux and Windows ]]}
We can now spell out the presupposition and the content of only in this case:
Presupposition: One of these is true:
[[ Dell uses Windows ]],
[[ Dell uses Mac and Windows ]], [[ Dell uses Linux and Windows ]],
[[ Dell uses Mac and Linux and Windows ]]
Descriptive Content: None of these is true:
[[ Dell uses Mac and Windows ]], [[ Dell uses Linux and Windows ]],
[[ Dell uses Mac and Linux and Windows ]]
Because presupposition and content jointly imply that [[ Dell uses Windows ]] is true,
they also imply that e.g. [[ Dell uses Linux ]] is not, since then [[ Dell uses Linux and
Windows ]] would be true. (The scale is here based on entailment.) This is what the only
sentence should mean; as it is embedded under negation, there is no conflict with the
given piece of information that Dell uses Linux.
Thus the meaning of the exclusive is successfully computed on the basis of one
Question while the Focus Principle is satisfied with respect to another Question. Yet BC
(pp. 35ff.), following Roberts (1998), assume a unique Current Question:
“A question that is . . . accepted by the interlocutors as the most immediate
goal of the discourse becomes the Current Question . . . ”, “A point in a
discourse may be characterized in terms of a sequence of . . . Questions, of
which the most recent is the Current Question.”
Now the most recent Question and maybe the most immediate goal of the discourse at
the point where only occurs in (6) is not the Question relevant for only but the Question
relevant for focus, the Question based on alternatives to uses; the Question based on
alternatives to Windows is a little less recent. This seems to imply:
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Focus relates to the most current Question;
the word only relates to the most current Question or to the second
most current Question.
In this way, the view that exclusives and other particles are discourse sensitive, although
not quite in the same way as focus, would be maintained.
But the cases (2)–(4) above, where a set of propositions based on alternatives to
the particle’s associate is difficult to identify as a Question, remain problematic. In the
next section, we will look at another class of problematic facts.
3 Focus × 2, one = the Associate
In the last section, we looked at cases where there is one, relatively narrow focus in
the relevant clause and this focus, contrary to BC’s theory, does not coincide with the
associate of the exclusive particle. But there are also cases where there are two or more
foci within the confines of one clause and an exclusive particle can in principle associate
with either one. Consider (8) and (9).
(8) Lois LOVES SUPerman but she only LIKES CLARK.
(9) Lois LIKES CLARK but she only LOVES SUPerman.
It would seem that in such cases, the CQ corresponds to a double wh question and that
BC’s theory predicts that the exclusive associates with both foci, that is, that the excluded
propositions are based on alternatives to the pair in focus. This, however, is counterintu-
itive. A reasonable guess for the Current Question at the point in a discourse where (8)
or (9) is uttered is the meaning of (10):
(10) What is Lois’ emotional attitude towards which of the two of Clark and Super-
man?
If for simplicity we assume that there are only two relevant emotional attitudes and that
one, love, entails the other, like, the CQ will be the following:
{ [[ Lois likes Clark ]], [[ Lois loves Clark ]], [[ Lois likes Superman ]],
[[ Lois loves Superman ]], [[ Lois likes Clark and Superman ]],
[[ Lois loves Clark and Superman ]]}
Consider now the second half of (8): the presupposition is that Lois likes Clark or Lois
loves Clark or Lois likes Clark and Superman or Lois loves Clark and Superman, and the
descriptive content is that only the first of these is true. So the prejacent follows: Lois
does like Clark. But it also follows that she does not like Superman (from the entailment
that she does not like Clark and Superman and the implication that she likes Clark). This
contradicts the first half of (8). (Our assumption that love entails like is not essential for
the contradiction to arise; the first half could equally well say that Lois likes and loves
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Superman.) The problem is that only is construed as expressing not just that liking is all
Lois feels for Clark but also that she likes noone but him.
The source of this problem is that the two foci in the second half of (8) are
treated alike, or to put it differently, that we assume a Current Question with two slots for
alternatives. Intuitively, the focus on (Superman and) Clark in (8) is not a rheme focus
but a theme focus (and in (9) it is the other way around, the focus on (likes and) loves
is a theme focus while the focus on (Clark and) Superman is a rheme focus). Steedman
(2007), for instance, would say that the accent on Clark in (8) and on loves in (9) is not
the rheme focus accent H* but the theme focus accent L+H* (or even L+H*L-H). We
might conclude that only is sensitive to rheme focus only, not to theme focus. Now for
one thing, this seems an overgeneralisation in the face of data like (11) or (12), where it
can be argued that (one) only associates with a theme focus.
(11) Most countries have both loans and grants. Only Iceland has only loans.
(12) Only Iceland has massive glaciers, active volcanoes, gorgeous geysirs, and mag-
nificent waterfalls.
Besides, because the sensitivity to focus is in BC’s theory mediated through the CQ, to
make use of the conclusion that only is sensitive to rheme focus only, we must ensure
that the relevant CQ is not neutral towards theme and rheme, more specifically, that the
members of the CQ relevant for only in (8) are not based on alternatives to both likes and
Clark symmetrically. In particular, they should not include the proposition that Lois likes
Clark and Superman – recall that this proposition was responsible for the counterintuitive
result above.
There are at least two ways to achieve this. One is to say that there is a special
CQ for the second half of (8), more constrained than the CQ for the first half (which may
be the meaning of (10)). As soon as the first half has been uttered, the CQ is revised to
the meaning of (13):
(13) Well, what about Clark? What is her emotional attitude towards him?
That is, it reduces to this small set: { [[ Lois likes Clark ]], [[ Lois loves Clark ]]}. This
yields the right result for the exclusive. However, there is a cost to this solution: first,
it predicts that theme focus does not respect the Focus Principle. Second, it is a mere
accident that the exclusive occurs in the second sentence; if it were to occur in the first,
there would be no motivation for revising the Question whose members are based on
alternatives to both likes and Clark.
Alternatively, we can assume that the CQ for (8) is the meaning of a question
slightly different from (10), namely, (14); and taking our cue from Krifka (2001), we
can analyse the ‘pair-list’ reading of (14) as a conjoined question, (15):
(14) What is Lois’ emotional attitude towards Clark and Superman?
(15) What is Lois’ emotional attitude towards Clark? And,
what is her emotional attitude towards Superman?
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The meaning of (15) is arguably more restricted than the meaning of (10); the union of
the two sets of propositions denoted by the two conjoined questions is
{ [[ Lois likes Clark ]], [[ Lois (likes and) loves Clark ]],
[[ Lois likes Superman ]], [[ Lois (likes and) loves Superman ]]}
Crucially, this set is not based on alternatives to Clark or to Superman; rather, the sub-
stitution of one for the other results from unifying the Q pertaining to one with the Q
pertaining to the other. Therefore, the proposition [[ Lois likes Clark and Superman ]]
does not enter into the CQ. Theme and rheme are not treated alike after all. This yields
the right result for focus and for only.1
So the case of two foci in the clause does not provide conclusive evidence that
it is wrong to say that only depends on the CQ in the way described by BC; if we are
careful about how to construe the CQ, in particular, assuming a ‘list’ Question for a
theme focus, this case ceases to present a problem.
4 Focus × 2: one = only
Sometimes, only itself appears to be in focus, not just phonologically, but also pragmat-
ically, in the sense that a focus semantic value computed on the basis of that focus is a
superset of a set of propositions to be found in the context. Consider first (16).
(16) I expected to miss both my parents, but as it turned out, I ONly
miss my DAD.
Intuitively, only in the second sentence contrasts with both in the first sentence, so that (a
subset of) the focus semantic value of the second sentence might be { [[ I miss both dad
and mom ]], [[ I miss only dad ]], [[ I miss only mom ]]}. The embedded proposition in the
first sentence is of course a member of this set, so the focus preupposition is verified (the
Focus Principle is satisfied) with respect to the singleton set containing that proposition.
It has been customary, however, to ignore alternatives to accented exclusives (or
inclusives) when computing focus semantic values (or related structures). And to be
sure, in the case at hand, it is not necessary to take the focus on the exclusive seriously;
the Focus Principle can be satisfied with sole reference to the focus on my dad, and BC
make correct predictions about the contribution of only to the meaning without taking
alternatives to only into consideration.
It is interesting to note, however, that in BC’s theory, it is in principle excluded
to take alternatives to the exclusive into consideration, because that would mean consid-
ering a Current Question with propositions based on the exclusive and on alternatives to
it; since to judge the relative strength of propositions in the CQ, it would be necessary to
1Similarly, in the theory of Bu¨ring (2003), the CT (contrastive topic) value of the second half of (8)
will be a set of sets of propositions, one for Clark and one for each alternative to Clark, and there will be
one Question under Discussion for Clark and another for Superman. Since there is not a unique CQ in this
theory, however, BC’s analysis is not directly applicable.
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compute the contribution of only, something which in turn depends on the CQ, we are
led into an infinite regress.
That may not matter at all in a case like (16), but there are cases where it might
matter. These cases are otherwise reminiscent of cases considered in Section 1: the
associate is given information, out of focus. What is new in (17) is that the rheme focus
accent is on the exclusive:
(17) All natural fibre garments last longer if you handwash them.
And you should ONly handwash SILK.
It is reasonable to assume that SILK is a theme focus and that the focus semantic value
of the second sentence is a set of propositions roughly like this:
{ [[ you should only handwash silk ]], [[ you should preferably handwash silk ]],
[[ you should only handwash wool ]], [[ you should preferably handwash wool ]],
[[ . . . ]], [[ . . . ]] . . . }
The Focus Principle will be satisfied through the meaning of the first sentence if this is
taken to be the following set of propositions, a subset of the above:
{ [[ you should preferably handwash silk ]],
[[ you should preferably handwash wool ]],
(and so on for the other natural fibre garments) }
To know what these propositions and those in the focus semantic value are, we need
information from some other source on what the exclusive associates with, or on its con-
tribution to the propositions. To that end, we may return to BC’s theory, with reference to
another set of propositions than the one above, given by the first sentence and satisfying
the Focus Principle; it is not implausible, for instance, to assume an underlying Question
like the meaning of (18):
(18) How should I wash natural fibre garments?
The whole of (17) can well be an answer to this, but in the course of (17), the CQ
relevant for focus itself is revised, while the CQ relevant for the exclusive is retained. So
the situation is quite similar to the one described in Section 2 in connection with (5)–(7).
The only difference is that here, in connection with (17), the CQ needed for focus is not
available for the exclusive for principled reasons – the exclusive could not relate to a CQ
containing propositions based on the exclusive itself and its alternatives.
5 Outlook and Conclusion
The hypothesis that focus and only (when interpreted at the same clausal level) consis-
tently rely on one and the same contextually determined proposition set, defended by
Beaver and Clark (2008) and adopted by Ippolito (2008) and others, can be seen as a
blend of Rooth (1985) and Rooth (1992): whereas Rooth (1985) equated the set relevant
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for only with the focus semantic value, according to Rooth (1992: 78f.), the set rele-
vant for only will tend to coincide with the set constrained to be included in the focus
semantic value. Rooth (1992: 108f.) was careful to point out, however, citing evidence
resembling (2)–(7) above, that this coincidence is not obligatory (“focus effects should
always be optional”). This point of view has been corroborated in the previous sections:
It is unrealistic to assume that the contextually determined set of propositions relevant
for focus always serves double duty as the set of propositions relevant for the exclusive.
Careful considerations have shown that it is difficult to uphold a simple and unitary no-
tion of the (most immediate, most recent) Current Question, even if it is conceived of as
an abstract set of propositions, to do the job for both focus (expressions) and allegedly
focus sensitive expressions.
It may not be surprising that the notion of a uniform Current Question, serving
as a frame of reference for a range of phenomena, from intonation via various discourse
devices to particles modifying truth conditions, is problematic. But here two problem
sources must be distinguished. First, it is obviously unrealistic to expect the identifica-
tion of the Current Question to be a mechanistic process. The notion is an abstraction,
coinciding with observable interrogatives only exceptionally. This has been pointed out
many times, not least by Martı´ (2003). But on the other hand, once a suitable amount
of idealisation is taken on board, one might expect the notion of the CQ to have a wide
range of applications. This expectation has now been disconfirmed.
On a constructive note, the counterevidence, in particular the cases discussed in
Section 2.2 and Section 4, has brought to light the need to distinguish two or more layers
of Current Questions, one, the most immediate, relevant for focus, another, perhaps less
immediate, relevant for particles. This is a picture into which BC’s overall theory of the
meaning of exclusives and inclusives still fits: the content can be defined in terms of sets
of alternative propositions, but these expressions are less sensitive to local adjustments
of Questions than focus is, more oriented towards the goal of the discourse, the Question
under Discussion, the Topic in the sense of Asher (1993).
Although the counterexamples are in no way unnatural, they do perhaps strike
us as exceptional, and it may well be that 99% or more of the cases conform to the
BC pattern. The question why this should be so is an interesting one, and a fruitful
observation may be that the interpretation of only and the interpretation of focus are very
similar to each other, and if they both utilise the same CQ, the parallelism is enhanced
and the interpretation effort is minimised.
For one thing, both focus and only rely on contextually determined alternatives:
the members of the relevant set of propositions are in both cases based on substitutions
from a restricted domain, as emphasised by Rooth (1992: 78f.) and by Martı´ (2003).
This domain restriction, the identification of the salient set of alternatives, can be done
in one step if focus and exclusive particle work in tandem, both exploiting the same
contextual parameter.
Second, if the associate coincides with the focus, the meaning of the sentence
with only is not very different from the meaning of the sentence without only. As noted
by Schmitz (2008), exclusive meaning is a pragmatic effect of focus; a contrast implica-
ture mirroring the exhaustive interpretation of the answer to the congruent Question; and
only, relating to the same Question, can be seen as literalising that implicature, turning
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a pragmatic inference into a truth condition. So when hearing the answer in (1), you
compute an interpretation very similar to what you would compute on the basis of focus
alone.
(1) – What is Lucia eating?
– She’s only eating PASta.
Those considerations may go some way towards explaining the fair correlation between
the set of alternatives relevant for only and that relevant for focus. But the fact remains
that the correlation is not absolute. We do encounter a more complex interaction between
focus, exclusive, and Questions, where the exclusive refers to a Question a little less
immediate, or the notion of a Question does not seem particularly relevant. It would
seem that what we witness here is a hearer-based pressure for ease of interpretation
counterbalanced by a speaker-based preference for richness of interpretation.
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Variation in Focus
Daniel Wedgwood
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
This paper takes a broad view on the notion of focus. It calls into question the idea
that focus is a unitary, cross-linguistically applicable notion and also questions the
implicit metatheoretical reasoning that apparently leads linguists of various schools
to posit such a thing. A comparison of the Hungarian ‘focus position’ with the
English it-cleft provides a case study of how even considerable similarity of form
and function may spring from independent origins. This is accompanied by brief
demonstrations of more blatant diversity in ‘focusing’ phenomena.
1 Introduction
There is a popular perception among linguists (directly reflected in textbook presenta-
tions like that in Saeed, 1997) that there is a single notion of focus that can be associated
with a variety of grammatical phenomena in different languages. Commonly cited ex-
amples include focal pitch accenting in English (as in (1)), Hungarian ‘focus movement’
(as in (2)) and focus morphemes in Somali (as in (3)):
(1) a. [What did Susan drink?]
Susan drank GIN. / #SUSAN drank gin.
b. [Who drank gin?]
#Susan drank GIN. / SUSAN drank gin.
(2) a. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
meghı´vta
VM-called
Marit.
Mari-ACC
‘Ja´nos invited Mari.’
b. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
MARIT
Mari-ACC
hı´vta
called
meg.
VM
‘Ja´nos invited MARI.’ / ‘It’s MARI who Ja´nos invited.’
(3) a. Amina
Amina
wargeyskii
newspaper
baa-y
FOC-she
keentay.
brought
‘Amina brought THE NEWSPAPER.’
b. Amina
Amina
baa
FOC
wargeyskii
newspaper
keentay.
brought
‘AMINA brought the newspaper.’
Arndt Riester & Edgar Onea (eds.)
Focus at the Syntax-Semantics Interface.
Working Papers of the SFB 732, Vol. 3, University of Stuttgart, 2009
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All of these phenomena appear to involve those aspects of meaning that are said to be
characteristic of ‘focus’: in particular, some relationship to the expression of ‘new’ in-
formation and/or contrast, and the involvement of the intuitively somehow related notion
of sets of alternatives. Given such similarity of meaning, it is tempting to suggest that
all of the phenomena in (1)–(3) are driven by, or sensitive to, a particular grammatical
feature—call it [+focus]—which has a cross-linguistically consistent semantic correlate.
This is indeed a popular assumption. One school of thought in the Chomskyan ‘universal
grammar’ tradition even ties this feature to a particular syntactic functional projection in
the left periphery of underlying sentence structure (see Rizzi, 1997, and note the cru-
cial role of Hungarian ‘focus movement’ in motivating this proposal). While it is not
clear that this particular proposal is intended to account for prosodic focusing as in (1),
it does illustrate the depth of the assumption that focus may be treated as a grammatical
primitive with universal applicability—a truly fundamental notion, then1.
In spite of this popular perception of the status of focus, it is easy to show that—
at least in the implied, superficial way—(1)–(3) do not involve varying grammatical
expressions of a single meaning (let alone a single feature). It is a commonplace of the
literature on the Hungarian ‘focus position’ that, despite its name, the occupants of this
position do not simply correspond to those expressions that carry focal pitch accenting
in English. Instead, the relevant Hungarian syntactic position is generally said to host
‘exhaustive focus’ or ‘identificational focus’ (see, for example, Szabolcsi, 1981, 1994;
E´. Kiss, 1998; Horvath, 2000). It is often claimed that this makes the Hungarian ‘focus
position’ more similar to an English it-cleft construction than to English accent-based
focusing. The accuracy or otherwise of such claims is discussed below, but it is at least
clear that this syntactic phenomenon in Hungarian cannot be simply assumed to provide
evidence for a grammatical primitive that also drives English focal accenting.
Similar observations may be made with regard to the Somali ‘focus morpheme’
exemplified in (3). Like the Hungarian phenomenon, it may bear sufficient interpretive
similarities to English focal accenting to have been given the name ‘focus morpheme’
by linguists, but more detailed consideration shows it to have quite different properties
too.
Such cases are merely illustrative of a broader cross-linguistic picture. Phenom-
ena to which the term ‘focus’ has been applied are by no means homogeneous. Some
are very clearly distinct from general definitions of focus, with decidedly idiosyncratic
properties. Others may illustrate common cross-linguistic tendencies, but close compar-
ison shows that significant differences may exist even between superficially very similar
constructions and that such cases may require an analysis whereby distinct mechanisms
happen to produce similar results.
This calls into question any simple form of universal structure-meaning mapping
that is driven by a unitary focus feature. One might then retreat to a position whereby
focus phenomena are accepted to be diverse in many ways, but to share certain core
1Note that the object of my arguments is not merely the idea of [+focus] as a universal syntactic
feature. Not all proposals that reify focus would do so in this particular way. My point is to question any
conception of a unitary ‘focus’ as a universal category in human language. Indeed, what is common to all
such universalist positions is arguably the idea that there is a universal semantico-pragmatic category of
focus, so this might be seen as my primary target.
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elements (perhaps a core set of features that may be combined and recombined to pro-
duce a variety of effects cross-linguistically). However, even this is questionable in the
case of focus. For one thing, those elements of meaning that seem to crop up regularly
in putative focusing phenomena relate to such fundamental aspects of communication
that one must ask whether they need to be considered part of the grammar at all, in any
given case, let alone ascribed to universal grammatical primitives. In section 4, I also
briefly consider more philosophical arguments for positing universal (or otherwise cross-
linguistic) categories like focus, and suggest that appeals to scientific methodology do
not suffice to justify this practice.
2 Starting to lose focus: Hungarian ‘focus movement’
and English clefts
If focus were shown to drive syntactic movement this might lend significant support to
the idea that focus is a primitive grammatical notion. However, as mentioned above,
it has long been observed that Hungarian ‘focus movement’ does not occur in all and
only those circumstances where focal pitch accenting arises in English. Commonly, the
claim in the literature on Hungarian is that the ‘focus position’ (henceforth FP—the scare
quotes remaining, implicitly) conveys ‘exhaustivity’ or ‘identification’, like an English
it-cleft, whereas English accenting may convey simply ‘information update’. Thus, FP
constructions are often translated in linguistic work with an it-cleft, as in (2). Moreover,
this apparent parallelismwith the it-cleft has led to a distinct kind of universalist analysis:
that there is a common underlying syntactic structure to FP and the it-cleft, even if focal
accenting has a different basis (E´. Kiss, 1998, 1999).
Irrespective of universal or language-specific claims, the conventional way to ac-
count for the Hungarian ‘focus position’ has in recent years been to assume the existence
of some dedicated functional projection (‘FocusP’) whose contribution to compositional
semantics is an ‘exhaustivity operator’ (Szabolcsi, 1981) or an ‘identificational operator’
(Kenesei, 1986; Szabolcsi, 1994):
(4) Exhaustivity operator: λx [λP [P(X) ∧ ∀y [P(y) → y= x]]]
(5) Identificational operator: λx [λP [x= ιy [P(y)]]]
The assumption in all such work is therefore that some notion of uniqueness, contrast or
exclusion constitutes the core semantics of this syntactic position, the difference between
the exhaustive and identificational approaches being a matter of whether this uniqueness
or contrast is thereby asserted or presupposed.
Evidence that FP does not introduce an assertion of uniqueness (as in (4)) is
provided by the contrast between (6)(7-a) and (6)(7-b)2. This exploits the fact that Hun-
garian can use a plural-marked version (kik) of the question word ki ‘who’. It might be
expected that a singular noun phrase would be acceptable in response to a kik-question
2This example is due to Balogh (2005) (who uses it to reach different conclusions); see Wedgwood
(2005, 137) for a separate demonstration that FP does not contribute an assertion of exhaustification, which
is in turn based on work on the English it-cleft by Horn (1981).
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iff it is accompanied by some explicit assertion of exhaustivity/uniqueness, which would
in effect cancel the expectation of a plural noun phrase. (6)(7-a) shows that this is indeed
the case: kik (‘who-plural’) can be felicitously answered with csak Anna (‘only Anna’).
(6)(7-b) shows that the use of FP does not have the same effect. Since it thus fails to have
the effects predicted of an assertion of uniqueness, we must conclude that this syntactic
position does not inherently introduce such an assertion3.
(6) Kik hı´vta´k fel Emilt?
who-PL called.PL VM Emil-ACC
‘Who called Emil?’
(7) a. #Anna
Anna
hı´vta
called
fel
VM
Emilt.
Emil-ACC
b. Csak
only
Anna
Anna
hı´vta
called
fel
VM
Emilt.
Emil-ACC
Therefore, if we are to account for FP in terms of the direct association of a syntactic pro-
jection with a semantic operator, the latter must be the presuppositional ‘identificational’
operator4.
For the time being, then, let us accept this identificational operator analysis. For
present purposes, the important question is then to what extent this has any connection
to traditional notions of focus, such as might be encapsulated in any putative universal
focus feature. As I outline below, the evidence suggests that the usage and interpretation
of FP sometimes has parallels with English prosodic focus but in other ways is clearly
not the same. At the same time, it resembles the English it-cleft in many ways, but not
perfectly.
Before going further, let me make clear that any genuine parallel with the it-cleft
militates against the idea that the ‘focus position’ lives up to its name (in the sense of
bearing any similarity to focal accenting). Clarification is necessary here, since clefts are
3There are two ways to interpret (6), both of which have the same force with regard to the putative
semantics of FP. The first interpretation is that offered in the main text: on the assumption that csak
has essentially quantificational exhaustive semantics, (6)(7-a) shows how an exhaustive assertion cancels
expectations of plurality, and (6)(7-b) shows that FP alone is incapable of doing so and therefore does
not inherently convey an exhaustive assertion. The second interpretation would be in terms of a recent
trend in the literature on only (e.g. Beaver and Clark, 2008, and two talks at the Stuttgart workshop)
which claims that part of the semantics of such ‘exclusive’ items is that they are ‘mirative’: they cancel
expectations. Balogh (2005) suggests that this is sufficient to explain the contrast in (6) while preserving
exhaustive semantics for FP. But the question remains why FP in this case does not also have mirative
properties. Beaver and Clark argue that ‘exclusives’ as a class are mirative. The crucial point here is
that asserting exhaustification amounts to an act of exclusion. Therefore, by either interpretation of the
semantics of csak/only, we should see ‘mirative’ effects in (6)(7-b) if exhaustification were encoded in
FP as in (4). Note that this does not rule out the involvement of exhaustivity/uniqueness as some form of
presupposition in the interpretation of FP, as argued below.
4With the exception of Kenesei (1986) and Szabolcsi (1994), this seemingly rather significant point has
been somewhat glossed over in the literature on Hungarian: E´. Kiss (1998, 2002) speaks of ‘identificational
focus’ but provides only an informal definition of its semantics, which appears to equivocate between the
assertional and presuppositional analyses, while Horvath’s recent (2000; 2007) proposals continue the
tradition of opposing a general, ‘information update’ type of focus with what is effectively an assertion of
exhaustivity, without considering a presuppositional analysis.
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sometimes thought of as focusing devices. This is not the case, as a number of analysts
have pointed out in the past. It is plain that whatever focal pitch accenting contributes
to meaning must be orthogonal to whatever clefting contributes, since pitch accents may
be shifted around within an English cleft sentence, with concomitant changes in inter-
pretation. Thus, in addition to the ‘citation form’ it-cleft in (8) (what Prince, 1978 calls
a ‘stressed focus’ cleft and Hedberg, 1990 calls a ‘topic clause’ cleft), we find cases like
(9) (which Prince terms an ‘informative presupposition’ cleft and Hedberg calls a ‘com-
ment clause’ cleft). Indeed, Delin’s (1989) corpus study finds the latter kind to be more
common in texts.
(8) Debbie’s been trying to take the credit for my tango-dancing prize. But it’s
HARRY who taught me to tango.
(9) A: Why are you so fond of Harry?
B: Because it’s Harry who taught me to TANGO.
Consequently, if the Hungarian ‘focus position’ truly resembles the it-cleft, it cannot be
a manifestation of the same ‘focus’ that putatively underlies focal pitch accenting; on
the other hand, if it truly resembles focal accenting in any significant way, then it cannot
be identical to the it-cleft. The worst situation for any universalist analysis is therefore
one in which the Hungarian phenomenon shows significant similarities to both of the
English phenomena—and this is what we find.
On the one hand, FP bears close parallels to the it-cleft. As already noted, it
is typically associated with contrastive or exhaustive readings, just as the it-cleft is. It
also precludes a classic ‘topic-comment’ (or ‘VP-focus’) reading of the sentence (a point
made by Lambrecht, 2001 regarding clefts)—i.e. one in which everything except a single
argument or adjunct is ‘in focus’ by traditional definitions such as passing the question-
answer heuristic. In this respect, FP and the it-cleft are quite unlike focal accenting,
which is commonly reckoned to allow for the expression of ‘VP-focus’ via placement of
an accent on the rightmost argument within that VP, as in (10):
(10) A: What did John do?
B: John [F kissed MARY].
A sentence like B’s contribution in (10) would not be felicitously translated in to Hun-
garian using FP, though it plainly involves focal pitch accenting, which relates to the
crucial focus heuristic of answering aWh-question.
Moreover, it is as true of the Hungarian ‘focus position’ as of English clefts that
the locus of information update may be found at various points in the sentence. (11) is an
attested example of a ‘focus position’ sentence that parallels ‘comment-clause’ it-clefts:
(11) Nagyon
much
szeretek
love-1SG
fa´t
wood-ACC
va´gni.
chop-INF
Ha
if
csak
only
lehet,
may.be
[fava´ga´ssal]
woodchopping-with
kezdem
start-1SG
a
the
napot.
day-ACC
‘I love to cut wood. If possible, it’s with wood-cutting that I start the day.’
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It is plain, then, that FP could not be said to host all and only focused material, if ‘focused
material’ is taken to bear any relation to that which is focally accented in English and/or
that which is in focus according to question-answer heuristics.
On the other hand, the Hungarian ‘focus position’ shows certain important dif-
ferences to English it-clefts. Notably, there is a significant connection between the use
of FP and question-answer coherence. Specifically, when the ‘answer’ part of a sentence
happens to be just the size of a single, structurally simple noun phrase or adjunct—i.e.
in cases traditionally called ‘narrow focus’ (or Lambrecht’s ‘argument focus’)—the un-
marked sentence form uses FP, as shown in (12).
(12) Ki
who
hı´vta
called
fel
VM
Emilt?
Emil-ACC
‘Who called Emil?’
a. Anna
Anna
hı´vta
called
fel
VM
Emilt.
Emil-ACC
b. ?? (Anna) felhı´vta (Anna) Emilt (Anna).
This is quite unlike the English it-cleft, which is by no means an unmarked way to
answer such a question, let alone the unmarked way.
There seems little chance, then, of unifying Hungarian ‘focus position’ with any
notion of focus that could be at work in the grammar of English: the semantic contri-
bution of the Hungarian position cuts across what must be different notions in English
(cleft-presuppositionality and focus as conveyed by accent). Consequently, there is no
common [+focus] feature to be found here, even though there are undoubtedly various
comparable elements of both structure and semantico-pragmatic effect.
2.1 Similar effects; different causes
Since we have just concluded that the Hungarian ‘focus position’ is not functionally just
the same as the English it-cleft, it is worth also noting that the Hungarian construction
doesn’t look quite like a cleft structurally.
Once again, there certainly are some striking superficial similarities: in both con-
structions a ‘left-peripheral’ noun phrase (or similarly sized expression) is lent some
special status and commonly carries some form of pitch accent, while the rest of the sen-
tence appears to be given a presuppositional reading of some kind. On the other hand,
there are very notable differences. In particular, the Hungarian ‘focus position’ doesn’t
involve those defining characteristics of cleft constructions, (i) a copula verb whose sub-
ject is some form of pronominal and (ii) a relative clause5. Note further that Hungarian
does use other, more cleft-like constructions, as in the (attested) example (13), a fairly
clear indication that FP is not simply this language’s way of realising some universally
available, underlyingly cleft-like structure6.
5Note that while Hungarian has a null copula in the present tense, this is not the reason for the lack of
a visible copula in FP sentences: the past tense copula is non-null and does not appear in such sentences.
6Indeed, this example shows not only an overt cleft structure in the main clause but also an FP structure
in the subordinate clause that would not be felicitously translated with an English it-cleft.
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(13) . . . e´desanya´m
mother-1SG
volt
was
az,
that
aki
who
a
the
munkahelye´n
workplace-in
magasabb
superior
pozı´cio´t
position-ACC
to¨lto¨tt
fill
be.
in(VM)
‘{It was my mother who / My mother was the one who} occupied the superior
position in the workplace.’
Nevertheless, we have also seen that the it-cleft and the ‘focus position’ do regularly look
alike to a very considerable extent (and on-going work with corpus-derived data suggest
that the interpretive parallels stretch into areas of meaning that have not previously been
considered in this connection).
What this suggests is a very natural kind of situation, but one which linguists
often seem rather unhappy to recognise: rather than different manifestations of some
underlying shared core, we simply have close resemblance across distinct phenomena.
This is of course a very common situation in all kinds of extra-linguistic domains; sim-
ple examples from everyday experience include fluorescent, candescent and LED-based
light bulbs, which these days can all look very similar both on the shop shelves and in
use, or plasma screen and LCD-screen televisions. In both of these examples, quite dis-
tinct kinds of underlying technology produce strikingly similar results in terms of both
function and superficial form. In a parallel fashion, there are many instances in the nat-
ural world of resemblances of both form and function that we know to have different
origins, both in the evolutionary sense and in the sense of the ‘synchronic’ mechanisms
involved. Different kinds of eye or wing found across animal species provide obvious
examples (about which more below).
What, then, might be the particular mechanisms involved in the it-cleft and the
Hungarian ‘focus position’ respectively, such that these are underlyingly distinct but
produce just the degree of similarity that we observe?
My proposal is in part based on taking the surface-structural properties of the
two constructions seriously. I assume that the it-cleft has relatively straightforward,
compositional semantics: a presupposition of the existence of some unique entity is
introduced through the use of a pronominal subject and this entity is identified as one
that bears a certain property or properties through the use of the copula verb. This
leads naturally to essentially the meaning expressed in the ‘identificational operator’
analysis of the Hungarian ‘focus position’, as given in (5) above. I further propose
that this Hungarian construction also takes on this meaning as a result not of an atomic
‘operator’ that we stipulate to form part of the grammar, but rather as a result of more
basic semantic operations. As I outline below, the details of the interpretations of the
English and Hungarian constructions are closely related, but they are not identical. In
the Hungarian case, interpreting the relevant construction is not such a transparently
compositional process.
Both sides of this analysis involve controversial elements, which I can only
briefly allude to here. The idea that the it-cleft has broadly transparent compositional
semantics goes against a common assumption that the subject it is merely an expletive
element. However, a growing number of analysts now recognise that this is not the case:
the it of the it-cleft may not have all the characteristics of a full pronoun (such as number
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and gender agreement), but nor is it typical of expletive elements (see Bolinger, 1972;
Borkin, 1984; Hedberg, 1990, 2000; Geurts and van der Sandt, 2004). Crucially (as ob-
served by Geurts and van der Sandt), the same necessarily neuter pronoun appears in all
identificational copula sentences, not only clefts, as in Guess who I saw at the swimming
pool? It / *He was Alfred Tarski!. It seems reasonable to suggest that the lack of gender
and number agreement on this pronoun relates to the very fact that it denotes something
that requires identification, and as such carries minimal semantic specification itself. In
any case, it is clear that this it maintains those elements of full pronouns that are crucial
to the present argument: definiteness and its associated presuppositions of existence and
uniqueness.
My analysis of FP is essentially that of Wedgwood (2005) (and a relative of that
of E´. Kiss, 2006, 2008), which again can only be presented in rough outline here. The
core of the proposal is that the occupant of FP itself (which I define as the expression
immediately left-adjacent to the tensed element in the sentence, whose occupancy is
accompanied by the postposing of any otherwise pre-verbal ‘verbal modifier’ element
in the sentence) must be interpreted as the ‘main predicate’ of the sentence. Unlike
most analysts, I assume that all of the following occupy the same syntactic position: a
‘syntactic focus’, a verbal modifier when in its unmarked, pre-tense position, and a main
verb in its unmarked pre-tense position7.
Evidence for this is found in the behaviour of infinitival main verbs in the pres-
ence of an auxiliary verb (and hence morphologically free of the expression of tense).
(14) shows how the main verb then seems to ‘compete’ with any verbal modifier (such as
the particle meg) for the pre-tense position, just as foci seem to. Still more significantly,
the presence of a ‘syntactic focus’ causes an infinitival main verb to postpose, as in (15).
(14) a. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
la´tni
see-INF
fogja
will
Marit.
Mari-ACC
‘Ja´nos will see Mari.’
b. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
meg
VM
fogja
will
{hı´vni
call-INF
Marit
Mari-ACC
/ Marit
Mari-ACC
hı´vni}.
call-INF
‘Ja´nos will invite Mari.’
c. #Ja´nos
Ja´nos
meghı´vni
VM
fogja
will
Marit.
call-INF Mari-ACC
Intended: ‘Ja´nos will invite Mari.’
(15) a. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
MARIT
Mari-ACC
fogja
will
la´tni.
see-INF
‘It’s Mari who Ja´nos will see.’
b. *Ja´nos
Ja´nos
MARIT
Mari-ACC
la´tni
see-INF
fogja.
will
Intended: ‘It’s Mari who Ja´nos will see.’
7Note that in Wedgwood (2005) I argue for an approach to syntax based on linear processing, in the
manner of Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al., 2001; Cann et al., 2005); hence, I am not claiming here that
main verbs, verbal modifiers and ‘foci’ move to the same syntactic projection in the sense of conventional
frameworks, nor that they necessarily could.
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Given this, my claim is that a requirement that the occupant of the position in question be
interpreted as the main predicate predicts the different readings that are associated with
different kinds of expression in this position. That is, it is predicted that a main verb or
verbal modifier in this position will generally trigger an unmarked, ‘topic-commment’
reading, while the appearance of a noun phrase in this position will trigger a cleft-like
‘identificational’ reading.
The basic reasoning behind the first part of this is straightforward enough: a verb
is inherently predicative and in fact carries sufficiently rich structured semantic material
(in the form of argument and event structure) that applying this predicate to some referent
(given also some temporal anchor) can in itself constitute a fully propositional property-
ascription. Similar reasoning applies to the Hungarian ‘verbal modifiers’, which are
clearly in some sense intrinsically predicative elements, though here the arguments are
relatively complex (see Wedgwood, 2005, Chapter 7).
Other expressions, such as ordinary definite or indefinite noun phrases, are not
thought of as being inherently predicative. What, then, should we predict when such
an expression appears in a position that requires its occupant to take on a predicative
reading? An answer may be sought in Partee’s (1987) type-shifting principles. The type-
theoretic equivalent of lending a predicative reading to an individual-denoting expression
would of course be a shift from type 〈e〉 to type 〈e, t〉, an operation that Partee notably
calls ident and which amounts to the shift exemplified in (16)8:
(16) mary′ → λx. x=mary′
(‘interpret Mary as the set of things that are Mary’)
The informal English paraphrase given in (16) hints at where my argument is going: the
result of requiring an individual-denoting expression to be read as a predicate is precisely
to introduce an identificational element to the semantics of that expression. We are no
longer merely dealing with Mary, but rather with those things (or more plausibly that
thing) that can be identified as being Mary.
From this point, the full ‘identificational’ reading of ‘focus position’ sentences
follows—not as a matter of strict logical necessity, but by reasonable inferences nev-
ertheless. An act of identification implies the existence of something to be identified,
whence the presuppositional element to the identificational reading. Just what is pre-
supposed is determined by the rest of the sentence. Essentially, the predicate that is the
‘focus position’ expression needs a term to predicate over and also needs to be made to
relate in some coherent way to the rest of the material in the sentence in which it appears.
Both of these issues are resolved if we take the rest of the sentence to be what is iden-
tified by the ident-style predication—thus fullfilling the requirement that the pre-tense
expression is the main predicate. Putting all of this togther, we in effect end up with just
the reading given in the ‘identificational operator’ in (5). That is, the overall effect of the
‘focus position’ is (i) to abstract the denotation of its occupant from the normal meaning
of the sentence, (ii) via a process of inference, to bind the remainder with an iota (rather
than merely a lambda) and (iii) to apply the predicative reading of the ‘focus position’
8Alternatively, one might assume a shift from 〈e,〈e, t〉〉 to 〈e, t〉, Partee’s BE. This would not affect my
main point.
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expression to this iota-expression.
For example, the interpretation of (15)(15-a) involves a grammatically encoded
requirement to read Marit as the main predicate. It is therefore (lambda-)abstracted
away from the compositional semantics of the rest of the sentence and given essentially
the reading ‘be Mari’. This remainder, being inferred to relate to ‘that which is to be
identified’ is understood to represent ‘the thing(s) that Ja´nos will see’ (and note how the
selection of this as the term for the main predicate is practically forced in this case by
the presence of accusative case-marking in Marit). The resulting reading is therefore
essentially that of The entity that Ja´nos will see is Mari.
The idea that the Hungarian ‘focus position’ is essentially predicative receives
independent support from the distribution of quantified noun phrases across different
positions in the Hungarian sentence. The data are somewhat complex but boil down
to the observation that intersective quantifiers can appear in FP, while lexically simple
proportional quantifiers cannot, unless they are to be interpreted with contrastive focus
on the restrictor noun. Intersective quantifiers are notably those that can be thought of
as cardinality predicates; lexically simple proportional quantifiers cannot, and as such
fail to provide a potential main predicate. A phrasal proportional quantifier, meanwhile,
allows for the possibility that one of its constituent words is taken to provide the required
predicate (for reasons of space, the reader is referred to Wedgwood, 2005, Chapter 5 for
more details).
For present purposes, the point of all of this is simply to give one reasonably
detailed illustration, from within the domain of putative focus phenomena, of how very
similar interpretations may arise from different kinds of linguistically encoded meaning.
It is not necessary posit common underlying structure to account for such similarities.
As noted above, there are also significant differences between the it-cleft and FP and the
present proposals fit well with these also. While both constructions tend to be associated
with a presuppositional, identificational reading, in my analysis this is intrinsic to the
basic compositional semantics of the it-cleft, while it is something that merely follows
by inference (albeit regularly) from a more basic semantic procedure in the case of FP.
Given this, it is natural that the it-cleft should be more marked in contexts such as the
reply to a Wh-question. The Hungarian construction is compatible with any context
in which its implicit presupposition happens to be satisfied, whereas use of the it-cleft
constitutes a more active move on the part of the speaker to introduce the identificational
reading (hence its typical infelicity in aWh-question context).
3 Losing focus on a cross-linguistic view
This section takes a much broader and shallower perspective than the previous one,
merely noting a number of further examples of the existence of variation in what gets
called ‘focus’ in different languages (for reasons of space, in several cases I just mention
claims from the literature; I refer the reader to the cited works for examples). Even this
small number of illustrations is, I believe, sufficient to cast serious doubt over the via-
bility of ‘focus’ as a unitary cross-linguistic notion. The final section of the paper will
address on a more philosophical level why the assumption of any such notion would be
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mistaken in any case.
As noted in section 1, Somali has been presented as having a ‘focus morpheme’,
baa. Examples like (3) apparently bear a close resemblance to Hungarian ‘focus move-
ment’ (on a conventional understanding of that phenomenon), insofar as both correspond
to ‘narrow’ (or ‘argument’) focus and relate to a sense of contrast or exhaustivity. How-
ever, consideration of a broader range of examples shows that the baa has other, quite
distinct uses. Lecarme (1999) shows how baa can mark what by pretty much any defi-
nition are topics, in addition to foci:
(17) a´rdaygan
this.student
baa
F
wuxuu
expl-F
do´onayaa
wants
ı´nuu
comp
arko´
see
warqa´ddiisa
his.note
‘This student wants to see his notes.’
Lecarme argues that baa can mark both contrastive and non-contrastive topics. This is
debatable given the examples Lecarme presents (as is perhaps inevitable: it is hard to see
how contrast can ever be fully divorced from the business of predication and assertion,
for standardly Gricean reasons). The way might just be open therefore to maintain at
least an analysis in the style of Vallduvı´ and Vilkuna (1998), whereby baa could be
considered a marker of contrast (or ‘kontrast’), which might separately combine with
focus and topic features. Note, however, that even this kind of analysis would have
to recognise that this contrast feature would be manifested in the grammar in a rather
different way than in other languages: Lecarme points out that baa can be attached to an
expletive element, as in (18) (where it is manifested as the allomorph bu´u), and thereby
in effect fails to attach to the point of contrast within the VP, which in this case is the
verb meaning itself:
(18) A: (sa´aka)
today
wax
thing
ma´
Q
akhriyay?
read
‘Did he read (today)?’
(19) B: Ma´ya,
No
wax
thing
bu´u
F
qoray
wrote
‘No, he wrote’ (lit. ‘No, he wrote THING’)
The Siberian language Even is another that appears to use the same morphological mark-
ing on narrow foci and on contrastive topics. Again, this might be taken as support for a
grammatical primitive relating to contrast, but again it has idiosyncratic properties that
undermine any simple claim of universality. Matic´ (2007) reports that the relevant suf-
fix in Even relates not to just any sense of contrast but specifically to closed sets of
alternatives, typically with just two members. This is notably quite different to many
other kinds of putative contrast marking—including the situation in Somali described
above, where potentially open sets of alternatives make it difficult even to judge whether
a baa-marked topic is contrastive or not.
While Somali and Even appear to grammaticalise (different) meanings that cut
across the traditional information-structural categories of topic and focus, Aghem seem-
ingly grammaticalises a multitude of distinctions that roughly fall within traditional def-
initions of focus, thus undermining the unity of the notion of focus from the opposite
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direction. Watters (1979) (cited in Bearth, 1999) claims that complex interactions of
morphology and word order allow Aghem to encode all of the following distinctly: (i)
information (‘assertive’) focus, (ii) corrective (‘counter-assertive’) focus (i.e. ‘X, not
Y, is P’), (iii) ‘counter-assertive polar’ focus (i.e. assertion of a proposition following
its denial), (iv) focus that allows an inference to be drawn, as in ‘they gave the dogs
[F porridge] (and that’s why they are sick)’. Of this list, only (i) fits straightforwardly
into existing universalist theories of focus. Note that even (ii) looks subtly different to
other kinds of ‘contrastive focus’ (going by Watters’ description).
It is notable that Aghem has been cited as a ‘focus movement’ language along-
side Hungarian, as support for the existence of a focus position in universal grammar
(E´. Kiss, 1995). Yet the details of focus-related phenomena in this language speak of
considerable cross-linguistic diversity, rather than of language-specific exploitation of a
common focus primitive.
Luganda is a language that seems to mark focus straightforwardly, if one only
considers simple question-answer cases. In this case, the language appears to mark the
part of a sentence that answers a Wh-question by the absence of a certain prefix, tradi-
tionally known as an ‘augment’. This might be dealt with by the assumption that focus
licenses the absence of the augment (as Hyman and Katamba, 1993 argue), but this phe-
nomenon once again proves to have very different properties to those associated with
focus in more widely studied languages. For example, Hyman and Katamba (1993) note
that this putative focus-marking is neutralised within the scope of negation; something
which they note to be “quite pervasive in African languages”, but which is not charac-
teristic of more widely discussed ‘focus-marking’ phenomena. Also, the presence of an
adverb in a non-negative main clause necessitates would-be ‘focus-marking’ (i.e. the
absence of an expected augment) on some constituent within the clause, even if the in-
terpretation is predicate (or VP-) focus. Most unexpectedly for a focus-marking device,
the relevant distinction is neutralised in the case of proper nouns, which always lack the
augment, and demonstratives, which always carry the augment. Perhaps relatedly, Hy-
man and Katamba note that the augment can often be translated with a definite article
(though they argue convincingly that it is not one).
Whatever the proper description of the augment is, these properties strongly sug-
gest that it cannot be simply defined in terms of a category of focus that is also operative
in phenomena like English accenting, or indeed Hungarian ‘focus movement’. Yet it
does overlap substantially with traditional notions of focus, including passing the key
test of marking the answer to aWh-question. Taken together, these facts imply similarity
of effects, rather than identity of (grammatical) causes.
As a final point on Luganda, note that even if one could justify the idea that this is
‘focus’ in some meaningful sense, it would have to interact with the rest of the grammar
in ways that differ from other languages. For example, Hyman and Katamba show that
interpretations that might be called predicate (or VP-) focus, polarity focus and focus
on tense or aspect all correspond to one linguistic form. This is not what we would
expect from other cases of putative focus-marking, including both English accenting
and Hungarian ‘focus movement’, where such interpretive distinctions are associated
with quite different linguistic forms.
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Finally, English shows the inadequacy of ‘focus’, or related primitive notions, in
the face of the diversity of relevant phenomena within just a single language. Consider
the case of ‘focus fronting’, as in the second part of (20) (an utterance attributed to Jerry
Fodor by Prince, 1999):
(20) Let’s assume there’s a device which can do it—a parser let’s call it.
Vallduvı´ and Engdahl (1996) rightly note that this has different properties to focus-by-
accent, but claim that it still fits nicely within their universalist view of ‘information
packaging’: on this view, the fronted expression instantiates both a ‘Link’ (essentially, a
contrastive topic) and a ‘Focus’; that is, it sets up a background ‘set or scale’ and then
picks out an element of that set or scale. But note that this would describe any focused
item that may be read contrastively and therefore fails to provide sufficient conditions for
the use of fronting. Furthermore, Prince (1998, 1999) has shown this kind of construction
to be subject to subtle kinds of variation, cross-linguistically and cross-dialectally, above
and beyond what we could call ‘contrastive focus’. Thus, Vallduvı´ and Engdahl’s attempt
to squeeze this construction into a universally applicable schema actively suppresses an
accurate characterisation of its particular properties. It is easy to see that the risk of
significant distortion of the empirical picture is high when such an approach is scaled up
to the level of cross-linguistic analysis.
4 Assumptions of universality
Some readers may be unmoved by the above demonstrations of variation in putative
focus phenomena. It might be argued that such variation is merely superficial—or, at
any rate, that we should entertain the idea that it might be so. Moreover, it is key to any
scientific endeavour to seek to make unifying generalisations through bold hypotheses,
not simply to accept and re-describe the data. Is it not therefore the correct way to
proceed to assume that there is a universal category of focus unless and until it is shown
to be otherwise?
The answer is no, for a number of reasons. First, it is quite unclear what could
falsify such a supposition, if not the kind of ‘superficial’ evidence presented above. I
will not pursue this point, however, as this is not the place to delve into the details of
falsificationist philosophy of science. Here, I am more interested in the following points:
(i) it matters which generalisations we try to make and (ii) comparison with parallel
cases in the natural sciences shows the approach to universal categories described in the
previous paragraph to be a fallacy.
(i) is a crucial corollary to the mantra that we should ‘pursue the strongest hy-
pothesis’. Many absurd hypotheses could be described as being ‘strong’. Meanwhile,
the notion of comparing the strength of hypotheses implies that we have already identi-
fied a coherent, appropriate domain about which to hypothesise. Is this really the case
when we speak of notions like focus in a cross-linguistic context?
Here the accusation of dealing in superficial phenomena cuts both ways. If we
seek to identify those things that are so fundamental as to underlie the structures of all
human languages, we should be wary of taking surface effects, albeit ones that appear in
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similar forms across different languages, and reifying them as theoretically significant
atomic entities. Surface similarities are of course there to be explained, and we can all
agree that doing so means making generalisations; it does not follow that the relevant
generalisations should be stated in terms of the observed similarities. Whatever is truly
common to all languages need not bear much resemblance to the effects that it ultimately
produces. Therefore, to question notions like universal focus features on the basis of ob-
served cross-linguistic variation does not constitute an unscientific refusal to go beyond
superficial data; on the contrary, it implies a demand for a higher degree of abstraction:
a greater separation of surface effects from underlying causes.
This point could of course be applied to linguistic theory more generally, but at
this stage I want to emphasise that the properties of focus make it a notion that is par-
ticularly prone this criticism. Those properties that are typically ascribed to focus are
generally associated with domains that lie outside linguistic structure, but interact with
it (focus is, after all, regularly described as an ‘interface phenomenon’). Thus, ‘newness’
or noteworthiness clearly pertain to broader, extra-linguistic faculties of information pro-
cessing and to general cognitive issues of salience and selective focus of attention. Even
related ideas that have been modelled in terms of logical semantic formalism, like asser-
tion and contrast (or more loosely the relevance of alternatives), are essentially matters
of communication and of information processing, rather than being necessarily matters
of linguistic competence. Moreover, these ideas are truly fundamental within their re-
spective extra-linguistic domains.
It is therefore not a priori necessary to invoke a linguistic primitive (such as
a grammatical feature) to explain any given ‘focusing effect’ in a given language, let
alone to explain the existence of a number of similar effects cross-linguistically. It is
hard to imagine how linguistic communication could occur without ideas like newness
and contrast seeming significant, even if no language were formally sensitive to them
within its grammar. Note that this is not to deny that grammars may be sensitive to such
notions—it is always a logical possibility that a given language may conventionalise a
particular aspect of communication—but certainly it does not take a universal linguistic
primitive to explain how languages regularly appear to show a concern for such matters.
Let us now turn to point (ii) from above. In comparable scientific domains we
unproblematically assume many kinds of ‘category’ to be rather loose: descriptively
useful labels rather than minimal and invariant theoretical objects.
For example, an obvious analogy to the study of comparable phenomena across
different languages is that of comparable biological organs across different animal species.
Some organs may be truly very similar in a wide variety of species, constructed from
similar proteins as well as performing closely comparable functions. Others, however,
may show significant variation at all levels while still being recognisably part of the same
general ‘category’ of organ. The eye is an example of the latter kind of organ. As Land
and Fernald (1992) describe, the animal world contains a rich variety of solutions to the
problem of perceiving the outside world via the processing of light, from the pinhole
camera-like eyes of the chambered nautilus to the complex interaction of cornea, lens
and retina in eyes like those of humans. Both of these contrast with the compound eyes
of flies: arrays of individual image-processing units which must interface with the brain
in such a way that a composite picture is perceived. In addition to such gross morpho-
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logical differences, eyes plainly differ in function, some being adapted (for example)
to process subtle colour distinctions or or provide sharply focused images at consid-
erable distances, while others may provide only crude impressions of light and shade.
The material composition of eyes is also subject to significant variation: Land and Fer-
nald describe how some are apparently evolutionary innovations for optical use, while in
some species proteins have identifiably been co-opted from use in other tissues in ances-
tor species. This reminds us that variation in eyes across species is attributable not only
to divergence and specialisation over time but also to convergence, eyes having evolved
independently several times in the history of animal life.
Far from requiring us to assume identity until shown otherwise, the sensible and
fruitful scientific approach to the business of understanding eyes clearly involves recog-
nition of the value of descriptive labels that cover broadly similar physical forms with
broadly similar functions. Useful as the term ‘eye’ is in cross-species comparison, it
does not describe the same thing in each of its uses, nor is variation in eyes best under-
stood as parameterisation or as the result of combinations of a small number of primitive
elements (note that one could make essentially the same argument regarding, say, ‘lens’
as I am making regarding ‘eye’).
There is in fact one level at which a large proportion of the animal world’s eyes
are to some extent unified: the level of genes. There are surprising commonalities at
this level9. It seems that certain bits of genetic coding relevant to the production of
eyes have been co-opted repeatedly in the course of evolutionary history. Does this in
any way swing the analogy back in favour of universal notions of linguistic focus? Not
really. Note how far removed the genetic level is from any of the observable properties
of a given manifestation of the notion of ‘eye’. There is no chain of reasoning from the
surface similarities of some species’ eyes to the existence of certain sequences of DNA
that many species genuinely have in common. A mouse’s eye is still emphatically not
the same entity as a fly’s eye. Nor would assuming that they were the same have helped
in making the relevant genetic discovery (though recognising very broad functional and
formal similarity undoubtedly was involved). In any case, it is entirely unclear what
could be the analogue of the genetic level when it comes to discussions of linguistic
structure.
One thing that is clear is that a notion like focus, which is so closely drawn
from observable form and meaning, could not be considered analogous to shared genetic
material. Bringing together the strands of argumentation in this section, the role of the
genetic level within the broader analogy with cross-species comparison points up how
positing a universal notion like focus constitutes the reification of an observed effect of
language structure and use, at an essentially arbitrary level of detail—and indeed one
that is suspiciously superficial. The biological analogy shows that the level at which
similar-looking phenomena really share the same material may, at least in principle, be
at many removes from observable phenomena—if they truly share anything at all.
The degree to which putative ‘focusing phenomena’ across and within languages
really resemble each other, let alone work with the same grammatical primitives, is in
the end a wholly empirical matter. It will not be clarified by working to an assumption
9Thus, Halder et al. (1995) report that relevant sections of mouse gene spliced into a fly’s DNA can
cause normal fly eyes (not mouse eyes) to grow on different parts of the fly’s body.
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of maximum similarity. Above, I have given some reasons to believe that such resem-
blances are limited, though nonetheless interesting. While much further cross-linguistic
comparison and detailed analysis is undoubtedly required, this strongly suggests that our
approach to explaining such phenomena should move beyond the simplistic approach of
reifying focus (or a minimal set of related notions) as a part of the grammar; instead
recognising it to be a cover term for numerous effects of grammars and their uses.
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”Only” as a Mirative Particle
Henk Zeevat
ILLC, University of Amsterdam
1 Mirativity
The concept of mirativity was introduced in typology by DeLancey (1997) for certain
”tenses”. DeLancey refers to earlier traditions in ”Balkan Linguistics”. Malchukov
(2003) uses it in a typological overview of constrastive markers for the origin of certain
contrastive markers. A mirative marker indicates that whatever it marks is surprising.
The fact that one can express surprise does not need a special explanation, but the
fact that one can do it with a range of grammaticalised expressions in a whole range of
languages does. The explanation has to make a connection with a tendency in interpre-
tation to go for the unsurprising. The same tendency is assumed in probabilistic disam-
biguation, where one tries to interpret the linguistic expression by giving it the meaning
that is most plausible in the context (this is just the most rational way to disambiguate, if
other resources do not lead to a unique reading). Another well known instance is to go
for stereotypical interpretations. That means that interpreters will avoid the surprising
unless told not to —which would be precisely the aim of the mirative marker. Mirativity
is useful because it protects surprising content from correction by interpreters.
In English, one can find the markers even, still, already and only that seem to be
mirative (another group of mirative devices are the adversative markers: these are not
discussed here). In all four cases, they are specialised mirative markers, they express
surprise at the large size of a quantity (even), surprise at the small size of a quantity
(only), surprise at the early time of some event or the advent of some state (already) or
at the long continuation of a state (still). Surprise would be a question of conflict with
an expectation. Together this gives the following table:
even: more than expected
only: less than expected
already: earlier than expected
still: later than expected
Arndt Riester & Edgar Onea (eds.)
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It is relatively simple to state the semantics of the four particles informally in a uniform
way.
(1) Bill is still in Paris
(1) states or reconfirms that Bill is in Paris at the moment of speaking and presupposes
that he was expected to have left from there before the moment of speaking. The point
of the utterance is to assert that the presupposed expectation is false.
(2) Bill is already in Paris
(2) states that Bill is in Paris but presupposes him being elsewhere with the intention
of going to Paris and the expectation that he would not be in Paris yet. The point of the
utterance is to assert that the presupposed expectation is false.
(3) Even Bill is in Paris
The sentence states that Bill is in Paris and presupposes an expectation that others but
not Bill would be in Paris. The sentence asserts that the presupposed expectation is false.
(4) Only Bill is in Paris
(4) states that it is Bill who is in Paris and presupposes an expectation that ”more than
just Bill” would be in Paris. It asserts that the presupposed expectation is false. This is a
simple approximation to the semantics of the mirative particles if they are the outermost
operator in an assertion and the point of the utterance is to express the surprise. In the
case of ”still”, ”already” and ”even”, the host itself states new information, expected to
be false. Only is special because the information stated by the host is expected to be the
case: the expectation was ”Bill and more”, and this includes Bill.
The semantics of mirativity seems straightforward and can be isolated from the
other aspects: a presupposed expectation is asserted to be false. It is tempting to think
of the mirative markers as correction markers. And not entirely wrong because they can
be used in this role.
(5) A. Bill must be back home.
B. No, he is still in Paris.
A. [At a meeting in London.] Where is Bill?
B. He is already in Paris.
A. [Idem] Bill must be here.
B. Even Bill is in Paris.
A. The whole sales team is in Paris.
B. Only Bill is.
But —as it turns out— the expectation can be much weaker than the belief of the inter-
locutor (or the common ground, or a second speaker) and can even be vanishingly weak:
a mere suggestion or what somebody might think. Especially in subordinate occurrences
of only, the expectation can almost disappear.
Examples like (6) should therefore not be taken too seriously as counterexamples
to a mirative analysis. It seems enough that the alternative to the presupposed expectation
of the speaker or everybody is also under consideration in the context.
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(6) [I/everybody expect only John to come.]
If only John comes, we will have enough to eat, but if he
brings his son...
The weakening of presupposition in particles is a general phenomenon and can be related
to the ”semantic weakening” and ”pragmaticisation” that is attendant on grammaticali-
sation. In the case of mirative particles, Fong (2003) reports that ”already” in Singapore
can function as a perfective marker (without mirativity) and O¨sten Dahl (1985) takes
it that there is a general tendency of the already-type particles to become perfective
markers. Fong describes the process by which ”already” can mark perfectivity as a case
of semantic epenthesis: ”already” normally marks two semantic features: surprise and
perfectivity. In the perfective uses, surprise is still marked by ”already” but it does not
become part of the final interpretation that the hearer reaches and was never a part of the
interpretation that the speaker intended the hearer to reach.
While this is an interesting way to look at what is going on here, there is another
avenue: weak presupposition. The presupposed expectation can be common ground (be-
fore the speaker had the new information), they can be the speaker’s or the hearer’s, but
they can also be the expectation of a third party or of a possible third party. The weakest
expectation is ”there might be somebody who might think that A”. The presupposition
resolution mechanism tries to find the weak presupposition in the common ground and
in the opinions of highly activated persons, but also allows suggestions and attitudes by
other people as antecedent and can in the last resort just assume that the weak presuppo-
sition is somehow thinkable.
The outcome of presupposition weakening and semantic epenthesis is nearly
the same. The weakening approach finds confirmation in what one finds as ”presup-
position” in the weaker versions of ”wel” or ”doch”: in the strong versions they are
correction particles, in the weaker versions, the presupposed proposition that they con-
firm is merely suggested or even completely absent Hogeweg (2005), Zeevat (2004),
Karagjosova (2003). In fact, the strength of the presupposition antecedent is the key fac-
tor in keeping the different meanings of these particles apart in a context (and the factor
that determines the intonation, the other clue for disambiguation: overt antecedents lead
to contrastive intonation).
It is well-known that ”even”-type particles are a source for the non-mirative ad-
ditive particles (Malchukov (2003)). One may speculate that ”still” may be a source
for progressive marking. Only has a tendency to turn into an adversative particle, as in
Dutch or English and in Hungarian1..
(7) Peter is erg aardig. Je moet alleen oppassen als hij gedronken
heeft.
Peter is very nice. But/Only you must take care if he has
been drinking.
There is an almost universal agreement that only means ”to the exclusion of others”.
Barwise and Cooper (1981), Rooth (1992), van Rooy and Schulz (2005), Horn (1969),
Ippolito (2006).
1Gyuris, unfortunately only published in Hungarian
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(8) Only Bill is in Paris
Nobody but Bill is in Paris.
The discussion is then about what to do with the ”prejacent”, the host of only. For
some, it is asserted, others defend that it is presupposed, or that its topic ”x is Paris”
is existentially presupposed. Ippolito even lets the presupposition be ”If somebody is
in Paris, Bill is”. van Rooy and Schulz (2005) makes the prejacent an implicature. A
healthy exception is Atlas Atlas (1993).
Zeevat (2007) notes the following puzzle about only. In Rooth (1992) , an as-
sertion like ”John likes SUSAN”, with focus on ”Susan” turns out to mean the same as
”John likes only SUSAN”. But, intuitively, the meaning is not the same. My conclusion
in 1994 was that only meant ”less than expected” or that related to widening of the do-
main, but I did not see my way to a full treatment of only based on that view2. The same
puzzle arises in question-answer pairs.
(9) A. Who showed up?
B. Only John.
B is already expected to give an exhaustive answer to the question. The addition of only
would then be superfluous. The mirative view makes it easy to understand: more people
were expected to show up and only John came.
Umbach (2005) has a similar and beautiful example (10) for this phenomenon.
(10) (Things have changed in the Miller family.)
a. Yesterday, RONALD went shopping.
b. Yesterday, only RONALD went shopping.
In (10a) , Ronald went instead of Susan (he would not normally come along), whereas
in (10b) , one understands that he normally goes with Susan. In both cases, Ronald
goes alone. If only just meant exhaustivity, the contrast cannot be explained. We arrive
at the different interpretations by constructing the expectation that is violated in (10b) :
Ronald always goes shopping with Susan. In (12a) it is not necessary to construct an
expectation that a larger group than just Ronald goes shopping. In fact, it is difficult to
get a reading where ”Ronald” contrasts with ”Ronald and Susan”, presumably because
only is required for expressing that reading.
I want to defend the following four theses in this paper.
1. The semantic contribution of only is only low quantity mirativity: less than ex-
pected.
2. Other aspects —in particular exhaustivity— are an effect of ”focus”: the host has
to be interpreted as the exhaustive answer to its topic question.
2Mymain reason for taking this up again was reading part of an earlier manuscript of Beaver and Clark
(2008). The position of this paper is close to the final version but different in not attributing exclusivity
to the semantics of only, but to the exhaustive interpretation of the host forced by only. The proposed
“semantics” of mirativity and the treatment of only if are new elements. I would claim that the treatment
provided here makes it easier to see the relation with the other mirative particles and to deal with the
grammaticalisation of only.
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3. Only forces the host to have that interpretation.
4. Except for (2) and (3) an only-sentence means the conjunction of only and its host.
(4) would be the ideal for particle semantics and seems viable for most particles with
negation particles and floating quantifiers the exception. The host means whatever it
means, the particle adds something.
(1) denies the received view: only does not mean ”to the exclusion of others”.
That only-sentences entail exhaustivity is the effect of disambiguation: the interpreta-
tion as the exhaustive answer to the question coresponding to its topic (2) is a possible
meaning of the host, forced by the presence of only (3). Only itself has a different task,
denying an expectation.
Section 2 develops the meaning of only, section 3 discusses weak presupposition
as an analysis of expectation, section 5 applies these ideas to the logic of only if and the
conclusion contains a brief discussion of ”association with focus” and the other mirative
particles.
2 The Meaning of ”Only”
The first point to be made has to do with quantity mirativity. If only occurs in a host,
it can only express quantity mirativity if the host specifies a quantity. This forces an
interpretation on the host that turns it into an exhaustive answer to a quantity question.
It is clear what the question is: it is obtained by leaving out the focused element from
the host and replacing it by a suitable wh-element. Schematically the host is then H(C)
withC the focused element. The question is then ?xH(x) and its exhaustive answer isC.
The second point to be made is that surprise at a low quantity presupposes the
expectation of a higher quantity: somebody must expect the exhaustive answer to ?xH(x)
to be ”C together with other persons or things”.
This can be provisionally notated as exp(H(C+O)). An only-sentence then con-
firms the expectation that C belongs to the answer and denies that O is part of it. Only
therefore presupposes exp(H(C+O). It asserts that anything below O lacks the property
H: ∀x⊆ O¬H(x).
Let’s apply this to the Umbach example (11):
(11) Yesterday, only Ronald went shopping.
The presupposed expectation is that, last Saturday, others O would have gone shopping
with Ronald. Given the setting, O must resolve to the singleton {s} consisting just of
Ronald’s wife Susan. This gives the representation (12) (I will write the presupposition
before ”:” and the assertion after it.).
(12) exp(S(r+ s)) : ¬S(s)
The utterance implicates that Ronald is the single person from the Miller family
who went shopping yesterday—that part of the expectation is not denied. It is properly
denied that Susan went shopping with Ronald. The denial involves a correction of the
expectation: Susan was expected to go, but didn’t.
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If the utterance is denied as in (13) the nature of the expectation changes. The
information that the utterance illustrates how the Miller family habits changed makes
it impossible to assume that Susan and Ronald had a habit of shopping together on
Saturdays. It seems that a sociological fact of couples normally doing the shopping
together on Saturdays will now have to underpin the expectation.
(13) Last Saturday not only Ronald did the shopping.
exp(S(r+ s)) : ¬¬S(s)
The result of the negation is that the expectation is implicated to be true: the Miller
couple did the shopping together last Saturday, since this is the evoked and uncorrected
expectation. There is another expectation involved here: the expectation that Ronald
would be shopping alone, presumably based on an opposite habit. This expectation is
evoked by the negation: without that expectation, there is no reason for denying that
Susan did not go.
While this is an approximation and explains the intuitions about who it is that
accompanies Ronald in (13) , it is too weak. Both the positive and the negative example
seem to entail that Ronald went shopping, whether by himself or in company and not
just to implicate it. Also the analysis fails to exclude a situation where a relevant other
person, different from the expected Susan went along shopping with Ronald, e.g. his
mother in law. And this is intuitively ruled out in the positive case.
The problem is that we only dealt with only, treating the host sentence merely
as a convenient source for semantic material to slot into the semantics of only. This
semantics can be given abstractly as: only α(c) presupposes an x that is expected to have
the property α together with the disjoint c3 and denies α of x.
(14) x,exp(α(c+ x) : ¬α(x)
What does the host sentence contribute? The use of only does not make sense on a host
α(c) unless α(c) is interpreted as determining the ”quantity” c as the exhaustive answer
to the question ”wh- among the C has the property α?”. If α(c) merely gave a non-
exhaustive answer to that question without a further claim that that is the full answer,
no quantity mirativity could sensibly attach to it. If c is merely one of the true answers
to the question, c could not be less than expected, since the other answers are unknown
and maybe add up to the expected quantity. An exhaustive answer can be seen as a
non-exhaustive answer together with the statement that other answers, disjoint from c or
exceeding c are false. This can be written as follows.
(15) : α(c),∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x))
The two semantic representations can be combined into (16).
(16) x,exp(α(c+ x)) : ¬α(x),α(c),∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x))
3Here and elsewhere, x+ y is used for a sum of disjoint entities. This is not a restriction: if x and y are
not disjoint, one can take y\ x instead of y.
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Now a simplification is possible. ¬(α(x)) is a consequence of ∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x)) and
so it can be dropped.
But also the status of α(c) changes, since it is part of the expectation. This leads
to another simplification which however needs a closer look at expectation.
The operator ”expected” is only correct for the positive Umbach example, where
the expectation based on our take of the habits of the Millers is a full-fledged member
of the common ground. But already in the negative example the expectation is much
weaker. Do we really expect that couples do the shopping together on Saturday? This
is just a tendency and far too weak to put any money on Susan and Ronald going to-
gether especially when they have a habit of not doing so. The expectation is much better
analysed as weak presupposition, needed anyway in the analysis of many particles. In
the examples, weakly presupposed shopping by Ronald and Susan could pick up both
a habit of the Millers of shopping together or the general habit of couples shopping to-
gether on Saturday. These problems are better addressed by weak presupposition: the
common ground should contain a reason for thinking that p is true given, where p is the
expectation. There may be reasons for thinking both that p and that ¬p, and there may
be a reason for thinking that p even if there is more reason for thinking that ¬p. Weak
presupposition in addition seems to be independently required for the meanings of other
particles, for negation, for questions and for intonation.
3 Weak Presupposition
Weak presupposition has been around for a long time, especially in areas like negation
and questions. What makes it weak is that the weakly presupposed material does not
need to hold in the common ground or in the common ground extended with local infor-
mation such as normal, strong presupposition requires. The weak presupposition may
be in the common ground as such, but it can equally well be in the common ground as
a suggestion, as an opinion of somebody or merely as a plausible inference. The claim
is that negation weakly presupposes the opposite opinion in the context (which then
gets denied) and that wh-questions weakly presuppose the truth of the corresponding
existential statement (which is enough for making it plausible that it can be answered).
Some maintain that the difference between positive and negative polar questions can be
explained by weak presupposition: positive polar questions weakly presuppose the neg-
ative answer and negative polar questions weakly presuppose the positive answer. Weak
presupposition is not important for the formal semantics of questions and negation, but
from the perspective of discourse and dialogue coherence, it is hard to overrate it. The
weak presupposition that finds a proper antecedent for a question or negation will give
vital clues about why the question arose and how it should be interpreted and related to
the speaker’s intentions or to what exactly it is that the interlocutor is denying.
In the area of particle semantics, weak presupposition seems to be even more
unavoidable. A correction marker requires a statement to be corrected, an adversative
marker, something that is ”adverse” to it, an additive marker something that it is in
addition too, a confirmation marker something that it confirms. And quite systematically
one finds that the corrected statement does not need to be entailed in the local context
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of the marker (one can correct Harry’s beliefs just as well as the interlocutor’s or one’s
own), that the adverse information is not directly given but must be inferred by plausible
inference, that additive antecedents are embedded under operators like perhaps or even
Bill dreamt that and that confirmation markers can confirm information that is given
under a similarly wide range of operators .
Not that anything goes. Negative contexts (like negation and doubt) do not pro-
vide good antecedents (but their negations may be picked up). Also proper contexts for
antecedents can be blocked by denying the truth of the antecedent or casting doubt on it.
(17) Mary doubted that she would pass. ??She did indeed./She
failed indeed.
John thinks that Mary is in Spain. Bill is in Spain too.
John thinks that Mary is in Spain, which cannot be
true/which I doubt ??Bill is in Spain too.
The conditions on what is a good antecedent are also not uniform for the different mark-
ers.
(18) Bill dreamt that Mary was in Spain. She is indeed.
Bill dreamt that Mary was in Spain. ?Susan is there too.
Bill dreamt that Mary was in Spain in June. ??She is there
again.
One can try to develop a single operator that generalises over all possible operators
(see Zeevat (2004) for an attempt) but in the light of the different acceptability of the
examples in (18) this seems misguided and at best only partly correct. There is also a
default when different resolutions are possible: one needs to go for the ”most accessible”
one and this default is obscured by having a single operator that lumps all the possibilities
together.
Another problem with such an account can be illustrated by the following pair.
(19) Hij komt WEL.
Hij komt wel.
The first example needs a proper antecedent with an overt negation and is a correction of
the opinion expressed by the negated sentence (it can be the correction of the belief of a
person different from speaker or hearer):
(20) Piet denkt dat Jan niet komt.
Hij komt WEL.
The second example means something like, Don’t worry. In my opinion, he will come.
This is similar to WEL in presupposing the negation of the host, but this time it can
be an unexpressed thought which is attributed to the audience. The way in which the
antecedent is given seems to be decisive for the ambiguity between a proper correction,
based on what the speaker believes to know and the much weaker disagreement with the
negation expressed in the other case.
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It would seem that the different degree of toleration for weak antecedents can be
much better understood as the outcome of a natural historical process4 in which proper
lexical presupposition triggers lose descriptive meaning in favour of a linking and dis-
tinguishing function, acquire more toleration for inaccessible antecedents and lose their
ability to force accommodation.
The property of non-accommodation (also here a question of degree) is the third
property that sets weak presupposition apart from strong presupposition. If weak presup-
position cannot be resolved to the discourse context, as a last resort they can be assumed
to hold under an operator like it might be thought that. This would deal with the cases of
negations and questions where no antecedents seem to be around or with the ”extremely
grammaticalised” uses of particles like wel.
The three properties of weak presupposition are connected. Little lexical content
means that the presupposition will not end up in a predication that must be true in the
local context of the trigger, which allows it to have antecedents that do not need to exist
or be the case in that local context. Linking and distinguishing to discourse elements
that one first has to accommodate does not seem useful, quite apart from the fact that
signaling that the discourse context has certain components when it does not, sits badly
with the intuition that the discourse context has common ground status.
The notion of weak presupposition can be implemented by a variant of the pro-
posal of van der Sandt (1992) for strong presupposition. The weak presupposition is
provisionally represented at the site of the trigger. The accessible contexts are then
searched in the normal order, with two additional options. The first is a recursive search
in the content of their subordinate contexts which are introduced by positive attitude and
modal operators. The second option is inference: does the context offer a reason r for
thinking that p. This comes down to searching with a search term [r,normallyi f r, p] and
requires an axiomatisation of ”normally if”. Instead of failing or normal accommodation
when the antecedent cannot be found, the most tolerant class of weak triggers can just
add the always uncontroversial: it might be thought that p to the outermost context, as a
last resort.
The most tolerant class of weak triggers —to which only belongs— is constituted
by questions, negations and confirmation and correction markers. Additive markers are
more restricted in the range of operators under whose content can be searched and do not
allow the last resort reading. Adversative markers seem similarly restricted. This is not
say that these classes of particles are homogeneous. This paper is however not a place
to engage in a proper study of the fine structure involved.
The application to only is to replace the notion of expectation by weak presuppo-
sition of the kind that can take antecedents from any kind of positive context and from
inferential processes and as a last resort can add ”it might be thought that p”. In this, it
would be comparable to wh-questions, negation or to particles like indeed.
This makes the meaning of only into (21).
4A much more systematic argument for differentiation by a historical process can be developed here
by comparing the distribution of classes of particles. For example, only, but, just, merely are all exclu-
sive particles and exclusively is an adverb with exclusive meaning, but they vary substantially in their
distribution. As another example, the Russian particles i, tozhe and takzhe are all three additive but have
completely different syntactic and semantic properties.
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(21) x,weak(α(c+ x)) : ¬α(x)
And the meaning of the combination of only and its host α(c) into (22).
(22) x,weak(α(c+ y)) : α(c),∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x))
I.e. α(c) is both weakly presupposed and asserted. This is a strange status: as an assertion
α(c) should be new, as a weak presupposition, it is given. Assertions that are not new
are normally marked by confirmation markers such as indeed, unaccented doch and the
like. It seems natural to claim only is a confirmation marker with respect to prejacent.
A technical proposal to deal with material that is both weakly presupposed and
asserted is to make it both strongly and weakly presupposed. The weak presupposition
forces a search for the material and if it turns out to be present in the accessibility path of
the trigger, this is the antecedent for both the weak and the strong presupposition. If the
search for weak antecedents however leads to a weak antecedent, the accommodation
attendant on strong presupposition will add the material to a context on the accessibility
path of the trigger, nl. at the point of the operator on the weak antecedent.
This comes down to the statement that α(c) is either resolved to an accessible an-
tecedent, or resolved to an inaccessible antecedent with a further accommodation in an
accessible context. The further accommodation in case the resolution is to an inaccessi-
ble attitude or suggestion is a confirmation of that attitude or suggestion. In neither case,
it can be new focal material of the only-sentence that can be in the scope of a negation.
The technical proposal is presumably the correct analysis of confirmation mark-
ing. (23) is correct in identifying the assertion with the weak presupposition, but it would
correspond to an instruction to identify p in the context (including the non-accessible
parts under a positive operator) followed by an update with p. But if p is found in the
accessibility path of indeed, this would lead to a spurious update with p, i.e. garbage
with the potential of generating confusion.
(23) indeed(p)
weak(p) : p
So the correct view is as in (24) which avoids spurious updates. The ideal for particle
semantics is to see indeed(p) as the conjunction of the assertion that p and the fact that p
is given. But this is self-defeating: proper assertions are supposed to assert new material.
Marking p as a given presupposition solves the problem.
(24) weak(p), p :
The conclusion is that question whether the host in an only-sentence is a presupposition,
an assertion or an implicature is a false trilemma. It cannot be a proper assertion since it
is marked as given: it is however confirmed. It cannot be a proper presupposition since
it can be tied to inaccessible material outside the common ground, it is however a weak
presupposition. It cannot be an normal implicature since it cannot be cancelled. The
status of a given presupposition seems the way out.
The proposal hardwires the impossibility of negation as in (25) taking scope over
the statement ”Ronald did the shopping”: it is given and presupposed. But even if that
”Only” as a Mirative Particle 131
statement is thought of as part of the assertion, the assertion would be improper, since
it is a partial confirmation of the weakly presupposed statement that Ronald and others
went shopping. The antecedent of the weak presupposition is not in the scope of the
negation.
(25) It is not the case that only Ronald went shopping.
Not only Ronald did the shopping.
The proposal makes the representation of only-sentences still simpler, as in (26).
(26) α(c),weak(x,α(c+ x)) : ∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x))
Notice that this version deals with the problems noted above. Ronald’s shopping be-
comes entailed by any successful interpretation of the positive and negative case, Ronald’s
mother in law is excluded from accompanying him in the positive case and weak pre-
supposition allows Susan’s presence to be more unexpected than expected in the negated
case.
One can continue to be unhappy about the negated case. In the Umbach example,
the result of pure mirativity was that the expected Susan was indeed asserted to be the
person who was with Ronald when he did the shopping. The combined version merely
entails that Ronald went shopping with someone other than himself. This is perhaps
right, with it being an implicature that it was Susan due to the setting: the sentence gives
an explanation of a change in the Miller household and this points towards Susan.
Compare (27)on this point. Speaker A has noticed that John did not take the
danish rolls at an occasion he was offered bagels and danish rolls. Speaker B knows
better: he also eats chocolate croissants. B has not entailed that John eats danish rolls
when he finishes the first part of his correction.
(27) A: John only eats bagels.
B. No, John does not only eat bagels. He also eats chocolate
croissants.
It has been noticed in the literature (Horn (1969)) that one can fairly felicitously correct
on the prejacent in the positive case, but that this becomes almost inacceptable in the
negative case.
(28) Only Ronald did the shopping but I am not sure that he did
indeed go.
(??) Not only Ronald did the shopping, but I am not sure that
Ronald did indeed do the shopping.
The asymmetry can be connected to the analysis. Somebody who makes the positive
statement exploits the weak presupposition and makes the exhaustive assertion of the
host that goes with it. He can then correct himself on the point of Ronald really doing
the shopping. This is quite comparable to saying (29), using the strategy of saying
something stronger and then taking back some of it: nobody else went shopping and
perhaps not even Ronald.
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(29) Everybody came. Except John.
In the negative case, the weak presupposition is not denied but confirmed. So here the
speaker would come out as both affirming and denying the weak presupposition and
it would not be an instance of the strategy of overstating and taking back some of it
employed in the last example. Moreover, it seems unfortunate to first focus on the others
(taking Ronald for granted) and then coming back to Ronald and to express one’s doubts.
Finally, the real challenge for those who want to maintain that the host is pre-
supposed is to explain why it cannot be cancelled under negation, as is predicted to be
possible under almost any view of presupposition. Presuppositions under negation can
be easily cancelled as shown by examples like (30).
(30) The king of France is not bald. There is no king of France.
What your generalisation captures is exactly nothing.
But (31) is completely out.
(31) ????Not only Ronald did the shopping. He never went near
a shop.
????It is not the case that only Ronald did the shopping. He
never went near a shop.
An explanation of this impossibility should show that local accommodation in the scope
of the negation is not possible for the non-exhaustive version of ”Ronald did the shop-
ping”. In the view of Van der Sandt, cancellation under negation is local accommodation
under the negation. For ”Ronald did the shopping” there are two possibilities. Either it
resolves to the same antecedent as the weak presupposition ”Ronald and others did the
shopping”. In that case, it cannot be locally accommodated under the negation. The
other possibility is that ”Ronald and others did the shopping” finds a weak antecedent
in a context originating from an accessible context C of only. In that case, the proper
accommodation site for ”Ronald did the shopping” is C, again well outside the local
context of the negation. In this perspective, the fact that the weak presupposition of only
entails the prejacent is responsible for the absence of accommodation of the prejacent
under negation.
4 Context-sensitivity of ”Only”
Low quantity mirativity is a label that hides considerable complexities. To be surprised
at a low quantity one needs: a set of quantities for comparison, an ordering over them
and an orientation. Before a quantity was a set in a set of sets ordered by inclusion and
the orientation was from small to large.
But quantities can be objects, weights, chunks of matter, sizes, numbers, profes-
sions, propositions and other things, with an order and orientation derived from the topic
question, the goal behind it and the elements themselves.
(32) is ambiguous5 as can be seen by the utterances it may correct.
5Notice that this example is fine in English but translates badly into Dutch or German.
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(33) Seven boys can lift this piano./20 boys can lift this piano.
No, only 12 boys can lift the piano.
If one corrects on ”seven boys”, the question is ”how many boys can lift this piano” and
one denies that the answer ”seven boys” is correct. The true answers form an interval
[n,ω] of the natural numbers. The smaller cardinalities 1 . . .11 are denied by the exhaus-
tive interpretation. When ”20 boys” is corrected, the question must be different: if 7 or
12 boys will do, also 20 boys will do. The question in this setting is ”what is the least
number of boys that can lift the piano”. The set of numbers that give a true answer is
now just {n} and the contribution of only is limited to the negation of the expectation
that is normally —but not here— entailed by the exhaustive interpretation.
The following examples show that the ordering for the interpretation can derive
from non-logical and non-mathematical factors.
(34) Only Bill is in Paris.
Assume Bill is there on a business trip, Bill is the best salesman in the company, but his
boss the best negotiator and Bill is there for important negotiations. The issue addressed
is whether there is a good negotation team and only Bill is less good than could be
expected. If one changes the setting to a sales visit and the issue to whether the company
has sent the right team, the use of (34) will become inappropriate.
What seem to be going on here is some mapping from the possible answers to
the quality of the team for the job they are supposed to do. Adding the boss to the
negotiation team would make it better. Adding the boss to the sales team would not
make much difference.
One way of thinking about cases like this would be as another question hiding be-
hind the official question ”who is in Paris?”. Something like: ”how good is our company
team in Paris for the negotiations?” This is the question resolution mechanism discussed
by Ginzburg (1995).
Something similar is going on in the following example. Suppose A has organ-
ised a voluntary question hour before the test for his course. He now reports (35).
(35) Only John showed up.
He may in fact be disappointed about the number of students who showed up without the
fact that John was the exception having any special role in his expectations. He expected
5 students to show up. John is just a special way of answering the question with one.
Mechanisms of question resolution and domain restriction as part of question
resolution have an important part to play. The structure of the set of possible answers
to the question determines the meaning of exhaustivity (the denial of the answers not
entailed by the host) and so influences the meaning of an only-sentence. In the mirative
theory of only this part of the account of only-sentences is not related to only as such: it
belongs to the explanation of scalar implicatures and other exhaustivity effects.
(32) A. 20 boys can lift the piano.
B. ?Slechts/alleen/maar 12 jongens kunnen de piano optillen.
B. ? Nur 12 Jungen koennen das Klavier aufheben.
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5 Only if
The assumption that the semantic function of only is to express low quantity mirativity
on top of the semantics of the host runs into trouble with a famous use of only in logic:
the only if ... then-connective normally claimed to mean to reverse of the connective if
then.
(36) if p then q: p→ q
only if p then q: q→ p
It is directly clear that this should be an exception to the view on only developed in this
paper and to all other views that hold that the host is entailed, presupposed, implicated
or otherwise true if the only-sentence is. The logical view makes things easy: q→ p just
does not entail p→ q, so the only-sentence can be true without the host being true.
One may perhaps think for a brief moment that this is an artefact of the logical
tradition: one has been trained to understand it the logician’s way. But this is not plausi-
ble, since there are similar ways of connecting material that have the same property and
that play no role in logic.
(37) John visits Mary on Sundays.
In Paris, John drinks wine.
When it rains, John takes an umbrella.
The most accessible interpretations of these sentences is as a soft universal quantifica-
tion: this is what John does on a Sunday, this is what he takes for his drink in Paris (at
his meals perhaps), this is what he does when it rains. Compare these with the following
cases.
(38) John visits Mary only on Sundays.
Only in Paris, John drinks wine.
Only when it rains, John takes an umbrella.
Here clearly, the soft universal reading is not present. John may visit Mary only very
rarely on a Sunday. It may have been a single time during many long visits to Paris that
John took some wine and the occasions on which it rained and John took an umbrella
may be few in comparison with the cases in which he went into the rain without one. So
from a linguistic perspective, the problem of only if arises at other places and it cannot
be an artefact of logic, in which sentences such as these are rarely discussed.
These other cases turn out to give the key to the solution to the problem with
only if: it is possible to set up the context so that the universal quantification becomes an
existential one, as in (39).
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(39) A. John never visits Mary on a Sunday.
B. Well, he does visit Mary on Sundays. Only not very often.
A. John never drinks wine in Paris.
B. Well, he does drink wine in Paris. But he also has beer
when he is there.
A. John never takes an umbrella.
B. Well, when it rains, John takes an umbrella. But not
always.
And another way (40) of forcing these interpretations.
(40) A. When does John visit Mary?
B. He visits Mary on Sundays. Only not very often.
A. When does John drink wine?
B. He drinks wine in Paris. But he also has beer when he is
there.
A. When does John take an umbrella?
B. When it rains, John takes an umbrella. But not always.
And this is precisely what is needed. The view on only in this paper was given as follows.
1. The semantic contribution of only is only low quantity mirativity: less than ex-
pected.
2. Other aspects —in particular exhaustivity— are an effect of ”focus”: the host has
to be interpreted as the exhaustive answer to its topic question.
3. Only forces the host to have that interpretation.
According to (3), only forces an exhaustive interpretation on these examples as
in (38) as an answer to a question as in (40) . The pattern is the same when one uses
the corresponding if . . . then-sentences.
(41) John visits Mary, if it is Sunday.
John drinks wine, if he is Paris.
If it rains, John takes an umbrella.
Applying this to a well-known example (42), it gives three things.
(42) Only if you behave, you will get a cookie.
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The first is an expectation that indifferent as well as proper behaviour will lead to a
cookie. The expectation is quite likely founded in the behaviour of the adressee. The
expectation is denied.
”if you behave” should be an exhaustive answer to the topic question, here:
”when will you get a cookie?”. It is not completely obvious what exhaustivity means
in this context but this may be safely left for future research6.
But property (3) is really the important one. It forces an interpretation on only
if-sentences where the host is an exhaustive answer to the question ”when does the con-
sequent hold”. And this gives—as shown above— an existential reading: there are cases
in which the condition and the consequent both hold.
Applied to our example, it is clear that it does not amount to a promise. But there
is hope: some lines of proper conduct will lead to a cookie.
Normal if...then sentences are universal, just like the examples in (39) . They
typically answer questions of the form (43).
(43) What happens, if ....
What follows, if ....
And the causal and logical order are such that this assigns universal force. If the answer
is based on causality or logic, it will invariably (or ceteris paribus) follow from the
antecedent.
Unfortunately, in the case of (42) it does not suffice to add an earlier never-
sentence or to make a when-question explicit to get the host to have this reading. B’s
contribution cannot —or only with the greatest difficulty— be interpreted existentially,
i.e. without given it the force of an a conditional promise.
(44) A. When will I get a cookie?
B. If you behave, you will get a cookie.
A. So I will not get a cookie under any circumstance?
B. If you behave, you will get a cookie.
In fact, this prompted Saeboe (1986) to the conclusion that the host of only if-sentences
must contain a hidden can. I prefer a different formulation of this insight: can must be
inserted when only is removed since just removing only makes the existential reading
non accessible. The can is not a hidden operator, but an (obligatory) marker of the
(modal) existential interpretation of the conditional (a disambiguating device).
There are two kinds of if . . . then-sentences: one where the condition describes
many (possible) events and one in which the condition describes a single possible event.
The existential reading is different in both cases: with many events, the conditional
states that some of these events are accompanied by the consequent, with the singular
event that it may be accompanied by the consequent. For a condition of many events, the
existential reading can be forced by inserting sometimes (an optional marker). Only also
forces this reading. But there are quite a number of contexts (bare plural, bare singulars,
6The intuitive generalisation of the semantics given earlier on is not bad however: the possible lines of
conduct which are not special cases of ”behave” do not have the property that a cookie will be awarded at
the end of them. But this lacks logical sophistication.
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unanchored past, omitted arguments etc.) in which an existential interpretation does
not need to be overtly marked and it is unsurprising to find another cases of the same
phenomenon, i.e. the case that the conditional is the answer to a when-question or the
case that it denies a never-statement. The existential reading on conditionals in which
the condition describes a single event can be forced by modals like can or by only. But
the possibility interpretation cannot remain unmarked, since it is not the default: that
is the statement that the consequent will happen or hold when the condition happens or
holds. So what happens in a singular event conditional hosting only is that when only is
removed, it reverts to the non-existential default interpretation.
The counterargument to the view of this paper based on only if turns out on a
closer look to be more an argument in its favour. The disambiguation of the host by
the presence of only is even more spectacular than in the case of if . . . then-sentences
than in the case of simple sentences like ”only Ronald did the shopping”. This reading
of ”if”-sentences has been noticed before by Saeboe (1986) and Kratzer (1979). The
latter discusses the case that the i f -clause associates with an adverbial like sometimes,
and this gives the same reading. The presence of an existential adverbial is however not
necessary for the reading, as I hope to have shown.
6 Conclusion
The considerations above make it possible to avoid association with focus, even in the
minimal sense of Rooth (1992). Only expresses that an exhaustive answers to a wh-
question falls short of the expectation. The meaning can be characterised in terms of
that question and its answer. Since the host normally has the intonation of such an
answer, stress is on the element that corresponds with the wh-phrase.
The easiest way to deal with the combination of the semantics of only and its
host is by means of anaphora. Only would presuppose the semantics of the host as an
exhaustive answer to a wh-question and would pick up both the question and its answer
as antecedents, with the additional requirement that if the occurrence is non-elliptical,
the antecedents belong to the same clause as only. The weak presupposition and its
partial negation are derived by structure sharing.
The other mirative particles become easier with the machinery of this paper.
(45) Bill is still in Paris.
weak(Lebp,e< t) : Pbt
Bill is weakly presupposed to have left Paris before the time of utterance and asserted to
be there nonetheless. His being in Paris at a moment of time before his supposed leaving
is a lexical presupposition of ”leave” and not indicated.
Bill is weakly presupposed to have left Paris before the time of utterance and
is asserted to be there nonetheless. His being in Paris at a moment of time before his
supposed leaving is a lexical presupposition of leave and not indicated. The fact that
this presupposition is not weak can be accounted for by making it a part of the lexical
specification of still, as proposed by Loebner (1989), Krifka (2000) a.o.
Another option is the hypothesis that lexical presuppositions of weak presuppo-
sitions are projected as normal presuppositions of the trigger of the weak presupposition.
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Within the system of developing presuppositions in auxiliary DRSs at the site of the trig-
ger that is adopted in van der Sandt (1992), the development of a lexical presupposition
of the weak presupposition generated by an occurrence of still takes place at the same
position as the development of the weak presupposition. Resolution or accommodation
of the lexical presupposition of leave would then have to take place before the treatment
of the weak trigger and be confined to the accessibility path of still. In (45) this places
the information that Bill is in Paris at the time of his weakly presupposed departure in
the main DRS.
Notice that in the second option, the ideal of analysing (42) as the conjunction
of mirativity and the semantics of the host can be maintained. This is a good reason for
adopting this second option. In (46), the first formula, would reduce to the second.
(46) weak(at(t ′e),Pbt ′ : Lebp,e< t) : Pbt
at(t ′e),Pbt ′,weak(Lebp,e< t) : Pbt
(47) Bill is already in Paris.
weak(e : Abp,e> t) : Pbt
Bill is weakly presupposed to arrive in Paris after the moment of speaking, but is there
nonetheless. His not being in Paris before the supposed arrival is a lexical presupposi-
tion of arrive and not indicated here. The same remark as above applies to this lexical
presupposition.
(48) Even Bill is in Paris.
weak(Px,¬Pb) : Pb
Bill is in Paris while being weakly presupposed to be not there unlike others. It remains
to be seen to what extent the usual analysis in terms of scales can indeed be avoided in
this way.
These three are simpler than only, since all that the particle does is add a weak
presupposition to the statement, a weak presupposition that conflicts with the statement
itself. They therefore conform to the ideal particle semantics where the particle makes
an independent addition to the semantics of the host. In the case of ”only” that does not
apply, because the statement itself is not a correction of the weak presupposition it con-
flicts with (the statement follows from the weak presupposition), though its exhaustive
interpretation is. The fact that ”only” disambiguates its host makes its semantics seem
to fall short of the ideal particle semantics where the particle just adds another conjunct.
The conclusions of this paper can be listed as follows.
1. Mirativity is best analysed as denying a weak presupposition. This makes the
mirative particles very similar to adversative particles, different only in the fact that
where adversative particles weakly presuppose the falsity of the host, the mirative
particles in addition presuppose a different value for some entity determined by
the host: a moment of time, an object or a quantity.
2. Only expresses low quantity mirativity and thereby imposes an exhaustive inter-
pretation on its host with respect to the definition of the relevant quantity.
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3. In the case of only if, the quantity question becomes under which circumstances
p?. This imposes an existential reading on the conditional and makes only a marker
of the existential reading of the conditional.
4. The status of the host (the prejacent) in only-sentences is that of a “given presuppo-
sition”. It is always weakly presupposed, but not necessarily part of the common
ground yet. If it is not, it will be accommodated at a position determined by the
weak presupposition. This status comes about by the mirative weak presupposi-
tion that makes the host weakly presupposed and makes it impossible to interpret
the host as giving new information. In this respect, it is like a confirmation. Given
presuppositions are not presuppositions, weak presuppositions, implicatures or as-
sertions and one of the two sources of confusion about only is that researchers have
tried to choose between assertion, presupposition and implicature.
5. The other source of confusion is the very close relationship between the denial of
part of the weak presupposition and exhaustivity. Exhaustivity entails the partial
denial of the weak presupposition, but it is stronger, even though, when the weak
presupposition is sufficiently vague (e.g. John and others) its denial can amount
to exhaustivity. It would seem that the possible implicature that the weak presup-
position is true in the case of negative only-sentences is important and cannot be
reduced to exhaustivity.
6. Presuppositions of weak presuppositions are normal presuppositions. This would
appear to be a consequence of the assumptions made in Gazdar (1978) and van der
Sandt (1992) and solves the technical problem of capturing the presupposition of
still p and already p (p was the case until its weakly presupposed end, p was false
until its weakly presupposed start) in a natural way. The lexical specification of
still and already becomes much simpler.
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